Voted: For
Rational: I voted in favor of this proposal as it allows the DAO treasury to capture currently missed funding from secondary sales and allows for expansion for the capture from other chains generating fees from secondary sales. See forum discussions for more details here and here.
Voted: For
Rational: I voted for in favor for this proposal, as it provides an incentive for delegates to participate in governance, and recognizes those who have actively participated in governance for the DAO. It also produces a healthier governance balance of larger voting power delegates, and up-and-coming delegates, by creating a way to earn voting power to defuse the potential of not meeting quorum and passing (or not) votes, which is currently based upon a few delegates. See my forum discussions for more details here, here and here.
*Note: Even though I voted in favor of this proposal, as I agree with the concept and purpose of incenting delegates to build a more diverse voting power pool for the DAO, I do feel that RRC-42 is inherently designed and executed incorrectly, and is compounded with the non-voting power of the LaunchPad III delegates whose veRARI voting power is currently “0”, including myself.
Therefore, due the timing of this proposal going up on Tally for a vote and the non-existant voting power of the LPIII delegates of “0” veRARI , this proposal cannot be executed regardless of it passing in favor of votes, but it will not meet quorum requirements. I personally feel that this current proposal by jarisjames, as the Delegate Incentive Program Administrator to resolve the many issues with this proposal must replace RRC-42.
Voted: For
Therefore, to complete this vote transaction successfully, I was able to vote with my former wallet address used in LaunchPad II (and as noted in previous Tally technical issues mentioned above in earlier votes), the wallet address that I used to vote for this proposal is: 0x3Bc71d21DC7B07a70E01159593d8F954eb065644
Rational: I voted in favor for this proposal as it promotes increased and diverse governance in the DAO while potentially attracting new token holders and delegation of unused token holders with rewards to the DAOs native chain. This proposal balances measurable KPIs with full visibility of meeting targets to the community. Here’s my commentary on forum, here, here and here.
Voted: For
Therefore, to complete this vote transaction successfully, I was able to vote with my former wallet address used in LaunchPad II (and as noted in previous Tally technical issues mentioned above in earlier votes), the wallet address that I used to vote for this proposal is: 0x3Bc71d21DC7B07a70E01159593d8F954eb065644
Rational: I voted in favor of this proposal, as I support this strategy for the DAO and Foundation. It’s a clear and concise plan, and with follow-thru execution and transparent reporting on the KPI’s, I believe it will put the DAO and RARI on the right path for growth. I look forward to seeing the results of this strategy and I’m optimistic of its’ successful outcome. Here’s my comments on Forum.
Update
I had to a create a new delegation wallet address, due to my current delegation wallet does not support L3 settlements of Arbitrum One with WalletConnect. It only supports L2 settlements on Arbitrum One.
What that means, is that I cannot use my former delegated wallet for Tally proposals for vote on RARI v2 (that uses the RARI chain).
If you would like to delegate to me, I would be grateful for your trust and you can do so with this delegation wallet: 0x6a39677F216D8Ea21BE5F95798Cd23d0c454E818 at my Tally profile.
Voted: For
Therefore, to complete this vote transaction successfully, I was able to vote with a new delegation wallet address to correct this issue. The wallet address that I used to vote for this proposal is: 0x6a39677F216D8Ea21BE5F95798Cd23d0c454E818
Rational: I voted in favor of this proposal as it provides a strong incentive for token holders to participate passively in governance by delegating their RARI tokens while earning attractive staking rewards in Phase 1. This proposal approves the action of pulling 25,000 RARI from the Treasury for Phase 1 rewards. The proposal and staking program, as was already approved with [RRC-43] Rari Staking Incentives Program provides a balanced approach for both token holders and delegates being rewarded with staking rewards or delegations, that I believe will increase engagement and growth for the RARI DAO. Here’s my two comments (comment 1, comment 2) on Forum for more detail.
Voted: For
Rational: With the second quarter of this delegate incentive program, there is a need for adjustments to this program to allow for more eligible delegates to participate. However, I still believe that this program does succeed in it’s purpose of encouraging and rewarding delegates to participate in governance and contributing long-term, to ensure the health of the DAO.
I voted in favor of this proposal to reward delegates who are engaging with the community in governance, not just voting on Tally. To continue to grow the strength of the DAO with more builders, tokens holders, artists and delegates, a strong DAO and it’s governance is required to attract quality individuals who want to become a part of this ecosystem.
Voted: For
Rational: I voted in favor of this amended proposal as it adjusts to a budget that aligns well with the current governance activity in the DAO, while recognizing the delegates that have been putting in the work for continuing to push the DAO forward towards full decentralization. With the addition of a multi-governance chain (Tally V1 and V2), this amended proposal allows for retro rewards for work completed from the failed RRC-46 vote. My full response to the proposal author on the Forum is here.
Voted: For
Rational: I voted in favor for this proposal as it’s a low risk and high return for the DAO to engage with new participants and communities. Additionally, with an experienced team, a well defined educational curriculum along with deepening relationships with other programs, it’s an ideal proposal for growth for the ecosystem. I fully support the ethos of this proposal and I’m looking forward to seeing its outcome results. I had other comments that I asked the proposal author and a more indepth reasoning for my support on the Forum.
