RRC-XX: RARI DAO Security Council Elections

Proposals Parent DAO Proposals
#22

For context, the appointed professional delegate role has historically been given to StableLab because they operate through an LLC, which provides the legal shield necessary to uphold a professional delegate arrangement. If another delegate has an LLC shell, they too can step into that role with the same level of professionalism and protection.

What you are proposing, @coffee-crusher, is entirely different. Instead of one appointed professional delegate bound by contract, you suggest forcing every elected member to sign a personal legal contract, meaning if something goes wrong on the Security Council, like a protocol exploit, a smart contract failure, or an emergency response gone bad, they could be personally sued. Instead of having the protection of an LLC like StableLab, grassroots contributors would be putting their own assets, their savings, even their homes at risk. In practice, that means grassroots members who would’ve had to complete KYC anyway in order to legally be paid by the Foundation would now also be forced to carry legal exposure.

Optimism and Arbitrum do not operate this way. Their councils require compliance checks and service agreements administered by the Foundation. Optimism uses an eligibility screening that includes KYC and a standard contract at the Foundation’s discretion. Arbitrum runs a compliance process where candidates or entities are vetted, and entities are encouraged to participate through their legal structure. Both models focus on basic KYC screening and entity-level protection, not blanket fiduciary contracts for every individual.

@Anria’s proposal for RARI builds on those precedents by introducing a single professional delegate under contract to ensure at least one seat carries clear legal accountability. This safeguard strengthens the Council without placing unnecessary liability on every member, striking the right balance between professionalism, contributor protection, and DAO security.

2 Likes
#23

Hi everyone! Kaf here. From now on I’ll be representing StableLab in RARI DAO. @Jose_StableLab has been covering this role until now and has been sharing his guidance with me as I get up to speed. As @Jaf already noted, he’s done an excellent job, and I’ll do my best to carry this forward with the same diligence and professionalism.

On this proposal, I’d first like to thank @coffee-crusher for sparking valuable discussion. I’d now like to share our perspective and respond to some of the comments raised:

  • Continuity and stability:The Council has been effective in its first term, and we believe continuity is critical. Moving immediately to four elected seats would effectively replace the entire body at once, which could undermine security.

  • Gradual decentralization: We agree with the principle of elections, but recommend a phased approach. A hybrid model, three appointed members (Foundation Director, the technical lead, and one professional delegate under contract) plus one or two elected members, would balance stability, technical knowledge, and community voice. This reflects the points made by @Anria and others in favor of a compromise solution.

  • Technical expertise: Under the hybrid model, the technical lead ( Enacu ) remains, and additional candidates with proven expertise can compete for elected seats. This ensures the Council retains the skills it needs while opening the door to new contributors.

  • Accountability and professionalism: Some comments highlighted the importance of transparency and avoiding conflicts of interest. Having at least one professional delegate bound by a legal contract ensures a higher level of accountability, which complements elected members and helps mitigate those risks.

  • Compensation and reporting: Concerns were raised about cost and visibility of Council work. A constructive path forward could be to review compensation (including alternative structures) alongside clearer reporting. Regular updates on Council activity would give the community a better basis to understand both the workload and the value delivered.

In closing: StableLab supports decentralization as a long-term goal, but believes the transition should be incremental. We recommend maintaining the current structure, or at most reducing CoffeeCrusher’s proposal of four elected seats to one or two. This approach ensures stability and continuity while still opening the door to greater community participation.

5 Likes
#24

Thank you, @Kaf_StableLab, for joining the discussion and for sharing your perspective. I have also considered the critical points raised by other delegates, which have helped to refine this proposal.

You’ve highlighted the importance of continuity and stability, which are crucial for this role. However, your argument for a hybrid model with only one or two elected members seems to contradict our shared goal of decentralization.

The consensus among delegates who have already commented is for three elected seats. Proposing to limit the DAO to one or two elected positions would shift the balance of power toward a more centralized governance structure, effectively taking away the voice and power of the DAO to choose its own Council members who serve and protect the DAO.

This also relates to the legal protection for council members. My refined proposal is as follows:

  • I continue to support the Foundation’s proposal to appoint Campbell Law and Enacu. Their proven expertise is invaluable.

