RRC-XX: Delegate Incentive Program v2.0 for RARI DAO Governance

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RRC-XX: Delegate Incentive Program v2.0 for RARI DAO Governance

Date of Submission: July 15, 2025

Author: @coffee-crusher

Abstract

This proposal introduces the RARI DAO Delegate Incentive Program v2.0, a refined and sustainable compensation framework for active delegates. It replaces RRC-40 and builds upon insights from the Q2 2025 Delegate Incentive Program Report Amendment proposal. Aligned with the RARI Chain migration, this program allocates a fixed quarterly budget of $11,500 USD (totaling $23,000 USD) for Q3 and Q4 2025. Rewards for active participation, rationale posting, and proposal authorship will be paid in RARI tokens.

To ensure predictable spending and maximize delegate incentives, a $10,000 USD delegate incentive pool will be fully distributed each quarter. If collective earnings fall below this, a proportional bonus ensures the entire pool is utilized; if earnings exceed it, payouts are proportionally scaled down to meet the cap. Eligibility spans both RARI v1 (Ethereum) and RARI v2 (RARI Chain) Tally instances, with future program adjustments utilizing RARI Chain governance. This proposal, upon community discussion, will be submitted for an on-chain vote on Tally v2 RARI Chain, underscoring the DAO’s commitment to advancing governance on the RARI Chain ecosystem. Crucially, successful funding requires a separate, one-time vote on Tally v1 to transfer the entire $23,000 USD equivalent in RARI from the DAO treasury (on Ethereum) to a RARI Chain multisig wallet for disbursement.

Motivation

Effective governance is vital to the RARI DAO’s success. The ongoing RARI Chain migration, coupled with recent program reviews and community discussions, highlights the need for a clear, predictable, and sustainable framework for delegate compensation. This program directly addresses lessons learned from previous incentive periods and aims to:

  • Ensure predictable and sustainable delegate incentives by establishing a fixed quarterly budget, providing fiscal clarity for the DAO.

  • Encourage high-quality engagement through a refined reward system that values in-depth contributions across all governance activities.

  • Strongly incentivize impactful proposal authorship, particularly rewarding proposals that gain enough community support to reach and successfully pass an on-chain vote, driving new initiatives.

  • Support the ongoing transition and participation across both Tally v1 (Ethereum) and Tally v2 RARI Chain, with a clear focus on incentivizing activity on the new RARI Chain.

  • Address concerns about falling participation and quality by rewarding consistent, deep engagement across both Tally instances.

  • Counter unpredictable costs and promote scalability by implementing a fixed USD budget combined with a dynamic proportional distribution model. This structure ensures the total program cost never exceeds the predefined quarterly budget, unlike uncapped systems, providing essential financial predictability while allowing for broader participation even if delegate numbers significantly increase (e.g., to 30+ members).

  • Improve overall DAO governance activity, especially in light of multi-chain transition challenges.

Key Improvements and Differentiators from Previous Delegate Incentive Programs

This Delegate Incentive Program v2.0 is a direct evolution, designed to address critical feedback and improve upon the structure of its predecessor, RRC-40, and insights from the Q2 2025 Delegate Incentive Program Report Amendment proposal. This updated framework specifically aligns with the RARI Chain migration by emphasizing and incentivizing governance on Tally v2 RARI Chain.

The primary differentiator lies in its refined financial model and approach to delegate compensation:

  • Challenges with Previous Programs (e.g., RRC-40): The previous Delegate Incentive Program (RRC-40), with a larger quarterly budget (e.g., approximately $31,000 USD for Q1 2025), faced a significant challenge during periods of slow governance activity. When there were limited proposals or overall engagement, the high total budget, divided among a small number of active delegates, could lead to individual delegate payouts that felt disproportionately high or “unjustified” for the actual level of DAO activity. This created a perception of the DAO overspending relative to its output.

  • Solution in v2.0: Capped & Dynamically Distributed Pool: This proposal introduces a more predictable and equitable system:

  1. Reduced and Fixed Delegate Incentive Cap ($10,000 USD): The program establishes a strict $10,000 USD quarterly cap specifically for delegate incentives. This provides the DAO with precise financial predictability and prevents overall spending from escalating, regardless of delegate activity levels.

