RRC-XX: RARI DAO Security Council Elections

Proposals Parent DAO Proposals
#8

Name/Handle: Johan van Caem (forexus)

Wallet Address: 0xd8936E602E38dfEe5d6466865068b94b1943DEBF

Candidate Status:

  • I am a $RARI token holder.
  • I have delegated voting power to my wallet.

Governance Participation & Contributions:
RRC-Dropable: RRC-Dropable
My very first proposal on the forum which I created with a fellow delegate, @dzonson.eth , with the main idea of creating a permissionless launchpad for NFT drops, incentivizing activity and bringing new utility to the RARI token. While we came far, not everyone was as happy about the proposal as we were, which allowed us to learn even more in the DAO. Dropable was a great idea, however it takes everyone’s support to bring an idea like that to life. That was a usefull learning experience.

RRC-Rarible Creator Fund Program: https://forum.rari.foundation/t/rrc-cf-rarible-creator-fund-program
All my experience gained in the last 2 years went in to this. Together with the help of @jarisjames and understanding the importance of attracting the right creators, projects and brands towards the new Rarible FUN marketplace, this proposal gained immediate support of the DAO, Rari Foundation and Rarible, eventually leading to a real proposal on Tally (thanks @Jose_StableLab ). Not only landed it on Tally, all the delegates where supporting it. This brought a new wave of excitement and motivation to do great things together in the upcoming periods.

Rarible Creator Fund Working Group: https://forum.rari.foundation/t/establishment-of-the-creator-fund-working-group
I’ll be contributing towards proper curation by being part of the Rarible Creator Fund Working Group for the upcoming year (3 Quarters).

Collector / Artist / Influencer: Been doing my best since 2020 to support Rarible in any way I can, on social media, as an artist launching drops on Rarible but also as a collector, often collecting drops and art in the Rarible Ecosystem (rarible.com / rarible.fun / rari chain). Also did several drops on RARI Chain, won an art contest. Currently building a collection on MegaETH.

Statement of Intent
As a dedicated member of the Rari Foundation ecosystem since 2020, I, Johan van Caem (forexus), have actively contributed to the growth and vibrancy of the Rarible DAO through governance participation, creative initiatives, and community engagement. My involvement began with the RRC-Dropable proposal, co-authored with @dzonson.eth, which aimed to create a permissionless NFT launchpad to enhance the utility of the $RARI token. Though the proposal faced challenges, it provided valuable lessons in consensus-building and collaboration within the DAO, strengthening my understanding of effective governance. Additionally, my leadership in the RRC-Rarible Creator Fund Program, developed with @jarisjames, demonstrated my ability to craft impactful proposals that align with the DAO’s vision. This initiative, which garnered unanimous support from delegates and advanced to a successful Tally vote, showcased my capacity to unite stakeholders and drive meaningful outcomes for the Rarible ecosystem. My extensive experience as a $RARI token holder, active voter, and delegate further equips me to contribute to the Security Council with a focus on transparency, fairness, and community-driven decision-making.

Beyond governance, my multifaceted role as an artist, collector, and advocate within the Rarible ecosystem underscores my commitment to its long-term success. I have consistently supported Rarible by launching NFT drops, collecting art on platforms like rarible.com, rarible.fun, and RARI Chain, and promoting the ecosystem on social media. My achievements, including winning an art contest and building a collection on MegaETH, reflect my deep integration into the community and my ability to bridge creative and technical perspectives. As a Security Council candidate, I bring a proven track record of collaboration, a nuanced understanding of the DAO’s needs, and a passion for fostering innovation and security. I am committed to safeguarding the Rari Foundation’s mission by ensuring robust, equitable governance and protecting the interests of all stakeholders, while continuing to champion the growth of the Rarible ecosystem.

Requirements & Code of Conduct:

  • I understand and agree to adhere to the Code of Conduct as a Security Council member.
  • I certify that I have or will obtain a new (or newly reset) hardware wallet that can generate a fresh address for this role.
  • I confirm that as the individual or entity representative applying, I am the sole owner of the hardware wallet being used to apply, and I will not use a hot wallet under any circumstances.
  • I agree that this hardware wallet will be used exclusively for actions related to the Security Council and for no other applications.
4 Likes
#9

I also support @jarisjames application, it’s a logical step with his technical background and contributions to the ecosystem.