Voted: For
Rational: This is one of those proposals that I really like, it’s fully aligned and addresses the needs of DAO and RARI Ecosystem - to attract new NFT creators and collectors to RARI, while incentivizing creators and it also provides a 10% sharing model back to the DAO treasury, that returns a ROI to the DAO. With the dissolvement of the Grants program, this proposal fulfills a much needed program to attract creators, that is necessary for the health of RARI. I’ve provided more of my reasoning of why I like this proposal on the proposal’s forum comments.
Voted: For
Rational: This proposal is the conclusion of the Rari Chain Superboard Quest campaign as part of the approved RRC-43: Rari Staking Incentives Program, and requests the disbursement of the reward allocations to the campaign’s winners, when the campaign ended a couple of weeks ago, and payment had not yet been submitted to the winners. Therefore, there was consensus on the Forum to reduce the 7 day commentary window and go straight to a vote, which I supported here. It’s important to not only follow through on the participant expectations to receive their funds in a timely manner, but also for the DAO’s social credibility for future campaigns.
Voted: For
Rational: I voted in favor for this proposal because it prioritizes attracting new buyers with a zero-fee experience, which is key to increasing overall transaction volume and competitiveness. By tying all rewards to actual fees paid, the system is designed to be highly resistant gaming and ensures that only genuine contributors are rewarded. Additional comments and responses to my questions from the Forum post for this proposal.
Voted: For
Rational: This proposal has a clear purpose and objective and with it’s focus on running the Rarible Creator Fund Program, this is exactly the type of programs that the DAO should be promoting and expanding upon. The proposal has a well thought-out structure, rotation schedule and roles and responsibilities, and with a budget already approved in RRC-48 for this program, no addtional cost. Additional comments on Forum are here.
Voted: For
Rational: As the proposal author, I voted in favor because I believe in the progressive decentralized model that combines appointed and elected seats. This framework strengthens accountability by granting the DAO the power to remove any Security Council member via a Tally v2 vote should they fail their duties or cause harm. It also formally defines member responsibilities. Crucially, this proposal establishes a clear path for future decentralization, allowing the community to increase the number of elected seats in the next term via a stand-alone proposal. All the forum discussions and my responses to feedback from the delegates are here.
Voted: For
Rational: I voted in favor for this proposal, as it provides an operational efficiency and token stability that outweighs the more centralization management approach of the DAO treasury by the Foundation. This proposal also addresses and resolves the historically missed DAO market opportunities with a strategy to create a healthy market, a balanced treasury allocation and a potential increase in RARI token demand. This proposal treasury management approach is also balanced with the DAO still retaining a strategic oversight (setting high-level objectives and governance rules) and the power of an annual on-chain renewal vote, ensuring that the Foundation remains transparent and accountable to the community.
Voted: For
Rational: This proposal was re-submitted by the Foundation, as RRC-50 did not pass the Tenderly simulation and therefore it would not execute. My commentary for voting on this proposal remain the same from my RRC-50 rational, because it ties rewards to actual fees paid to disincentive gaming and ensuring that only genuine contributors are rewarded.
Voted: For
Rational: I support this proposal and voted “For” , as it’s the type of proposals - promoting NFT artists - that this DAO should encourage. I like that the author has a well thought plan, has credibility of successfully completing similar prior events, and that it’s purpose is to build and support NFT artists on the Rariable.fun marketplace. My other forum comments are here and here.
Voted: For
Rational: I support and therefore voted in favor of this proposal, as it not only generates DAO revenue and strengthens DAO financial stability, but it also includes a competitive 2% fee structure that also offers a zero fee buyer experience. The action points are designed to discourage wash trading or sybil attacks, since each transaction incurs fees and therefore, any gaming attempts will not be a financially gainable advantage. My comments on forum about this proposal are here.
Voted: For
Rational: I voted in favor for this proposal and the Account Abstraction upgrade is a critical security and compatibility improvement essential for the protocol’s long-term health. Although I support the technical merits, I remain concerned that the proposal does not outline a comprehensive plan for communicating these changes to third-party partners to prevent ecosystem disruption.
RRC‑XX: Fund Phase 2 of RARI Staking Rewards
Voted: Against
Rational: While I appreciate the authors addressing my concerns about a communications plan to the users and the inclusion of how this proposal superseeds RRC-43 for discontinuation for Phase 3.
However, I am voting against because this proposal fails to include the transaction to return the ~14,200 RARI surplus (Phase 1 leftovers + cancelled Phase 3) to the DAO Treasury immediately.
The 2025 Operational Budget (RRC-37) contains a clause stating: ‘If there are unspent funds at the end of the budget cycle, the Foundation may propose to keep the amount in an operational reserve.’
By leaving these staking funds in the Foundation’s wallet without a clawback today, there is a potential that it being absorbed into next year’s operational reserve by default, and handling it with a future decision creates an unnecessary governance debt.