  2. Dynamic Per-Reward Value (via Overflow/Reduction): This is the core mechanism that ensures fairness and full utilization of the capped budget:

  • In Periods of Lower Activity (Under-utilization): If the calculated total rewards for all active delegates fall below the $10,000 pool (e.g., $7,500), the remaining funds are converted into an additional proportional bonus. This bonus is distributed among all eligible delegates, ensuring the entire $10,000 budget is used to incentivize continued participation. This ensures all payouts, even in periods of lower activity, represent a justified share of a fully utilized, capped $10,000 pool, ensuring funds are always put to work for incentives.

  • In Periods of Higher Activity (Over-utilization): Conversely, if the collective calculated rewards exceed the $10,000 cap (e.g., $12,000), all individual delegate RARI payouts will be proportionally scaled down to ensure the total distributed amount never exceeds the $10,000 budget. Each delegate’s payout decreases proportionally to their initially calculated earnings.

This refined approach transforms the incentive program into a fiscally predictable and transparent system that ensures the DAO’s allocated funds are always fully utilized for delegate incentives, while also providing fair compensation that adapts to the overall level of governance activity.

Specifications

1. Program Duration & Payment Schedule:

  • Program Period: This program will run for two quarters:

    • Q3 2025: July 1, 2025 – September 30, 2025

    • Q4 2025: October 1, 2025 – December 31, 2025

  • Retroactivity for Q3: Since July 1st has already passed, if this proposal is approved on Tally v2 RARI Chain, Q3 incentives will be applied retroactively to activity starting from July 1, 2025.

  • Payment Schedule: Payments to eligible delegates will occur quarterly, with an on-chain proposal for rewards shared at the end of each quarter.

  • Early Termination Clause: While the program is scheduled to run until December 31st, 2025, the RARI DAO can choose to terminate this program at any time prior to that date. Any such termination would require a separate, successful on-chain DAO vote, ensuring community consensus on ending the program. If terminated early, all unused funds from the program’s budget will be returned to the DAO treasury.

  • How the Program Can Adapt Over Time: To keep the program responsive to the evolving RARI ecosystem (including RARI price changes, delegate participation levels, and DAO priorities), its key parameters (like total quarterly budget, point values, and eligibility criteria) can be adjusted for future quarters through a new proposal and on-chain DAO vote. This flexibility is crucial if community activity, especially proposal authorship, significantly increases and impacts funds for the Voting & Engagement (V&E) pool.

2. Eligibility Criteria:

To be eligible for quarterly incentives, delegates must meet all of the following criteria:

  • Minimum RARI Delegation: Hold at least 2,000 RARI delegated on Tally v2 (RARI Chain) by the last day of the quarter. The Program Administrator will verify this status. This ensures new delegates joining mid-quarter can still qualify if they meet the threshold by the quarter’s end.

  • Minimum Karma Delegate Score of 60: Achieve a minimum Karma Delegate Score of 60 for their overall voting participation on all official DAO votes across both RARI v1 (Ethereum) and RARI v2 (RARI Chain) Tally instances for proposals during the 90-day quarter. This score combines voting activity from both chains. Delegates can check their Karma score here. This threshold aims to encourage consistent, broad governance participation, reflecting a strong commitment while being realistic about current engagement levels.

  • Proposal Inclusion for Quarter & Earning Rewards: To earn authorship rewards, a proposal must be submitted for voting on Tally (RARI v1 or RARI v2) before the quarter’s end. Similarly, for voting rewards, a vote counts towards the quarter in which the proposal was originally submitted to Tally, even if voting extends into the next quarter. This ensures all relevant proposals contribute to eligibility and reward earning for their respective quarter.

  • Active Delegate Thread: Maintain an active Delegate Thread on the RARI DAO Forum. This provides a public space for accountability, communication, and transparency with delegators and the wider community. This thread should be updated with voting rationales and significant contributions at least once per quarter.

  • Not Already Paid: Any delegate applying for incentives under this program must not be currently receiving payment from the RARI Foundation for professional delegate services during the program quarter.