  • The three remaining seats should be filled by community elections. To ensure all members are legally accountable while protecting them from personal risk, I propose a system as suggested by @jarisjames . This model aligns with industry best practices from leading DAOs:

    • For professional entities, a candidate running for an elected seat must do so through a legally-protected entity, such as an LLC.

    • For individual delegates, the requirement will be to complete KYC and compliance checks and service agreements administered by the Foundation.

This model is the strongest path forward. It directly addresses the Foundation’s need for legally and fiducially accountable members while protecting our grassroots contributors. Most importantly, it ensures the majority of the Council is accountable to the DAO community, with the added power for the DAO to remove any elected member who does not perform their duties.

Accountability and Transparency

I agree that a professional delegate under contract is a valuable asset. However, this is not a unique quality that justifies an appointment. The election process is the correct path for any delegate, including professionals, to earn the community’s trust for this role.

You mentioned that a constructive path forward could include clearer reporting. This is a point I strongly agree with, and it’s a central component of my proposal. It also leads me to a key question: as a serving member of the Security Council, can you clarify why regular, transparent reporting was not already a priority during your two-year tenure?

Compensation

Finally, on the matter of compensation, my revised proposal fully supports the Foundation’s suggestion to reduce the monthly amount to 1,000 USD per member. This aligns with the community’s consensus and ensures the DAO’s treasury remains sustainable. Your comment about a “constructive path forward” was not clear on whether you support this reduction. Please clarify your position on this.

3 Likes
#25

Thank you, @jarisjames for your thoughtful and insightful feedback, I truly appreciate your thoughts on this proposal. And your comments have raised a critical point that has significantly strengthened this proposal.

You are absolutely right about the potential legal exposure for grassroots contributors, and I agree completely that we must protect them from personal liability. I have incorporated your recommendations into the updated proposal that I’ve included in my response to Stablelab, which now distinguishes between professional entities and individual delegates.

Your input in aligning this proposal with the best practices of other leading DAOs, such as Optimism and Arbitrum is the right way to go. This distinction ensures the Security Council remains accountable while providing the necessary legal protections for all who serve. Thank you for this clarification and addition to the proposal.

3 Likes
#26

Very solid individuals running for the council. Fully support @jarisjames, @forexus, @coffee-crusher running as I have seen their impacts across the DAO over the past couple months and years. They are strong candidates indeed.

3 Likes
#27

Name/Handle: @DAOplomats, represented by @WinVerse.

Wallet Address: 0x58F724697cf24D3D3cFdA44F22E45EFEd4D69A1D

Candidate Status:

  • We are $RARI token holder.
  • We have delegated voting power to my wallet.

Governance Participation & Contributions:

DAOplomats have led several initiatives in the RARI DAO. Here is a list of a few of them:

We also started DAO overflow calls and have hosted several of them over the years.

Statement of Intent:

From our past contributions, it is clear that we have RARI DAO’s best interest at heart. All of our contributions over the years have been aimed at making the DAO more robust in governance, ensuring alignment with one of the core principles of DAOs, decentralization.

Personally, I have been a contributor at RARI DAO since the inception of the delegates launchpad program, a Cohort 1 member. I was also a member of the Grants Committee before its dissolution. I have been actively involved in the DAO and its activities, as I sincerely cherish what we are building here.

The Security Council is a very important body of every DAO so it is of utmost importance that the right individuals and entities are brought in as they play a critical role in securing the DAO’s funds and preventing bad actors from gaming the system. This is the major reason we are applying. We care so deeply about RARI DAO and ensuring its security is a high priority for us.

I think I would be a good Security Council member because I’m good with emergency response and I have wide availability for a responsibility of this magnitude. I also think that my geographic location favors a diverse set of participants across different time zones.

Requirements & Code of Conduct:

  • I understand and agree to adhere to the Code of Conduct as a Security Council member.

  • I certify that I have or will obtain a new (or newly reset) hardware wallet that can generate a fresh address for this role.

  • I confirm that as the entity representative applying, I am the sole owner of the hardware wallet being used to apply, and I will not use a hot wallet under any circumstances.

  • I agree that this hardware wallet will be used exclusively for actions related to the Security Council and for no other applications.

