RRC-XX: RARI DAO Security Council Elections

Proposals Parent DAO Proposals
#29

Thanks everyone for the constructive discussion.

Since I was directly mentioned by @coffee-crusher and @bitblondy, I want to respond to those points first. I understand your concerns around decentralization, reporting, and sustainability, those are valid points and I agree they need to be part of any refined model. Once that’s said, I’d like to clarify that this isn’t about StableLab trying to secure a guaranteed seat. Our intention has always been to contribute to building solid governance structures that serve the DAO as a whole. I’m open to different structures and I don’t want any conflict of interest. What I do believe is that the Council should have at least one role tied to a legal entity, with a contract, KYC, and clear availability to step in when needed. That safeguard doesn’t have to be StableLab, any qualified entity could do it, but without it the DAO risks being exposed in ways that individual contributors can’t cover. I’ve also seen support for this idea. @Jaf highlighted the standards Jose set and encouraged me to continue them, @jarisjames emphasized the value of having a delegate under a legal entity, and @forexus underlined the importance of continuity with both a technical expert and a professional delegate. To me this shows there’s already a shared understanding that legal and operational capacity on the Council matters.

Looking at the discussion so far, there’s clear agreement on a few points:

  • The Security Council is essential and continuity matters.

  • A technical expert seat should remain to protect protocol knowledge.

  • At least one member should bring legal protection for the DAO and the person serving.

  • Reporting must improve, with simple updates and consequences if it’s not done.

  • On compensation, if the adjustment toward ~1,000/month is primarily for sustainability, I can understand that.

At this point, the real blockers are: should the Foundation appoint two or three seats, and should StableLab (or an equivalent entity) be included directly or run like any other candidate. If the consensus is the latter, we’re happy to also prepare a Candidate Template and put ourselves forward like the rest.

Since the elections are coming up soon, I’m glad to continue the conversation here and, if necessary, help put together a new proposal that reflects the consensus.

6 Likes
#30

Name/Handle: @PGov (Lead: Juanbug)

Wallet Address: 0x3FB19771947072629C8EEE7995a2eF23B72d4C8A

Candidate Status: We are a $RARI token holder & we have delegated voting power to our wallet.

Governance Participation & Contributions:

  • Active forum participant and community call attendee.
  • 100% Voting participation and forum communication since start (1+ years ago)

Statement of Intent: Thanks to everyone for their consideration. We have been active in the Rari ecosystem for over a year now and would love the opportunity to become involved through the Security council. During the term, we would bring a good amount of operational optimizations and security frameworks to the DAO.

We have extensive multisig experience and are clinically online at all hours so are often one of the first signers or transaction creators. Some past & current roles our team has had managing ecosystem multisigs:

  • Compound Security Council: Group tasked with the proposal guardian (last line of defense against malicious proposals) and pause guardian (continuous monitoring of Compound markets)
  • Metis Security Council: Core chain security council
  • Arbitrum Multisig Service: Multisig service used by most Arbitrum governance initiatives prior to Foundation absorption.
  • Optimism Grants & Operations Multisig: Manage the OP for all governance grantees as well Council budgets.
  • Uniswap Accountability Committee: Manage and deploy Uni incentives across all of Uniswap’s cross chain deployments over a dozen wallets and chains. Also manage payroll and stipends for various other Uniswap committees and initiatives.
  • Badger Treasury Council: Manage BadgerDAO’s treasury and treasury related operations across half a dozen multisigs
  • Lido Operations Multisig: Team that manages payroll and expenses for service providers
  • Other related multisigs (Uniswap LTIPP, Optimism Anti Capture Commission, Pear Protocol, MakerDAO Velodrome, Compound Gov WG, EH Oversight, etc.)

Requirements & Code of Conduct:

  • I understand and agree to adhere to the Code of Conduct as a Security Council member.
  • I certify that I have or will obtain a new (or newly reset) hardware wallet that can generate a fresh address for this role.
  • I confirm that as the individual or entity representative applying, I am the sole owner of the hardware wallet being used to apply, and I will not use a hot wallet under any circumstances.
  • I agree that this hardware wallet will be used exclusively for actions related to the Security Council and for no other applications.
2 Likes
#31

Thanks @KAF for checking in, agree with your bullet points.

I’m not a legal expert, so I’m not sure about that, but how should one security council member from a legal entity protect the others as well? Given the sensitive role of this council, I’d suggest the Foundation KYCs and drafts contracts for all members, in terms of responsibilities and legal liability.