2 Likes
#10

I fully support @forexus’ application. He has been one of the most dedicated and active members of the DAO, already handling issues daily in the Discord as a trusted moderator, which makes him an ideal fit for the Security Council.

2 Likes
#11

I also support the candidacy of @forexus as his dedication to the RARI DAO and ecosystem is proven and exemplary in supporting in the best interest for this DAO.

He exceeds the requirements of a Security Council member, as does @jarisjames - with the role responsibilities that include:

  • Be Aligned: Uphold the Constitution of the RARI DAO and act in the best interests of the RARI ecosystem.
  • Be Diverse: Collectively represent a broad mix of geographies and time zone to ensure capture resistance and rapid response capability.
  • Be Available: Be ready to prioritize RARI and respond immediately in the event of an emergency.
  • Be Proactively Engaged: Collaborate with fellow Security Council members when action is needed.
  • Be Responsible: Communicate and publish a transparency report after emergency actions are taken.
3 Likes
#12

Name/Handle:GozmanGonzalez

Wallet Address:0x79f16606e9a64eDb8bA09c55eE1375bDa883c032

Candidate Status:

  • I am a $RARI token holder.
  • I have delegated voting power to my wallet.

Governance Participation & Contributions: Please provide a brief overview of your history of participation in RARI governance and contributions to the ecosystem. Link to relevant forum posts, proposals, or other on-chain activity.

My journey with RARI governance has been about learning, showing up, and adding value where I can. I’ve been following the DAO closely for over a year and made it a point to participate in discussions where I try to share honest thoughts and constructive feedback.

Some of the places I’ve contributed:

  • I shared my perspective during the transition to merit-based governance here, because I strongly believe fair recognition is key to keeping contributors motivated and aligned.
  • I weighed in on the formation of a treasury committee here, highlighting the importance of clear accountability and streamlined decision-making.
  • I also gave input on the RARI staking rewards proposal here, supporting incentives that encourage real participation, not just speculation.

Overall, my contributions come from a place of genuine interest in seeing RARI succeed.

Statement of Intent: In 1-2 paragraphs, please explain why you are a good candidate for the Security Council and what you hope to achieve during your term.

I believe the Security Council role is not just about technical safeguards but about protecting the trust that holds our community together. Over the years, I’ve been actively involved in different Web3 communities, taking part in governance discussions, helping to coordinate contributors, and stepping into roles where consistency and accountability were needed. These experiences have taught me how to balance different voices, resolve conflicts fairly, quietly put in the work to keep things safe, transparent and keep decisions anchored on the long-term good of the ecosystem. That’s the energy I want to bring into this position, someone who is dependable when things are calm, and steady when challenges arise.

If selected, my goal is to help make RARI’s governance safer and easier for contributors to trust. I hope to serve as a bridge between the community and the processes that protect our treasury and decision-making, by making sure that decisions are made with the community’s best interest at heart, while also being proactive about risks that could threaten the DAO. For me, being part of the Security Council is less about recognition and more about a chance to stand on the front lines for security, not just as a technical safeguard, but as a responsibility to the people who believe in the DAO.

Requirements & Code of Conduct:

  • I understand and agree to adhere to the Code of Conduct as a Security Council member.
  • I certify that I have or will obtain a new (or newly reset) hardware wallet that can generate a fresh address for this role.
  • I confirm that as the individual or entity representative applying, I am the sole owner of the hardware wallet being used to apply, and I will not use a hot wallet under any circumstances.
  • I agree that this hardware wallet will be used exclusively for actions related to the Security Council and for no other applications.
3 Likes
#13

Name/Handle: coffee-crusher

Wallet Address: 0x6a39677F216D8Ea21BE5F95798Cd23d0c454E818

Candidate Status:

Governance Participation & Contributions:

My history with the RARI DAO is rooted in a long-term commitment to its community and governance. I began actively participating in the RARI forums in early 2024, providing feedback and contributing to discussions. This led to me becoming a delegate in March 2024 after acceptance into the LaunchPad II program, where I have consistently engaged on forum and Tally (1, 2, 3, 4) to support the DAO’s strategic direction.