4 Likes
#28

Thanks @coffee-crusher for your comprehensive feedback and answers. Including regular reporting in the proposal sounds great. That the previous council did not fulfil this requirement as specified in the proposal is really concerning!

Maybe it’s necessary we introduce consequences, in case the reporting duties are not fulfilled this time, i.e. withholding compensation and even legal action. I also expect from Foundation @Anria that these requirements are checked on a regular basis.

About the seats:

As far as I understand, Campbell Law is set through the constitution? It would also make sense continuing with Enacu on the technical seat, given we need someone with deep experience on the product. I’d suggest Enacu goes through the application process, though, since he is no longer with the Foundation as far as I understand?

The compensation for StableLab has been “confidential” for the past two years, but that’s another story. Given this conflict of interest and the 3/5 quorum, I’d suggest not continuing their participation in the council. This should be an independent organ.

About legal contracts:

Agree with your suggestion @jarisjames. Foundation is registered as an LLC, so they should KYC and provide legal contracts for council members. It’s a bit questionable that this has not happened in the past.

3 Likes
#29

Thanks everyone for the constructive discussion.

Since I was directly mentioned by @coffee-crusher and @bitblondy, I want to respond to those points first. I understand your concerns around decentralization, reporting, and sustainability, those are valid points and I agree they need to be part of any refined model. Once that’s said, I’d like to clarify that this isn’t about StableLab trying to secure a guaranteed seat. Our intention has always been to contribute to building solid governance structures that serve the DAO as a whole. I’m open to different structures and I don’t want any conflict of interest. What I do believe is that the Council should have at least one role tied to a legal entity, with a contract, KYC, and clear availability to step in when needed. That safeguard doesn’t have to be StableLab, any qualified entity could do it, but without it the DAO risks being exposed in ways that individual contributors can’t cover. I’ve also seen support for this idea. @Jaf highlighted the standards Jose set and encouraged me to continue them, @jarisjames emphasized the value of having a delegate under a legal entity, and @forexus underlined the importance of continuity with both a technical expert and a professional delegate. To me this shows there’s already a shared understanding that legal and operational capacity on the Council matters.

Looking at the discussion so far, there’s clear agreement on a few points:

  • The Security Council is essential and continuity matters.

  • A technical expert seat should remain to protect protocol knowledge.

  • At least one member should bring legal protection for the DAO and the person serving.

  • Reporting must improve, with simple updates and consequences if it’s not done.

  • On compensation, if the adjustment toward ~1,000/month is primarily for sustainability, I can understand that.

At this point, the real blockers are: should the Foundation appoint two or three seats, and should StableLab (or an equivalent entity) be included directly or run like any other candidate. If the consensus is the latter, we’re happy to also prepare a Candidate Template and put ourselves forward like the rest.

Since the elections are coming up soon, I’m glad to continue the conversation here and, if necessary, help put together a new proposal that reflects the consensus.

6 Likes
#30

Name/Handle: @PGov (Lead: Juanbug)

Wallet Address: 0x3FB19771947072629C8EEE7995a2eF23B72d4C8A

Candidate Status: We are a $RARI token holder & we have delegated voting power to our wallet.

Governance Participation & Contributions:

  • Active forum participant and community call attendee.
  • 100% Voting participation and forum communication since start (1+ years ago)

Statement of Intent: Thanks to everyone for their consideration. We have been active in the Rari ecosystem for over a year now and would love the opportunity to become involved through the Security council. During the term, we would bring a good amount of operational optimizations and security frameworks to the DAO.

We have extensive multisig experience and are clinically online at all hours so are often one of the first signers or transaction creators. Some past & current roles our team has had managing ecosystem multisigs:

  • Compound Security Council: Group tasked with the proposal guardian (last line of defense against malicious proposals) and pause guardian (continuous monitoring of Compound markets)
  • Metis Security Council: Core chain security council
  • Arbitrum Multisig Service: Multisig service used by most Arbitrum governance initiatives prior to Foundation absorption.
  • Optimism Grants & Operations Multisig: Manage the OP for all governance grantees as well Council budgets.
  • Uniswap Accountability Committee: Manage and deploy Uni incentives across all of Uniswap’s cross chain deployments over a dozen wallets and chains. Also manage payroll and stipends for various other Uniswap committees and initiatives.
  • Badger Treasury Council: Manage BadgerDAO’s treasury and treasury related operations across half a dozen multisigs
  • Lido Operations Multisig: Team that manages payroll and expenses for service providers
  • Other related multisigs (Uniswap LTIPP, Optimism Anti Capture Commission, Pear Protocol, MakerDAO Velodrome, Compound Gov WG, EH Oversight, etc.)