StableLab has experience with the DAO and the expertise. My only concern is in how far you are able to act independent of the Foundation, do you have any strategy on this conflict of interest?
Another option would be raising the quorum to 4/5.

2 Likes
#32

The FDN can draft KYC and agreements for the SC members.

However, the members can also easily set up a Ricardian LLC agreement if they wish.

This will solve the protection issue, plus it’s free.

More info on Ricardian LLC can be found here .

2 Likes
#33

Appreciate the thoughtful points, @bitblondy. I see where your concern comes from. From our side, we’ve always approached this as a governance contributor, not as part of the Foundation, and I think the best way forward is for the DAO to define the standards it wants here, whether that’s KYC, contracts, or quorum. We’ll follow whatever framework the community agrees on.

2 Likes
#35

RC-XX: Revised RARI DAO Security Council Election Proposal

Author: coffee-crusher
Reviewer: @Anria , RARI Foundation

Summary

This is a revised forum proposal for the RARI DAO Security Council elections. The current Security Council’s term expires on September 30, 2025, and this proposal outlines the framework for a new council election that uses a progressive decentralized approach for a combination of council seats that are elected and appointed.

Based on valuable community feedback and co-creation, this proposal now shifts to a model of three appointed seats and two elected seats, ensuring a balance between decentralization and security.

Since our Tally v2 governance contract does not allow for multiple-choice voting, a forum poll will be conducted as a temperature check for the DAO to select the top two candidates. These two individuals will then proceed to a Tally v2 vote for election to the Security Council.

Motivation

The decentralization of the RARI DAO is a core value. This revised proposal, building upon the principles of RRC-33, integrates community feedback to create a framework that balances continuity, technical expertise, and accountability. This model empowers delegates and token holders to directly influence the protocol’s most critical decisions while ensuring proven experts are in place to safeguard its security.

The two elected Security Council seats will ensure the Council is accountable to the DAO, and allows for the removal of elected Security Council members who are not acting in the best interests of the DAO. Every elected Security Council member will be required to complete KYC/KYB verification.

This framework draws inspiration from successful DAO-led governance models, such as the Arbitrum Security Council election process, and builds upon the foundational RARI proposal, RRC-33.

Security Council Details

Mandate and Scope of Work

A vital body to mitigate risks associated with decentralization of the Rarible Protocol and RARI chain is the Security Council. A functioning Security Council is a mechanism to prevent governance attacks in which an attacker acquires voting power through legitimate means but uses that to manipulate votes to their own benefit—i.e., exploiting the DAO’s treasury or the Protocol via skewing governance or introducing Protocol vulnerabilities. The Security Council has the ability to perform emergency and non-emergency actions such as urgent upgrades, minor, routine maintenance to the Rarible Protocol, and stopping DAO hack attempts.

The Safe multisig wallet addresses the Security Council uses to perform its functions are:

  • Veto function: eth 0xd35ec9F67Aa082Ae666be1716C79291f1f6e4E0a (majority threshold: 3/5)
  • Upgrade function: eth 0xa5e4514145463385aEF763Fc8161CB42b92c74f2 (majority threshold: 4/5)

Overall Cost

The total annual cost for the five Security Council seats is 60,000 RARI. Funding will be from the DAO operational treasury with funds transferred from RARI v1 treasury to a RARI v2 treasury, if required for funding availability.

Composition, Term, and Legal Requirements

The Security Council will consist of five (5) members and will serve a one-year term, with terms expiring approximately on October 3rd, 2026.

Based on feedback and to ensure security, the 5-member Security Council will comprise of three (3) appointed seats and two (2) elected seats.

Each elected Security Council member will be required to complete a KYC/KYB with the Foundation and all five Security Council members will be required to sign a consent agreement with the Foundation.