  • Exclusion from Incentives for Program Authors/Administrators: The Program Administrator and the author of this specific Delegate Incentive Program proposal (v2.0), as well as any delegates who propose minor revisions to its parameters, are not eligible to claim points or rewards for authoring this proposal, for any future minor changes to its core parameters, or for administrative deliverables such as quarterly reports. Their compensation or contributions are recognized separately to prevent conflicts of interest and ensure the program encourages new, important governance initiatives.

3. Reward System (Fixed Base USD Equivalent):

Rewards will be distributed in RARI tokens based on the following fixed base USD equivalent amounts. All RARI payouts will be subject to a proportional adjustment at the end of the quarter to ensure the overall budget is met (details in Section 4).

On-chain Voting (Tally v1 Ethereum & Tally v2 RARI Chain): Up to $500 USD equivalent in RARI per quarter for casting votes (For/Against/Abstain) on all on-chain proposals. Prorated if votes are missed.

Rationale Posting: Up to $500 USD equivalent in RARI per quarter for posting thoughtful rationales in their delegate thread for on-chain votes. Prorated if rationales are missed.

  • Note: Rationales must clearly state the vote, provide concise reasoning, and contribute constructively.

Proposal Authorship:

  • $600 USD equivalent in RARI for each proposal authored that successfully reaches an on-chain vote (regardless of outcome).

  • Additionally, an extra $200 USD equivalent in RARI will be awarded if the authored proposal successfully passes its on-chain vote.

  • If co-authored, the reward is split evenly.

4. Program Budget & Reward Calculation: Predictable Spending & Dynamic Payouts

This section details the program’s fixed budget, how rewards are calculated based on delegate activity, and how the total payout dynamically adjusts to fit within the set budget, ensuring fiscal predictability and full utilization of allocated funds.

4.1. Quarterly Budget Breakdown:

For each quarter (Q3 2025 and Q4 2025), a fixed budget of $11,500 USD is allocated:

  • Program Administration Fee: $1,500 USD in RARI (500 USD/Month).

  • Delegate Incentive Pool: The remaining $10,000 USD is dedicated solely to delegate payments.

4.2. Calculating Individual Delegate Payouts:

  1. At the end of each quarter, the total calculated USD equivalent of RARI rewards for each eligible delegate will be determined by summing their earned rewards based on the fixed base amounts defined in Section 3 (e.g., $500 for voting, $500 for rationales, $600/$800 for proposals).

  2. The sum of all individual calculated rewards across all eligible delegates will be determined.

  3. Dynamic Adjustment to the $10,000 Delegate Incentive Pool:

Scenario A: Total calculated rewards are LESS THAN $10,000.

  • If the sum of all calculated delegate rewards is, for example, $7,500 (less than the $10,000 pool), the remaining $2,500 will be converted into an additional proportional bonus.

  • This bonus will be distributed among all eligible delegates, ensuring the full $10,000 budget is utilized. Each delegate’s payout increases proportionally to their initially calculated earnings.

Scenario B: Total calculated rewards are GREATER THAN $10,000.

  • If the sum of all calculated delegate rewards is, for example, $12,000 (more than the $10,000 cap), then all individual delegate RARI payouts will be proportionally scaled down to ensure the total distributed amount never exceeds the $10,000 budget. Each delegate’s payout decreases proportionally to their initially calculated earnings.

  • The final RARI amount for each delegate (after any proportional adjustment) will be converted to RARI using the spot price at the time of disbursement and then disbursed to their wallet.

4.3. Budget Sustainability & Scalability:

This program is designed to be financially sustainable and scalable for the DAO:

  • Fixed Overall Budget & Cap: The DAO commits to a predictable $11,500 USD per quarter. Crucially, the $10,000 USD delegate incentive pool acts as a strict cap on total delegate payouts, preventing unexpected cost increases even with a significant rise in active delegates

  • Dynamic Per-Reward Value: The value of each reward automatically adjusts to ensure the total budget is always met or not exceeded. This proportional distribution allows the program to effectively scale, rewarding more contributors from the same fixed budget.