My contributions are guided by a proactive approach to improving the DAO, as demonstrated through two key proposals:

  • Delegate Incentive Program v2: I authored this proposal to establish a clear and sustainable framework for delegate compensation. While it did not proceed to a vote, the process of authoring it was a crucial learning experience. It not only underscored the importance of integrating delegate feedback into proposal refinement but also enhanced my skills as a delegate, solidifying my commitment to strengthening our governance.

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  • RARI DAO Security Council Elections: This above proposal is a crucial step towards fostering a more transparent and accountable governance model. By transitioning the council’s selection from a DAO appointment to a community-wide election, we can empower delegates and token holders to directly influence the protocol’s most critical decisions, ensuring a diverse range of expertise is brought to the table. This proposal directly reflects my core belief in a decentralized and community-driven DAO.

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Beyond specific proposals, I am committed to expanding the RARI ecosystem’s reach and inclusivity. As one of four women representing the DAO, I was selected to participate in the Grow3dge Accelerator program, which was officially passed by the DAO in this proposal.

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Through this program, my objective is to facilitate partnerships, onboard new delegates from well-respected organizations across Web3, and amplify the voices of women in governance. My passion lies in building and strengthening the RARI DAO, creating a thriving ecosystem for NFT artists, collectors, and builders to find community and purpose.

Statement of Intent:

In my view, the role of the Security Council is to be a vigilant and trusted guardian of the RARI ecosystem. I was voted in as a Flag Keeper at the Black Flag DAO, a position that included serving as a Steward of the DAO multisig treasury, along with other critical responsibilities. While the DAO became defunct, the trust placed in me for these essential and wide-ranging duties is a testament to my ability to handle complex security responsibilities.

This, combined with my consistent on-chain governance engagement with RARI DAO since becoming a delegate, gives me the confidence to handle the responsibilities of this position.

My commitment is to ensure the Security Council is a proactive, not passive, force for the DAO. Beyond embodying the core principles of this role of Aligned, Available, Proactively Engaged , and Responsible, a key goal of mine is to ensure these requirements are met with full transparency.

I believe the Council’s role is to actively protect our protocol through actions like urgent upgrades, routine maintenance, and responding to hack attempts. As a member, I will collaborate with my fellow Security Council members to work with the Foundation, ensuring our protocol is regularly reviewed and safeguarded. I will also champion security reports to the community, similar to best practices seen in other DAOs, to provide full transparency and keep the community informed on all security upgrades and actions taken.

Requirements & Code of Conduct:

I agree to, and will adhere to these requirements for this role and the RARI Code of Conduct, which includes:

  • I understand and agree to adhere to the Code of Conduct as a Security Council member.
  • I certify that I have or will obtain a new (or newly reset) hardware wallet that can generate a fresh address for this role.
  • I confirm that as the individual or entity representative applying, I am the sole owner of the hardware wallet being used to apply, and I will not use a hot wallet under any circumstances.
  • I agree that this hardware wallet will be used exclusively for actions related to the Security Council and for no other applications.
3 Likes
#14

I fully support @coffee-crusher for the Security Council. She’s shown real consistency in governance, balances community input with pragmatic decision-making, and has proven she can handle responsibility with integrity. She’d be a strong, addition to the Council.

1 Like
#15

Hi @coffee-crusher thank you for your proposal! The Security Council’s core mandate is — above all else — to safeguard the protocol and DAO. For this reason, the DAO should prioritize trusted individuals with proven expertise, rather than relying solely on elections that may not guarantee the right technical or fiduciary skillset.

We therefore propose that three of the five seats remain appointed, filled by current security council members as they already proved its reliability and expertise:

  • The Foundation Director – ensuring continuity, accountability, and alignment with the DAO’s strategic direction.
  • Enacu – who has served as the DAO’s technical lead and has deep knowledge of the RARI Chain infrastructure, security architecture, and smart contract environment.
  • A professional delegate bound by a legal contract – ensuring that at least one council member is legally accountable to act in the best interests of the DAO and its community.