To ensure that the Security Council has members who have proven security, accountability, and alignment with the DAO’s strategic direction, this proposal includes three appointed seats for the Security Council:

Specifications:

(A) Appointed Security Council members

  1. Campbell Law, current Director of the Foundation; wallet address: 0xd9C3EeD65968443F8587Bb068e6530A48dB5d177
  2. Andrei Taraschuck, RARI delegate, wallet address: 0x25Ad94C7768108666BfDB6742aB66b109CA82946
  3. Eugene Nacu, previous RARI technical lead with deep knowledge of the RARI Chain infrastructure, security architecture, and smart contract environment; wallet address: 0x978EBcd18c5A0d829C061566AA84227e9618C1A4

(B) Removal and Scope Changes

The members of the Security Council must act upon the direction of the Director of the RARI Foundation as well as the RARI token-holders pursuant to the RRC. Failure to act in accordance with directions from either the Director of the RARI Foundation or the RRC Process constitutes a reason for an ad hoc removal of Security Council members. Such removal shall follow the RRC Process, and one member of the Security Council must remain in place.

(i) After the 12-month term of these Security Council members, the total number of elected members of the Security Council may increase by one to replace one of the appointed Security Council seats if the community decides to establish on-chain elections with a stand-alone proposal.

(ii) The number of members on the Security Council may also be expanded or reduced pursuant to the RRC Process, provided that (a) there must be at least 1 member on the Security Council and (b) at least 1 member of the Security Council must be a director of the RARI Foundation.

The community, through an on-chain vote, has the ability to remove council members purely from an administrative perspective, but only to the extent that the criteria below have been met:

  • failure to adhere to the Code of Conduct
  • failure to undertake security council duties and responsibilities
  • a conflict of interest arises
  • a member is responsible for a security breach
  • the member no longer possesses the technical or strategic knowledge that is needed for future security challenges
  • there is a wider community loss of confidence in a council member

Compensation and Budget

Each Security Council member will receive 1,000 RARI per month, which keeps costs aligned with responsibility and ensures the sustainability of the DAO’s treasury while still fairly compensating contributors.

Specific Instructions:

  • 15,000 RARI tokens transferred at the execution of this proposal to the designated wallet address.
  • The remainder balance of 45,000 RARI will be moved from the mainnet treasury after 3 months.

Timeline

The proposed timeline for this election process is as follows:

  • 5-Day Forum Poll & Discussion (Non-Binding Signal): The forum poll for your two elected Security Council candidates will be open for 5 days, from September 22nd to September 26th, closing at 00:00 ET on September 27th.
  • 2-Day Tally Submission Delay: To allow the DAO to review the voters on the forum poll and submit disputes as outlined in the Dispute Process section, there will be a two-day delay.
  • Tally v2 Vote: The final vote for the 3 appointed council seats and the top two elected candidates from the forum poll will begin on September 29th. The vote will be conducted on Tally v2 and will remain open for 5 days. The execution delay will be 2 days.

The current Security Council members, even though their term is expiring on September 30, 2025, will remain active Security Council members until the execution of the Tally vote of this proposal.

Candidates

Six candidates have submitted their candidacy statements and are listed in order of application submission:

Forum Poll Instructions

As a delegate, please select your top two choices for the two elected Security Council seats. This forum poll is a non-binding signal vote . Your vote will serve as a temperature check to determine which two candidates will proceed to the final vote on Tally v2. You may only select two choices.

Dispute Process for Forum Poll

The Security Council forum poll will close at 00:00 ET on September 27th. At that time, all poll results and voter profiles will be visible. In the interest of a fair and transparent process, a simple dispute mechanism will be available to all token holders.

Any RARI token holder with voting power on Tally v2 may dispute an individual’s vote in this forum poll. This is intended to address any potential concerns regarding voter legitimacy. To ensure a thorough review, we have added a two-day Tally submission delay, which will allow the community to review all forum voters and submit disputes.

To file a dispute, please submit a new comment below this proposal with the following information:

  • Disputed Profile: Link to the forum profile that cast the vote you are disputing.
  • Reason for Dispute: A clear and concise explanation of why you believe the vote is invalid (e.g., “This profile has no on-chain voting power,” “This profile appears to be a duplicate account”).

Any other forum profile with voting power on Tally v2 may then endorse or support the dispute by replying to the comment.

All disputes will be reviewed by the Foundation, and any final decision regarding discrepancies will be made by them. It is important to note that the final decision on the candidates for the two elected seats will still be determined by a decentralized vote on Tally v2, which will take place after the forum poll and dispute period are finalized. This process is a non-binding signal to the community, designed to select the two candidates who will proceed to the final vote.