Bridging the Governance Gap: Funding Mechanism for RARI Chain v2 Initiatives

This Delegate Incentive Program, designed for voting and implementation on Tally v2 RARI Chain, relies on the DAO’s treasury funds for its execution. It’s crucial to acknowledge that the primary DAO Treasury currently resides on Tally v1 (Ethereum), managed through a multi-signature wallet.

To ensure the successful and timely funding of this program, and to empower the growing governance activity on RARI Chain v2, the following funding mechanism will be employed:

  1. V2 Program Proposal First: This Delegate Incentive Program proposal will first undergo a community discussion period on the RARI DAO forum and then proceed to an on-chain vote on Tally v2 RARI Chain. The successful passage of this proposal will signify the RARI v2 community’s mandate for its implementation, further solidifying the strategic shift towards RARI Chain as the primary hub for RARI DAO governance.

  2. Separate V1 Funding Proposal (One-Time Transfer): Upon the successful passing of this Delegate Incentive Program proposal on Tally v2 RARI Chain, a secondary, highly focused proposal will be submitted on Tally v1 (Ethereum). This V1 proposal will specifically request the one-time transfer of the entire total program budget of $23,000 USD equivalent in RARI from the RARI DAO Treasury on Tally v1 (Ethereum) to the Program Administrator’s designated multi-signature wallet on RARI Chain, co-signed by the Program Administrator and members of the RARI DAO Security Council. All program disbursements will be made from this RARI Chain multisig.

  3. Rationale for V1 Approval: The passage of this specific funding proposal on Tally v1 (Ethereum) is essential. It directly enables the implementation of a critical, community-approved initiative from the RARI Chain v2 governance. By funding this program, v1 stakeholders actively support the growth, decentralization, and ongoing health of the entire RARI ecosystem and its future on the RARI Chain.

  4. Contingency: The implementation and disbursement of rewards for this Delegate Incentive Program are expressly contingent upon the successful passing and execution of the aforementioned funding proposal on Tally v1 (Ethereum).

This phased approach ensures fiscal responsibility by clearly linking the funding to a v1 vote after v2 delegates have approved the program itself. It streamlines the funding request on v1 while empowering v2 governance and enabling efficient program administration.

Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) & Monitoring: Tracking Progress

To ensure this refined program is effective, its impact will be monitored quarterly using the following Key Performance Indicators (KPIs). The proposal author will be responsible for monitoring and reporting these KPIs to the DAO on the forum. These metrics are designed to be clear, objective, and easy to track, providing comprehensive information for future adjustments.

  • Delegate Participation Rate: The percentage of eligible delegates who actively participate in governance, measured against the total number of delegates with 2,000+ RARI delegated. This shows how many active participants are present.

  • Average Overall Voting Participation Rate (Karma Score): The average percentage of Tally votes (across RARI v1 and v2) that eligible delegates participated in, as reliably tracked by Karma. This is a direct measure of how engaged delegates are in voting.

  • Number of Rationales: A clear count of rationales posted by eligible delegates on the RARI DAO Forum, reflecting the depth of engagement and discussion.

  • Number of New Proposals (Forum to Tally): The count of unique proposals that successfully began on the forum and then reached an on-chain Tally vote (either RARI v1 or v2). This measures the program’s success in encouraging new governance initiatives.

  • Proposal Passage Rate: The percentage of delegate-authored proposals that successfully pass their on-chain Tally votes. This indicates how effective and aligned delegate-led initiatives are with DAO consensus.

  • Total USD Paid Out: A direct measure of the total USD equivalent disbursed to delegates each quarter, providing transparent financial reporting.

Financial Commitments for Implementation

Upon successful approval of this proposal on Tally RARI v2 and the subsequent successful funding proposal on Tally v1, the RARI Foundation will ensure the necessary funds are available and managed as follows:

  • Fund Source: This Delegate Incentive Program will utilize existing funds held in the DAO Treasury at 0x83CBaF64b94D1eDfeDd468b23234DeCf2AecDD8b (Tally v1 Ethereum).

  • Total Program Budget Commitment: The RARI Foundation will ensure that the DAO Treasury’s balance of RARI (RARI Chain) is sufficient to cover the total program budget of $23,000 USD for Q3 and Q4 2025, ensuring committed funding for the program’s duration.

