RRC-XX: RARI DAO Security Council Elections

Proposals Parent DAO Proposals
#21

Hi @bitblondy , as far I understand, Stablelabs is the only member of the current Security Council who has a contract with the Foundation. And the reason why they have a contract is not because they are member of the Security Council, it’s because they are paid by the DAO from our operational budget $48K USD yearly for delegate professional services since H2 2023, and including 2024 and 2025 budgets. As you even observed in your comments to the Foundation for the 2025 budget.

To address your question specifically, currently today it is not required for Security Council members to sign a contract with the Foundation as part of mitigating security risks of this trusted role for the Security Council. I want to change that, so our DAO aligns and uses best practices with the standards used by mature DAOs in the industry.

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#22

For context, the appointed professional delegate role has historically been given to StableLab because they operate through an LLC, which provides the legal shield necessary to uphold a professional delegate arrangement. If another delegate has an LLC shell, they too can step into that role with the same level of professionalism and protection.

What you are proposing, @coffee-crusher, is entirely different. Instead of one appointed professional delegate bound by contract, you suggest forcing every elected member to sign a personal legal contract, meaning if something goes wrong on the Security Council, like a protocol exploit, a smart contract failure, or an emergency response gone bad, they could be personally sued. Instead of having the protection of an LLC like StableLab, grassroots contributors would be putting their own assets, their savings, even their homes at risk. In practice, that means grassroots members who would’ve had to complete KYC anyway in order to legally be paid by the Foundation would now also be forced to carry legal exposure.

Optimism and Arbitrum do not operate this way. Their councils require compliance checks and service agreements administered by the Foundation. Optimism uses an eligibility screening that includes KYC and a standard contract at the Foundation’s discretion. Arbitrum runs a compliance process where candidates or entities are vetted, and entities are encouraged to participate through their legal structure. Both models focus on basic KYC screening and entity-level protection, not blanket fiduciary contracts for every individual.

@Anria’s proposal for RARI builds on those precedents by introducing a single professional delegate under contract to ensure at least one seat carries clear legal accountability. This safeguard strengthens the Council without placing unnecessary liability on every member, striking the right balance between professionalism, contributor protection, and DAO security.

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#23

Hi everyone! Kaf here. From now on I’ll be representing StableLab in RARI DAO. @Jose_StableLab has been covering this role until now and has been sharing his guidance with me as I get up to speed. As @Jaf already noted, he’s done an excellent job, and I’ll do my best to carry this forward with the same diligence and professionalism.

On this proposal, I’d first like to thank @coffee-crusher for sparking valuable discussion. I’d now like to share our perspective and respond to some of the comments raised:

  • Continuity and stability:The Council has been effective in its first term, and we believe continuity is critical. Moving immediately to four elected seats would effectively replace the entire body at once, which could undermine security.

  • Gradual decentralization: We agree with the principle of elections, but recommend a phased approach. A hybrid model, three appointed members (Foundation Director, the technical lead, and one professional delegate under contract) plus one or two elected members, would balance stability, technical knowledge, and community voice. This reflects the points made by @Anria and others in favor of a compromise solution.

  • Technical expertise: Under the hybrid model, the technical lead ( Enacu ) remains, and additional candidates with proven expertise can compete for elected seats. This ensures the Council retains the skills it needs while opening the door to new contributors.

  • Accountability and professionalism: Some comments highlighted the importance of transparency and avoiding conflicts of interest. Having at least one professional delegate bound by a legal contract ensures a higher level of accountability, which complements elected members and helps mitigate those risks.

  • Compensation and reporting: Concerns were raised about cost and visibility of Council work. A constructive path forward could be to review compensation (including alternative structures) alongside clearer reporting. Regular updates on Council activity would give the community a better basis to understand both the workload and the value delivered.

In closing: StableLab supports decentralization as a long-term goal, but believes the transition should be incremental. We recommend maintaining the current structure, or at most reducing CoffeeCrusher’s proposal of four elected seats to one or two. This approach ensures stability and continuity while still opening the door to greater community participation.

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#24

Thank you, @Kaf_StableLab, for joining the discussion and for sharing your perspective. I have also considered the critical points raised by other delegates, which have helped to refine this proposal.

You’ve highlighted the importance of continuity and stability, which are crucial for this role. However, your argument for a hybrid model with only one or two elected members seems to contradict our shared goal of decentralization.

The consensus among delegates who have already commented is for three elected seats. Proposing to limit the DAO to one or two elected positions would shift the balance of power toward a more centralized governance structure, effectively taking away the voice and power of the DAO to choose its own Council members who serve and protect the DAO.

This also relates to the legal protection for council members. My refined proposal is as follows:

  • I continue to support the Foundation’s proposal to appoint Campbell Law and Enacu. Their proven expertise is invaluable.

  • The three remaining seats should be filled by community elections. To ensure all members are legally accountable while protecting them from personal risk, I propose a system as suggested by @jarisjames . This model aligns with industry best practices from leading DAOs:

    • For professional entities, a candidate running for an elected seat must do so through a legally-protected entity, such as an LLC.