Requirements & Code of Conduct:

  • I understand and agree to adhere to the Code of Conduct as a Security Council member.
  • I certify that I have or will obtain a new (or newly reset) hardware wallet that can generate a fresh address for this role.
  • I confirm that as the individual or entity representative applying, I am the sole owner of the hardware wallet being used to apply, and I will not use a hot wallet under any circumstances.
  • I agree that this hardware wallet will be used exclusively for actions related to the Security Council and for no other applications.
2 Likes
#31

Thanks @KAF for checking in, agree with your bullet points.

I’m not a legal expert, so I’m not sure about that, but how should one security council member from a legal entity protect the others as well? Given the sensitive role of this council, I’d suggest the Foundation KYCs and drafts contracts for all members, in terms of responsibilities and legal liability.

StableLab has experience with the DAO and the expertise. My only concern is in how far you are able to act independent of the Foundation, do you have any strategy on this conflict of interest?
Another option would be raising the quorum to 4/5.

2 Likes
#32

The FDN can draft KYC and agreements for the SC members.

However, the members can also easily set up a Ricardian LLC agreement if they wish.

This will solve the protection issue, plus it’s free.

More info on Ricardian LLC can be found here .

2 Likes
#33

Appreciate the thoughtful points, @bitblondy. I see where your concern comes from. From our side, we’ve always approached this as a governance contributor, not as part of the Foundation, and I think the best way forward is for the DAO to define the standards it wants here, whether that’s KYC, contracts, or quorum. We’ll follow whatever framework the community agrees on.

2 Likes
#35

RC-XX: Revised RARI DAO Security Council Election Proposal

Author: coffee-crusher
Reviewer: @Anria , RARI Foundation

Summary

This is a revised forum proposal for the RARI DAO Security Council elections. The current Security Council’s term expires on September 30, 2025, and this proposal outlines the framework for a new council election that uses a progressive decentralized approach for a combination of council seats that are elected and appointed.

Based on valuable community feedback and co-creation, this proposal now shifts to a model of three appointed seats and two elected seats, ensuring a balance between decentralization and security.

Since our Tally v2 governance contract does not allow for multiple-choice voting, a forum poll will be conducted as a temperature check for the DAO to select the top two candidates. These two individuals will then proceed to a Tally v2 vote for election to the Security Council.

Motivation

The decentralization of the RARI DAO is a core value. This revised proposal, building upon the principles of RRC-33, integrates community feedback to create a framework that balances continuity, technical expertise, and accountability. This model empowers delegates and token holders to directly influence the protocol’s most critical decisions while ensuring proven experts are in place to safeguard its security.

The two elected Security Council seats will ensure the Council is accountable to the DAO, and allows for the removal of elected Security Council members who are not acting in the best interests of the DAO. Every elected Security Council member will be required to complete KYC/KYB verification.

This framework draws inspiration from successful DAO-led governance models, such as the Arbitrum Security Council election process, and builds upon the foundational RARI proposal, RRC-33.

Security Council Details

Mandate and Scope of Work

A vital body to mitigate risks associated with decentralization of the Rarible Protocol and RARI chain is the Security Council. A functioning Security Council is a mechanism to prevent governance attacks in which an attacker acquires voting power through legitimate means but uses that to manipulate votes to their own benefit—i.e., exploiting the DAO’s treasury or the Protocol via skewing governance or introducing Protocol vulnerabilities. The Security Council has the ability to perform emergency and non-emergency actions such as urgent upgrades, minor, routine maintenance to the Rarible Protocol, and stopping DAO hack attempts.