  • One-Time Transfer & Quarterly Disbursal: Once the entire $23,000 USD equivalent in RARI is transferred to the Program Administrator’s designated multi-signature wallet on RARI Chain, daospace, continuing in their role as Program Administrator, will manage the quarterly disbursements. Each quarter, $11,500 USD in RARI (at spot price) will be allocated for eligible delegates and the administration fee. All payments to delegates and the administrator will be made in RARI on RARI Chain.

Timeline

This section outlines the anticipated timeline for implementing the Delegate Incentive Program v2.0.

  • July 15, 2025: Proposal published to RARI DAO forum for community feedback.

  • July 15 - July 22, 2025: 7-day community discussion period on the forum.

  • July 22, 2025 (Approx.): Proposal submitted to Tally v2 RARI Chain for on-chain DAO vote.

  • Following Tally v2 Passage (Approx. July 29, 2025): A separate funding proposal submitted to Tally v1 (Ethereum) for the one-time transfer of the full $23,000 USD equivalent from the treasury to the Program Administrator’s designated multi-signature wallet on RARI Chain.

  • Following Tally v1 Funding Passage: Funds transferred to multisig, and Q3 2025 retroactive rewards calculated and disbursed at quarter-end.

Budget Breakdown (Total for Q3 & Q4 2025):

  • Total Program Budget: $23,000 USD

  • Delegate Incentives: $20,000 USD (2 quarters x $10,000/quarter)

  • Program Administration: $3,000 USD (2 quarters x $1,500/quarter)

6 Likes
#2

hi @coffee-crusher

After the Gov call yesterday, one of the suggestions was to plan the program expenses in $RARI - which I agree with, as it helps the DAO when the token price is low and better rewards the delegates when it’s high.
I was wondering if you’re considering modifying this in your proposal or keeping it as is?

–

Yesterday there was also discussion about the different ways this program could be gamed.
I like the idea of an end-of-quarter report and proposal to ensure there’s consensus around disbursements. I assume this practice will continue, and perhaps a monthly activity summary could also help keeping things running smooth.

2 Likes
#3

Hi @Jaf , I do like the idea of using $RARI token and mapping it to the incentive program. Even though there are numerous factors that affect the token price, in a small way, helping the DAO operate successfully is defiantly one of those factors, and as delegates we can contribute to that.

Based upon the conversations from the Governance overflow call, and I really appreciate your comments above, I’ve adjusted the proposal to reflect the use of $RARI as being more aligned with the delegates, which I think is a good thing.

Here’s the changes to the proposal, I would love to hear your thoughts on these adjustments:

The main change is that the program’s budget and all delegate rewards are now denominated directly in RARI tokens, rather than USD equivalents.

  • Fixed RARI Budget: The program now commits to a fixed quarterly budget of 75,000 RARI (Correction: 11,500 RARI) (with 60,000 RARI (Correction: 10,000 RARI) dedicated to the delegate incentive pool) for Q3 and Q4. This means the DAO has a precise, predictable outflow of RARI tokens.

  • Direct RARI Rewards: Delegates will now earn fixed RARI amounts for their actions (voting, rationales, proposals). This directly rewards delegates who are long-term holders, as the USD value of their earnings will appreciate with the RARI token. It also means that when RARI’s price is lower, delegates will receive more RARI tokens for their contributions, allowing for greater accumulation.

  • RARI-Denominated Pooling: The dynamic pooling mechanism now ensures that the entire 60,000 (Correction: 10,000) RARI delegate pool is always distributed. If calculated rewards fall below the cap due to lower activity, the remaining RARI is distributed as a proportional bonus. If calculated rewards exceed the cap due to high activity, payouts are proportionally scaled down to fit the 60,000 (Correction: 10,000) RARI limit. This provides a predictable token distribution model for the DAO and ensures all allocated RARI tokens are actively used to incentivize delegates.

Regarding your points on accountability:

  • Quarterly Reporting: Absolutely, the practice of end-of-quarter reports and on-chain proposals for disbursements will continue as a core component of transparency, as detailed in the KPIs section.

  • Monthly Summaries: Your suggestion for monthly activity summaries is excellent! While not in the core proposal to avoid over-scoping, I agree it would be a valuable operational enhancement. I believe the Program Administrator (daospace) could certainly implement this to keep everyone more regularly informed.