    • For individual delegates, the requirement will be to complete KYC and compliance checks and service agreements administered by the Foundation.

This model is the strongest path forward. It directly addresses the Foundation’s need for legally and fiducially accountable members while protecting our grassroots contributors. Most importantly, it ensures the majority of the Council is accountable to the DAO community, with the added power for the DAO to remove any elected member who does not perform their duties.

Accountability and Transparency

I agree that a professional delegate under contract is a valuable asset. However, this is not a unique quality that justifies an appointment. The election process is the correct path for any delegate, including professionals, to earn the community’s trust for this role.

You mentioned that a constructive path forward could include clearer reporting. This is a point I strongly agree with, and it’s a central component of my proposal. It also leads me to a key question: as a serving member of the Security Council, can you clarify why regular, transparent reporting was not already a priority during your two-year tenure?

Compensation

Finally, on the matter of compensation, my revised proposal fully supports the Foundation’s suggestion to reduce the monthly amount to 1,000 USD per member. This aligns with the community’s consensus and ensures the DAO’s treasury remains sustainable. Your comment about a “constructive path forward” was not clear on whether you support this reduction. Please clarify your position on this.

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#25

Thank you, @jarisjames for your thoughtful and insightful feedback, I truly appreciate your thoughts on this proposal. And your comments have raised a critical point that has significantly strengthened this proposal.

You are absolutely right about the potential legal exposure for grassroots contributors, and I agree completely that we must protect them from personal liability. I have incorporated your recommendations into the updated proposal that I’ve included in my response to Stablelab, which now distinguishes between professional entities and individual delegates.

Your input in aligning this proposal with the best practices of other leading DAOs, such as Optimism and Arbitrum is the right way to go. This distinction ensures the Security Council remains accountable while providing the necessary legal protections for all who serve. Thank you for this clarification and addition to the proposal.

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#26

Very solid individuals running for the council. Fully support @jarisjames, @forexus, @coffee-crusher running as I have seen their impacts across the DAO over the past couple months and years. They are strong candidates indeed.

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#27

Name/Handle: @DAOplomats, represented by @WinVerse.

Wallet Address: 0x58F724697cf24D3D3cFdA44F22E45EFEd4D69A1D

Candidate Status:

  • We are $RARI token holder.
  • We have delegated voting power to my wallet.

Governance Participation & Contributions:

DAOplomats have led several initiatives in the RARI DAO. Here is a list of a few of them:

We also started DAO overflow calls and have hosted several of them over the years.

Statement of Intent:

From our past contributions, it is clear that we have RARI DAO’s best interest at heart. All of our contributions over the years have been aimed at making the DAO more robust in governance, ensuring alignment with one of the core principles of DAOs, decentralization.

Personally, I have been a contributor at RARI DAO since the inception of the delegates launchpad program, a Cohort 1 member. I was also a member of the Grants Committee before its dissolution. I have been actively involved in the DAO and its activities, as I sincerely cherish what we are building here.

The Security Council is a very important body of every DAO so it is of utmost importance that the right individuals and entities are brought in as they play a critical role in securing the DAO’s funds and preventing bad actors from gaming the system. This is the major reason we are applying. We care so deeply about RARI DAO and ensuring its security is a high priority for us.

I think I would be a good Security Council member because I’m good with emergency response and I have wide availability for a responsibility of this magnitude. I also think that my geographic location favors a diverse set of participants across different time zones.

Requirements & Code of Conduct:

  • I understand and agree to adhere to the Code of Conduct as a Security Council member.

  • I certify that I have or will obtain a new (or newly reset) hardware wallet that can generate a fresh address for this role.

  • I confirm that as the entity representative applying, I am the sole owner of the hardware wallet being used to apply, and I will not use a hot wallet under any circumstances.

  • I agree that this hardware wallet will be used exclusively for actions related to the Security Council and for no other applications.

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#28

Thanks @coffee-crusher for your comprehensive feedback and answers. Including regular reporting in the proposal sounds great. That the previous council did not fulfil this requirement as specified in the proposal is really concerning!

Maybe it’s necessary we introduce consequences, in case the reporting duties are not fulfilled this time, i.e. withholding compensation and even legal action. I also expect from Foundation @Anria that these requirements are checked on a regular basis.

About the seats:

As far as I understand, Campbell Law is set through the constitution? It would also make sense continuing with Enacu on the technical seat, given we need someone with deep experience on the product. I’d suggest Enacu goes through the application process, though, since he is no longer with the Foundation as far as I understand?

The compensation for StableLab has been “confidential” for the past two years, but that’s another story. Given this conflict of interest and the 3/5 quorum, I’d suggest not continuing their participation in the council. This should be an independent organ.

About legal contracts:

Agree with your suggestion @jarisjames. Foundation is registered as an LLC, so they should KYC and provide legal contracts for council members. It’s a bit questionable that this has not happened in the past.

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