The Safe multisig wallet addresses the Security Council uses to perform its functions are:

  • Veto function: eth 0xd35ec9F67Aa082Ae666be1716C79291f1f6e4E0a (majority threshold: 3/5)
  • Upgrade function: eth 0xa5e4514145463385aEF763Fc8161CB42b92c74f2 (majority threshold: 4/5)

Overall Cost

The total annual cost for the five Security Council seats is 60,000 RARI. Funding will be from the DAO operational treasury with funds transferred from RARI v1 treasury to a RARI v2 treasury, if required for funding availability.

Composition, Term, and Legal Requirements

The Security Council will consist of five (5) members and will serve a one-year term, with terms expiring approximately on October 3rd, 2026.

Based on feedback and to ensure security, the 5-member Security Council will comprise of three (3) appointed seats and two (2) elected seats.

Each elected Security Council member will be required to complete a KYC/KYB with the Foundation and all five Security Council members will be required to sign a consent agreement with the Foundation.

To ensure that the Security Council has members who have proven security, accountability, and alignment with the DAO’s strategic direction, this proposal includes three appointed seats for the Security Council:

Specifications:

(A) Appointed Security Council members

  1. Campbell Law, current Director of the Foundation; wallet address: 0xd9C3EeD65968443F8587Bb068e6530A48dB5d177
  2. Andrei Taraschuck, RARI delegate, wallet address: 0x25Ad94C7768108666BfDB6742aB66b109CA82946
  3. Eugene Nacu, previous RARI technical lead with deep knowledge of the RARI Chain infrastructure, security architecture, and smart contract environment; wallet address: 0x978EBcd18c5A0d829C061566AA84227e9618C1A4

(B) Removal and Scope Changes

The members of the Security Council must act upon the direction of the Director of the RARI Foundation as well as the RARI token-holders pursuant to the RRC. Failure to act in accordance with directions from either the Director of the RARI Foundation or the RRC Process constitutes a reason for an ad hoc removal of Security Council members. Such removal shall follow the RRC Process, and one member of the Security Council must remain in place.

(i) After the 12-month term of these Security Council members, the total number of elected members of the Security Council may increase by one to replace one of the appointed Security Council seats if the community decides to establish on-chain elections with a stand-alone proposal.

(ii) The number of members on the Security Council may also be expanded or reduced pursuant to the RRC Process, provided that (a) there must be at least 1 member on the Security Council and (b) at least 1 member of the Security Council must be a director of the RARI Foundation.

The community, through an on-chain vote, has the ability to remove council members purely from an administrative perspective, but only to the extent that the criteria below have been met:

  • failure to adhere to the Code of Conduct
  • failure to undertake security council duties and responsibilities
  • a conflict of interest arises
  • a member is responsible for a security breach
  • the member no longer possesses the technical or strategic knowledge that is needed for future security challenges
  • there is a wider community loss of confidence in a council member

Compensation and Budget

Each Security Council member will receive 1,000 RARI per month, which keeps costs aligned with responsibility and ensures the sustainability of the DAO’s treasury while still fairly compensating contributors.

Specific Instructions:

  • 15,000 RARI tokens transferred at the execution of this proposal to the designated wallet address.
  • The remainder balance of 45,000 RARI will be moved from the mainnet treasury after 3 months.

Timeline

The proposed timeline for this election process is as follows:

  • 5-Day Forum Poll & Discussion (Non-Binding Signal): The forum poll for your two elected Security Council candidates will be open for 5 days, from September 22nd to September 26th, closing at 00:00 ET on September 27th.
  • 2-Day Tally Submission Delay: To allow the DAO to review the voters on the forum poll and submit disputes as outlined in the Dispute Process section, there will be a two-day delay.
  • Tally v2 Vote: The final vote for the 3 appointed council seats and the top two elected candidates from the forum poll will begin on September 29th. The vote will be conducted on Tally v2 and will remain open for 5 days. The execution delay will be 2 days.

The current Security Council members, even though their term is expiring on September 30, 2025, will remain active Security Council members until the execution of the Tally vote of this proposal.

Candidates

Six candidates have submitted their candidacy statements and are listed in order of application submission:

Forum Poll Instructions

As a delegate, please select your top two choices for the two elected Security Council seats. This forum poll is a non-binding signal vote . Your vote will serve as a temperature check to determine which two candidates will proceed to the final vote on Tally v2. You may only select two choices.