FORUM POLL

Security Council Elected Seat - Select your top two canditates
  • Jaris James
  • Johan van Caem (forexus)
  • GozmanGonzalez
  • coffee-crusher
  • DAOplomats (WinVerse)
  • PGov (Juanbug)

0 voters

7 Likes
#36

Thank you to everyone who nominated themselves! :raised_hands: You are all great contributors to RARI, and I’m confident that those who are elected will do a fantastic job in supporting the DAO and building the future of the ecosystem. My vote has been cast! :white_check_mark:

6 Likes
#39

Nicely done, @sohobiit :pray:

2 Likes
#40

I’m honestly torn, all are amazing candidates, Good luck!

4 Likes
#41

Lots of amazing candidates, thanks for voting :grinning:

2 Likes
#42

Congratulations to @forexus & @jarisjames on this well-deserved win! :tada: Both have been long-standing contributors to the Rari ecosystem, consistently bringing valuable ideas and initiatives that directly shaped our community and strengthened the Rari platforms.

Out of all the candidates, these two stood out by making the most tangible impact through their own projects and dedication. I’m genuinely happy with the results and excited to see what they achieve next. Best of luck moving forward!

6 Likes
#43

Thanks @coffee-crusher for adapting the proposal and finding a solution for nominating candidates. I also appreciate the new criteria introduced to prevent the council from missing reporting duties again.

  • I’d be curious why Andrei Taraschuck was nominated by the Foundation, that wasn’t mentioned before.

  • On the vote: are we connecting this to the amount of voting power delegates hold, and if so, on which chain? Also, shouldn’t applicants themselves abstain from voting?

  • Lastly, since both @jarisjames and @forexus were recently nominated to the Creator Fund Working Group, isn’t that a conflict of interest?
    They would do payouts from the RARI chain treasury while also safeguarding the treasury on this council. The treasury may be small, so it might not matter practically, but conceptually, Security Council members should not take on other DAO roles. That’s DAO 101.

1 Like
#44

Hi @bitblondy, hope your weekend’s starting off well :sun_with_face:

I’d like to share the facts pertaining to the Creator Fund Program and its Working Group proposal with you. I know proposals can be long reads, but here’s the tl;dr below:

When RRC-48: Rarible Creator Fund Program was executed on Aug 19, 2025, 110,010 RARI was transferred from the DAO’s mainnet treasury directly into a Foundation-administered multisig. That fully funded the Creator Fund upfront, including the 10K buffer.

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Then RRC-51: Establishment of the Rarible Creator Fund Working Group (Sep 23, 2025) simply created the group to curate applications and provide reporting. We don’t disburse from the RARI Chain treasury, that treasury isn’t part of the Creator Fund mechanics at all.

Actually, reading proposals before commenting is DAO 101.

5 Likes
#45

Thanks @dzonson.eth, really appreciate your support. It means a lot, especially given your knowledge of NFT culture and the crypto industry in general.

Excited to continue working alongside great builders like @forexus! :beers:

5 Likes
#46

Thanks a lot for the great words @dzonson.eth , can’t believe we made it. Got lots of more amazing plans to work on for the DAO and Rarible, the upcoming years are going to become great!

4 Likes
#47

Thank you so much @dzonson.eth for your amazing support of the process and especially your comments for these two chosen candidates. I 100% agree with all your comments; both @jarisjames and @forexus were the best candidates and I feel that the DAO has chosen wisely.

Our next step, is for this proposal to go forth to Tally v2 on Monday, Sept 29th to validate the poll selection and this proposal. I’ll update this forum post with an announcement once the Tally vote goes live.

Thank you also to @bitblondy for your questions, I really appreciate your support of the new criteria for Security Council members, and for the solution for nominating and selecting candidates.

To address your specific questions:

  • Andrei Taraschuck was suggested to me as an appointed candidate by the Foundation, not selected. I had a conversation with @Anria to address the Foundation’s concern’s about ensuring that the safety of the protocol and with the importance of this role, that there should be three appointed candidates for the Security Council election. As I mentioned, the Foundation suggested Andrei as a trusted member of the current Security Council and a trusted member of the Foundation, as he works closely with Alex. I therefore agreed with the Foundation’s recommendation of both 3 appointed seats and @Anria 's suggestion of including Andrei, and as the proposal author, I added Andrei to the revised proposal edit. Also, you will note, the Foundation suggested that this 3 appointed & 2 elected seats could be adjusted in the next term elections, which I added this to the proposal.

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  • Regarding the vote and on what chain, this was included in my revised (and original proposal version) that on-chain voting would be on Tally v2.