This combination ensures a balance between decentralization and security while protecting the DAO from governance capture, misaligned incentives, or gaps in technical expertise.

In addition, based on the current budget, the expected scope of work, and the actual time commitment required, the compensation should be adjusted. We propose to reduce it 1,000 RARI per month per member. This keeps costs aligned with responsibility and ensures sustainability of the DAO’s treasury while still fairly compensating contributors.

This model preserves the Security Council’s independence, ensures that critical technical and legal knowledge is present, and maintains cost efficiency — all while keeping security, the Council’s primary goal, at the center of its design.

4 Likes
#16

Thanks @coffee-crusher for outlining this comprehensive proposal and explaining the function of the council. Definitely a much-needed institution.

Two questions one that:

  • Who is currently on the council?
  • What is their workload / how often did the council act in the previous iteration?
  • How is the council ensuring they can cover emergencies / in what time frame do they have to act (e.g. in terms of time zones)?

I honestly wasn’t really aware about the council, there was also no updates or reporting shared from them in the past year. So if we were to reinitiate this council, I would suggest much more transparency and reporting.

Given the compensation, I’d expect a 5-10h job per person per week, which seems quite extensive. Otherwise, it seems reasonable to cut down compensation.

Also, since this is a security-relevant position, we should be mindful about conflict of interest. It would seem rationale to me to not include delegates that are in other working groups or have other positions in the DAO, already. Maybe even external security experts.

On the open questions:

  • Makes sense to me that a technical person from the Foundation / Rarible should join
  • Naturally, no extra compensation for team members
1 Like
#17

Edit: just reading @Anria’s comment. I’d agree with the adjustment in compensation, and adding Enacu.

I’m not sure, however, what a “professional delegate bound by a legal contract” should be. I’m assuming all security council members do have a contract.

2 Likes
#18

So 2 seats will be available, I agree with the first 3 seats. I guess the professional delegate will be @Jose_StableLab ?

1000 RARI per month sounds fair looking to the current market situation. I had to agree with @bitblondy that 2000 USDC might have been a bit excessive.

3 Likes
#19

It’s great to see such strong candidates running for the Security Council. Having worked with @forexus , @jarisjames , and @coffee-crusher for some time now, I know any of them would do an excellent job if elected, and I fully support their candidacy.

I also strongly support SL as a delegate. @Jose_StableLab has done an outstanding job and stepped in to support other delegates whenever needed. I’m confident that whether it’s Jose or another member from SL, they will continue upholding the same high standards we’ve seen from them so far.

4 Likes
#20

Thank you both, @bitblondy and @Anria for your invaluable feedback, I really appreciate your thoughtful comments. And you’ve both highlighted some of the most critical aspects of this role - from the need for transparency and accountability to the vital balance between decentralization and security.

I also want to express my full support for the proposed reduction in monthly compensation of $1,000, which aligns with the current treasury health and ensures a more sustainable runway for the DAO.

I’ve considered all of your points, and I believe we can create a stronger, more resilient Security Council by addressing them directly:

@Anria your concerns about ensuring continuity and expertise are well-founded, as this is the core mandate of the Council. I believe we can achieve this with a blended model that leverages proven reliability while championing decentralization.

I fully support the Foundation’s proposal to appoint Campbell Law and Enacu . Their proven expertise, legal accountability, and deep technical knowledge of the RARI Chain are invaluable assets that the DAO needs to safeguard its core infrastructure.

For the three remaining seats, I propose they remain elected positions chosen by the DAO community. This approach ensures the Security Council is accountable to the DAO that it serves. In addition, the election process allows for the removal of Security Council members who are not acting in the best interests of the DAO, which helps to ensure the Council always has the best interests of the DAO in mind.

To directly address the Foundation’s concern about the need for a legally bound, professional delegate, I propose that every elected Security Council member be required to be bound by a legal contract and complete KYC/KYB verification. This aligns us and aspires us to the best practices of leading DAOs like Optimism and Arbitrum. This model ensures every council member is both legally and fiducially accountable to the DAO, regardless of how they are chosen.