Dispute Process for Forum Poll

The Security Council forum poll will close at 00:00 ET on September 27th. At that time, all poll results and voter profiles will be visible. In the interest of a fair and transparent process, a simple dispute mechanism will be available to all token holders.

Any RARI token holder with voting power on Tally v2 may dispute an individual’s vote in this forum poll. This is intended to address any potential concerns regarding voter legitimacy. To ensure a thorough review, we have added a two-day Tally submission delay, which will allow the community to review all forum voters and submit disputes.

To file a dispute, please submit a new comment below this proposal with the following information:

  • Disputed Profile: Link to the forum profile that cast the vote you are disputing.
  • Reason for Dispute: A clear and concise explanation of why you believe the vote is invalid (e.g., “This profile has no on-chain voting power,” “This profile appears to be a duplicate account”).

Any other forum profile with voting power on Tally v2 may then endorse or support the dispute by replying to the comment.

All disputes will be reviewed by the Foundation, and any final decision regarding discrepancies will be made by them. It is important to note that the final decision on the candidates for the two elected seats will still be determined by a decentralized vote on Tally v2, which will take place after the forum poll and dispute period are finalized. This process is a non-binding signal to the community, designed to select the two candidates who will proceed to the final vote.

FORUM POLL

Security Council Elected Seat - Select your top two canditates
  • Jaris James
  • Johan van Caem (forexus)
  • GozmanGonzalez
  • coffee-crusher
  • DAOplomats (WinVerse)
  • PGov (Juanbug)

0 voters

7 Likes
#36

Thank you to everyone who nominated themselves! :raised_hands: You are all great contributors to RARI, and I’m confident that those who are elected will do a fantastic job in supporting the DAO and building the future of the ecosystem. My vote has been cast! :white_check_mark:

6 Likes
#39

Nicely done, @sohobiit :pray:

2 Likes
#40

I’m honestly torn, all are amazing candidates, Good luck!

4 Likes
#41

Lots of amazing candidates, thanks for voting :grinning:

2 Likes
#42

Congratulations to @forexus & @jarisjames on this well-deserved win! :tada: Both have been long-standing contributors to the Rari ecosystem, consistently bringing valuable ideas and initiatives that directly shaped our community and strengthened the Rari platforms.

Out of all the candidates, these two stood out by making the most tangible impact through their own projects and dedication. I’m genuinely happy with the results and excited to see what they achieve next. Best of luck moving forward!

6 Likes
#43

Thanks @coffee-crusher for adapting the proposal and finding a solution for nominating candidates. I also appreciate the new criteria introduced to prevent the council from missing reporting duties again.

  • I’d be curious why Andrei Taraschuck was nominated by the Foundation, that wasn’t mentioned before.

  • On the vote: are we connecting this to the amount of voting power delegates hold, and if so, on which chain? Also, shouldn’t applicants themselves abstain from voting?

  • Lastly, since both @jarisjames and @forexus were recently nominated to the Creator Fund Working Group, isn’t that a conflict of interest?
    They would do payouts from the RARI chain treasury while also safeguarding the treasury on this council. The treasury may be small, so it might not matter practically, but conceptually, Security Council members should not take on other DAO roles. That’s DAO 101.

1 Like
#44

Hi @bitblondy, hope your weekend’s starting off well :sun_with_face:

I’d like to share the facts pertaining to the Creator Fund Program and its Working Group proposal with you. I know proposals can be long reads, but here’s the tl;dr below:

When RRC-48: Rarible Creator Fund Program was executed on Aug 19, 2025, 110,010 RARI was transferred from the DAO’s mainnet treasury directly into a Foundation-administered multisig. That fully funded the Creator Fund upfront, including the 10K buffer.

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Then RRC-51: Establishment of the Rarible Creator Fund Working Group (Sep 23, 2025) simply created the group to curate applications and provide reporting. We don’t disburse from the RARI Chain treasury, that treasury isn’t part of the Creator Fund mechanics at all.

Actually, reading proposals before commenting is DAO 101.

5 Likes