  • Per our Code of Conduct (RRC-35) , the CoC does allow for voting for oneself if these conditions are both met: 1) if there is multiple-choice voting AND 2) the candidate also votes for at least one other candidate.
    I set up the Forum poll perimeter’s to the following: 1) Minimum number of votes: 2, and 2) Total number of votes: 2. Everyone who participated in the Forum poll could select only two candidates. Based upon the perimeter’s of the forum poll, any candidate who also voted in the poll would be unable to only vote for themselves, and therefore did not violate the CoC. This also holds true for any candidates who vote for the final proposal on Tally v2.

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  • @jarisjames did an excellent job of highlighting that the RRC-48 for the Creator fund, the funds are held in a multi-sig that is controlled by the Foundation. Therefore, the three Creator fund leads - @jarisjames , @forexus and @sohobiit do not have access to any funds, and therefore, there are no CoI violations either past or possibly in the future, for any of these Creator Fund program leads to benefit financially or in a personal interest that may compromise their Security Council decisions. This is true for either the Creator Fund or being selected overwhelming by the delegates, for these two candidates to be voted on Tally v2 for the Security Council, or any other DAO role. Regarding your comments about delegates taking upon other DAO roles, an exclusion is not standard in any DAO. Candidates who are voted by the delegates and token holders for any roles or as execution leads on proposals indicates these are delegates who are highly-valued and performance delegates by the community. In other words, they are aligned with the DAOs best interests, do the work and have the PoW to validate it.

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5 Likes
#48

Thank you to all the candidates, delegates, and token holders who provided feedback and voted in the Forum poll, which resulted in @jarisjames and @forexus being selected as the top two candidates for the two elected seats based on the community’s non-binding signal.

Here is the final version of the proposal that will be published on Tally v2 for a 5 day voting period. The proposal will be published on Tally v2 by @jarisjames per my request, who holds >5K RARI which meets the proposal threshold requirement.

RRC-52: RARI DAO Security Council Election Proposal

Author: coffee-crusher

Reviewer: @Anria , RARI Foundation

Summary

This is a revised forum proposal for the RARI DAO Security Council elections. The current Security Council’s term expires on September 30, 2025, and this proposal outlines the framework for a new council election that uses a progressive decentralized approach for a combination of council seats that are elected and appointed.

Based on valuable community feedback and co-creation, this proposal now shifts to a model of three appointed seats and two elected seats, ensuring a balance between decentralization and security.

Since our Tally v2 governance contract does not allow for multiple-choice voting, a forum poll was conducted as a non-binding signal for the DAO to select the top two candidates. The two elected candidates who received the highest non-binding signal from the Forum poll, Jaris James and Johan van Caem (forexus), are now included in this final proposal, alongside the three appointed members. This proposal votes in all five candidates.

Motivation

The decentralization of the RARI DAO is a core value. This revised proposal, building upon the principles of RRC-33, integrates community feedback to create a framework that balances continuity, technical expertise, and accountability. This model empowers delegates and token holders to directly influence the protocol’s most critical decisions while ensuring proven experts are in place to safeguard its security.

The two elected Security Council seats will ensure the Council is accountable to the DAO, and allows for the removal of elected Security Council members who are not acting in the best interests of the DAO. Every elected Security Council member will be required to complete KYC/KYB verification.

This framework draws inspiration from successful DAO-led governance models, such as the Arbitrum Security Council election process, and builds upon the foundational RARI proposal, RRC-33.

Security Council Details

Mandate and Scope of Work

A vital body to mitigate risks associated with decentralization of the Rarible Protocol and RARI chain is the Security Council. A functioning Security Council is a mechanism to prevent governance attacks in which an attacker acquires voting power through legitimate means but uses that to manipulate votes to their own benefit—i.e., exploiting the DAO’s treasury or the Protocol via skewing governance or introducing Protocol vulnerabilities. The Security Council has the ability to perform emergency and non-emergency actions such as urgent upgrades, minor, routine maintenance to the Rarible Protocol, and stopping DAO hack attempts.

The Safe multisig wallet addresses the Security Council uses to perform its functions are:

  • Veto function: eth 0xd35ec9F67Aa082Ae666be1716C79291f1f6e4E0a (majority threshold: 3/5)
  • Upgrade function: eth 0xa5e4514145463385aEF763Fc8161CB42b92c74f2 (majority threshold: 4/5)

Overall Cost

The total annual cost for the five Security Council seats is 60,000 RARI. The 60,000 RARI for this proposal will come from the Operational Budget, which will be additionally funded by the mainnet treasury.