Mitigating Conflicts of Interest

@bitblondy , your point on potential conflicts of interest (COI) is valid, and it’s an issue that the RARI Code of Conduct (RRC-35) already provides guidance for. As our code states, members should “avoid conflicts of interest wherever possible and reduce the impact of these when it’s not possible to avoid them,” and “disclose potential conflicts of interest whenever possible.”

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While I understand the rationale for excluding members of other working groups, a blanket exclusion could unintentionally weaken the Council. Many individuals in these groups have invaluable, hands-on knowledge of the DAO’s operational needs, which would be a significant asset.

Instead, I propose a system based on transparency and recusal that aligns with our Code of Conduct. Any candidate who is also a member of a working group must publicly disclose that involvement. If the Security Council ever needs to deliberate on an issue directly involving that working group, the member would be required to recuse themselves from that specific discussion and vote, ensuring they “act and vote based on what they believe best serves the interests of the DAO.” This approach allows us to leverage the expertise of our most dedicated contributors while upholding the highest standard of impartiality and accountability.

Transparency, Quorum, & Workload

@bitblondy your observation about the lack of past updates is spot on. I agree that the Security Council’s role is to be a proactive, not passive, force. If elected, I will champion security reports to the community, providing full transparency on all actions and protocol reviews.

To address your other questions specifically regarding the current Security Council:

The current members of the Security Council who were appointed by the Foundation and approved by the DAO with RRC-11 on August 24, 2023 with the three original Security Council members, then the Council was expanded to five members and with the continuance and appointment of their roles with RRC-33 on September 26, 2024 with an expiration of these roles for September 30, 2025.

Also to note that in RRC-33, it allowed for future elections of these roles by the DAO (other than the Director of the Foundation - held by Campbell Law which is required in our Constitution to always have an appointed seat on the Security Council as voted on in RRC-0).

These are the current Security Council members (RRC-33):

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To address your other two questions regarding the existing workload (and how often did they have to act in either an emergency or non emergency situations). I have not been able to find any reports on the Forum or other communications from the Security Council over the past two years during their term existence. This matches your own observations about not also being aware of any reporting (even though this is requirement for this role in RRC-33) or even that you were aware of the existence of this council. This lack of transparency also goes against standard practices in all DAOs of transparency to the DAO to report on all emergency procedures that they had to act upon.

Regarding your question about how will the Security Council ensure that emergencies are covered over time zones, I can only address how I determine it should be addressed based upon every other Security Council in DAOs, such as Arbitrum, Optimism and Scroll, as I do not have any historical or current knowledge of how the current Security Council team communicates, coordinates within themselves. In addition, with RRC-33 there is no allowance for the DAO to remove Security Council members who do not do their job. That’s why I added the voting power for the DAO to remove Security Council members in this proposal.

Personally I like the Optimism Security Council model with regular reporting, group chats, regular and ad hoc meetings to discuss issues, liveness checks and coverage, as something we should model our own Security Council from, to provide transparency and engagement not only with the DAO but also within the Security Council team.

Adding Security

And finally, to further strengthen our security framework, I propose increasing the quorum for Veto function actions from the current 3/5 to 4/5 as included in RRC-33. A higher quorum provides stronger security guarantees and aligns us with the standards of major DAOs, which operate with approximately a =/>75% quorum. This adjustment also confirms that this is not a passive role, and the compensation should reflect the need for a vigilant and responsive council.

1 Like
#21

Hi @bitblondy , as far I understand, Stablelabs is the only member of the current Security Council who has a contract with the Foundation. And the reason why they have a contract is not because they are member of the Security Council, it’s because they are paid by the DAO from our operational budget $48K USD yearly for delegate professional services since H2 2023, and including 2024 and 2025 budgets. As you even observed in your comments to the Foundation for the 2025 budget.

To address your question specifically, currently today it is not required for Security Council members to sign a contract with the Foundation as part of mitigating security risks of this trusted role for the Security Council. I want to change that, so our DAO aligns and uses best practices with the standards used by mature DAOs in the industry.

2 Likes
#22

For context, the appointed professional delegate role has historically been given to StableLab because they operate through an LLC, which provides the legal shield necessary to uphold a professional delegate arrangement. If another delegate has an LLC shell, they too can step into that role with the same level of professionalism and protection.

What you are proposing, @coffee-crusher, is entirely different. Instead of one appointed professional delegate bound by contract, you suggest forcing every elected member to sign a personal legal contract, meaning if something goes wrong on the Security Council, like a protocol exploit, a smart contract failure, or an emergency response gone bad, they could be personally sued. Instead of having the protection of an LLC like StableLab, grassroots contributors would be putting their own assets, their savings, even their homes at risk. In practice, that means grassroots members who would’ve had to complete KYC anyway in order to legally be paid by the Foundation would now also be forced to carry legal exposure.

Optimism and Arbitrum do not operate this way. Their councils require compliance checks and service agreements administered by the Foundation. Optimism uses an eligibility screening that includes KYC and a standard contract at the Foundation’s discretion. Arbitrum runs a compliance process where candidates or entities are vetted, and entities are encouraged to participate through their legal structure. Both models focus on basic KYC screening and entity-level protection, not blanket fiduciary contracts for every individual.

@Anria’s proposal for RARI builds on those precedents by introducing a single professional delegate under contract to ensure at least one seat carries clear legal accountability. This safeguard strengthens the Council without placing unnecessary liability on every member, striking the right balance between professionalism, contributor protection, and DAO security.

2 Likes
#23

Hi everyone! Kaf here. From now on I’ll be representing StableLab in RARI DAO. @Jose_StableLab has been covering this role until now and has been sharing his guidance with me as I get up to speed. As @Jaf already noted, he’s done an excellent job, and I’ll do my best to carry this forward with the same diligence and professionalism.

On this proposal, I’d first like to thank @coffee-crusher for sparking valuable discussion. I’d now like to share our perspective and respond to some of the comments raised:

  • Continuity and stability:The Council has been effective in its first term, and we believe continuity is critical. Moving immediately to four elected seats would effectively replace the entire body at once, which could undermine security.

  • Gradual decentralization: We agree with the principle of elections, but recommend a phased approach. A hybrid model, three appointed members (Foundation Director, the technical lead, and one professional delegate under contract) plus one or two elected members, would balance stability, technical knowledge, and community voice. This reflects the points made by @Anria and others in favor of a compromise solution.

  • Technical expertise: Under the hybrid model, the technical lead ( Enacu ) remains, and additional candidates with proven expertise can compete for elected seats. This ensures the Council retains the skills it needs while opening the door to new contributors.

  • Accountability and professionalism: Some comments highlighted the importance of transparency and avoiding conflicts of interest. Having at least one professional delegate bound by a legal contract ensures a higher level of accountability, which complements elected members and helps mitigate those risks.

  • Compensation and reporting: Concerns were raised about cost and visibility of Council work. A constructive path forward could be to review compensation (including alternative structures) alongside clearer reporting. Regular updates on Council activity would give the community a better basis to understand both the workload and the value delivered.

In closing: StableLab supports decentralization as a long-term goal, but believes the transition should be incremental. We recommend maintaining the current structure, or at most reducing CoffeeCrusher’s proposal of four elected seats to one or two. This approach ensures stability and continuity while still opening the door to greater community participation.

4 Likes
#24

Thank you, @Kaf_StableLab, for joining the discussion and for sharing your perspective. I have also considered the critical points raised by other delegates, which have helped to refine this proposal.

You’ve highlighted the importance of continuity and stability, which are crucial for this role. However, your argument for a hybrid model with only one or two elected members seems to contradict our shared goal of decentralization.

The consensus among delegates who have already commented is for three elected seats. Proposing to limit the DAO to one or two elected positions would shift the balance of power toward a more centralized governance structure, effectively taking away the voice and power of the DAO to choose its own Council members who serve and protect the DAO.

This also relates to the legal protection for council members. My refined proposal is as follows:

  • I continue to support the Foundation’s proposal to appoint Campbell Law and Enacu. Their proven expertise is invaluable.