Composition, Term, and Legal Requirements

The Security Council will consist of five (5) members and will serve a one-year term, with terms expiring on October 5th, 2026.

Based on feedback and to ensure security, the 5-member Security Council will comprise three (3) appointed seats and two (2) elected seats.

Each elected Security Council member will be required to complete a KYC/KYB with the Foundation and all five Security Council members will be required to sign a consent agreement with the Foundation.

Specifications

To ensure that the Security Council has members who have proven security, accountability, and alignment with the DAO’s strategic direction, this proposal includes five total candidates for the Security Council:

(A) Appointed Security Council members

  • Campbell Law, current Director of the Foundation; wallet address: 0xd9C3EeD65968443F8587Bb068e6530A48dB5d177
  • Andrei Taraschuck, RARI delegate, wallet address: 0x25Ad94C7768108666BfDB6742aB66b109CA82946
  • Eugene Nacu, previous RARI technical lead with deep knowledge of the RARI Chain infrastructure, security architecture, and smart contract environment; wallet address: 0x978EBcd18c5A0d829C061566AA84227e9618C1A4

(B) Elected Security Council members

The following two candidates were selected by the community through the non-binding signal forum poll and are included in this Tally v2 proposal for the elected seats:

  • Jaris James, RARI delegate, wallet address: 0xB04E6891e584F2884Ad2ee90b6545ba44F843c4A
  • Johan van Caem (forexus), RARI delegate, wallet address: 0x169ad963598fb0d360C3Ef55DD70BcAB678348BB

(C) Removal and Scope Changes

The members of the Security Council must act upon the direction of the Director of the RARI Foundation as well as the RARI token-holders pursuant to the RRC. Failure to act in accordance with directions from either the Director of the RARI Foundation or the RRC Process constitutes a reason for an ad hoc removal of Security Council members. Such removal shall follow the RRC Process, and one member of the Security Council must remain in place.

  • (i) After the 12-month term of these Security Council members, the total number of elected members of the Security Council may increase by one to replace one of the appointed Security Council seats if the community decides to establish on-chain elections with a stand-alone proposal.
  • (ii) The number of members on the Security Council may also be expanded or reduced pursuant to the RRC Process, provided that (a) there must be at least 1 member on the Security Council and (b) at least 1 member of the Security Council must be a director of the RARI Foundation.

The community, through an on-chain vote, has the ability to remove council members purely from an administrative perspective, but only to the extent that the criteria below have been met:

  • failure to adhere to the Code of Conduct
  • failure to undertake security council duties and responsibilities
  • a conflict of interest arises
  • a member is responsible for a security breach
  • the member no longer possesses the technical or strategic knowledge that is needed for future security challenges
  • there is a wider community loss of confidence in a council member

Compensation and Budget

Each Security Council member will receive 1,000 RARI per month, which keeps costs aligned with responsibility and ensures the sustainability of the DAO’s treasury while still fairly compensating contributors.

Specific Instructions:

  • The 60,000 RARI to fund this proposal will be funded from the Operational budget that will come from the mainnet treasury.

Timeline

The proposed timeline for this election process is as follows:

  • 5-Day Forum Poll & Discussion (Non-Binding Signal): The forum poll for your two elected Security Council candidates will be open for 5 days, from September 22nd to September 26th, closing at 00:00 PT on September 27th.
  • 2-Day Tally Submission Delay: To allow for community review of the forum poll voters before the final on-chain vote, there will be a two-day delay, concluding on September 28th.
  • Tally v2 Vote: The final vote for the 3 appointed council seats and the top two elected candidates from the forum poll will begin on September 29th. The vote will be conducted on Tally v2 and will remain open for 5 days. The execution delay will be 2 days.

The current Security Council members, even though their term is expiring on September 30, 2025, will remain active Security Council members until the execution of the Tally vote of this proposal.

4 Likes
Q3 2025 Delegate Incentive Program Report
Coffee-crusher Delegate Thread
#49

Looks great, can’t wait for the proposal to go live!

3 Likes
#50

I can’t wait to vote! Congratulations to everyone who participated!

2 Likes
#51

This proposal for the Security Council elections is now live for voting on Tally v2.

6 Likes