  • The three remaining seats should be filled by community elections. To ensure all members are legally accountable while protecting them from personal risk, I propose a system as suggested by @jarisjames . This model aligns with industry best practices from leading DAOs:

    • For professional entities, a candidate running for an elected seat must do so through a legally-protected entity, such as an LLC.

    • For individual delegates, the requirement will be to complete KYC and compliance checks and service agreements administered by the Foundation.

This model is the strongest path forward. It directly addresses the Foundation’s need for legally and fiducially accountable members while protecting our grassroots contributors. Most importantly, it ensures the majority of the Council is accountable to the DAO community, with the added power for the DAO to remove any elected member who does not perform their duties.

Accountability and Transparency

I agree that a professional delegate under contract is a valuable asset. However, this is not a unique quality that justifies an appointment. The election process is the correct path for any delegate, including professionals, to earn the community’s trust for this role.

You mentioned that a constructive path forward could include clearer reporting. This is a point I strongly agree with, and it’s a central component of my proposal. It also leads me to a key question: as a serving member of the Security Council, can you clarify why regular, transparent reporting was not already a priority during your two-year tenure?

Compensation

Finally, on the matter of compensation, my revised proposal fully supports the Foundation’s suggestion to reduce the monthly amount to 1,000 USD per member. This aligns with the community’s consensus and ensures the DAO’s treasury remains sustainable. Your comment about a “constructive path forward” was not clear on whether you support this reduction. Please clarify your position on this.

3 Likes
#25

Thank you, @jarisjames for your thoughtful and insightful feedback, I truly appreciate your thoughts on this proposal. And your comments have raised a critical point that has significantly strengthened this proposal.

You are absolutely right about the potential legal exposure for grassroots contributors, and I agree completely that we must protect them from personal liability. I have incorporated your recommendations into the updated proposal that I’ve included in my response to Stablelab, which now distinguishes between professional entities and individual delegates.

Your input in aligning this proposal with the best practices of other leading DAOs, such as Optimism and Arbitrum is the right way to go. This distinction ensures the Security Council remains accountable while providing the necessary legal protections for all who serve. Thank you for this clarification and addition to the proposal.

3 Likes
#26

Very solid individuals running for the council. Fully support @jarisjames, @forexus, @coffee-crusher running as I have seen their impacts across the DAO over the past couple months and years. They are strong candidates indeed.

3 Likes
#27

Name/Handle: @DAOplomats, represented by @WinVerse.

Wallet Address: 0x58F724697cf24D3D3cFdA44F22E45EFEd4D69A1D

Candidate Status:

  • We are $RARI token holder.
  • We have delegated voting power to my wallet.

Governance Participation & Contributions:

DAOplomats have led several initiatives in the RARI DAO. Here is a list of a few of them:

We also started DAO overflow calls and have hosted several of them over the years.

Statement of Intent:

From our past contributions, it is clear that we have RARI DAO’s best interest at heart. All of our contributions over the years have been aimed at making the DAO more robust in governance, ensuring alignment with one of the core principles of DAOs, decentralization.

Personally, I have been a contributor at RARI DAO since the inception of the delegates launchpad program, a Cohort 1 member. I was also a member of the Grants Committee before its dissolution. I have been actively involved in the DAO and its activities, as I sincerely cherish what we are building here.

The Security Council is a very important body of every DAO so it is of utmost importance that the right individuals and entities are brought in as they play a critical role in securing the DAO’s funds and preventing bad actors from gaming the system. This is the major reason we are applying. We care so deeply about RARI DAO and ensuring its security is a high priority for us.

I think I would be a good Security Council member because I’m good with emergency response and I have wide availability for a responsibility of this magnitude. I also think that my geographic location favors a diverse set of participants across different time zones.

Requirements & Code of Conduct:

  • I understand and agree to adhere to the Code of Conduct as a Security Council member.

  • I certify that I have or will obtain a new (or newly reset) hardware wallet that can generate a fresh address for this role.

  • I confirm that as the entity representative applying, I am the sole owner of the hardware wallet being used to apply, and I will not use a hot wallet under any circumstances.

  • I agree that this hardware wallet will be used exclusively for actions related to the Security Council and for no other applications.

4 Likes