If there is consensus to these changes, I can repost below in the comments the proposal in it’s entirety with these updates to make it easier to read and understand. Thks!

2 Likes
Karma Oracle for staking rewards
#4

Thank you for putting this up, Coffee!

Just a quick question, if we are dedicating 75,000 RARI per quarter as you mention here

isn’t that way higher than the previous program’s 11k USD? Or is this a typo?

Also, just as a side note, I think @Jaf comment on planning the program’s expenses in $RARI implies replacing the USD denominations in the main prop with $RARI. It is still somewhat confusing as it is currently.

1 Like
#5

Hi @WinVerse ,

Oh my goodness, thank you so much for catching that, yes, it was definitely a typo - from a much earlier proposal draft. Yikes!

OK, here’s the correct version (and I will correct the amounts in the my response to @Jaf above (sorry about that, Jaf, I should have double-checked it):

The intended scale of the program, in terms of its original USD value, remains at approx. $11,500 USD per quarter (including admin fees). Based on the feedback from the Gov Overflow call this week, to fully move the budget to RARI, so I’ve set the total quarterly budget at a fixed 11,500 RARI. This means:

  • The delegate incentive pool will be 10,000 RARI per quarter.
  • The program administration will be 1,500 RARI per quarter.

How a RARI denominated budget aligns with the delegates:

  1. Direct Investment & Shared Success: When delegates earn RARI directly for their contributions, they become even more deeply invested in the long-term success and value appreciation of the RARI token and the entire RARI Chain ecosystem. The delegates compensation literally grows with the network that we’re actively helping to govern, creating a powerful incentive for sustained, high-quality engagement.

  2. Strategic Accumulation Opportunity: By earning a fixed number of RARI tokens, the delegates have the opportunity to accumulate more RARI during periods when the token’s price is lower in USD terms. This provides a strategic advantage for those who believe in the DAO’s future and want to build their holdings, and potential self-staking to increase their voting power.

How a RARI denominated budget supports the DAO:

  1. Predictable tokenomics and treasury management: The DAO now commits to distributing a fixed quantity of RARI tokens each quarter. This provides predictability for our tokenomics and treasury outflow, making it easier to manage our token supply, inflation considerations, and long-term financial planning related to our token.

  2. Maximizing RARI utility: The dynamic pooling ensures that the entire allocated RARI token pool is always distributed. Every token committed to incentives is put directly into the hands of active contributors, maximizing the utility of the token for governance.

  3. Flexible USD cost (benefit in downturns): While the USD cost of the program will fluctuate with RARI’s market price, the DAO’s USD expenditure for the program will be lower when the RARI token price is low. This provides a built-in advantage during market downturns, allowing the DAO to fund its incentive program more efficiently in USD terms when the token price is depressed.

Addressing Other Inconsistencies

  • Inconsistent USD cap: You also are correct in identifying a leftover phrase about a “$10,000 USD quarterly cap” in the “Key Improvements” section. That was an error from a previous draft. The cap for delegate incentives is now strictly 10,000 RARI per quarter, as detailed in the “Program Budget & Reward Calculation” section.

  • Overall RARI denomination: And yes, you’re spot on regarding @Jaf 's comment and the overall confusion about mixed denominations. My aim was to make the proposal fully RARI-denominated, and I’ve included below (for easier reading) the revised proposal with the RARI dominations to ensure all budget figures and individual reward amounts (e.g., 500 RARI for voting, 600 RARI for authorship, etc.) are consistently in RARI.

Thank you so much for finding these inconsistencies, I hope that it’s clearer to understand and read. Please let me know if you have any more questions or suggestions! Appreciate your help!

2 Likes
#6

RM @coffee-crusher

How do you think this proposal can really motivate more delegates to remain active? And how is the issue of transparency and participation in the distribution of funds per quarter (Q) thinking? I think it could be considered to use a system like EAS (Ethereum Attestation Service) to record on-chain of what the delegates do and reward them in a traceable way.

Is it planned to review the program periodically to adjust or improve according to how the KPIS go? Do you have any clear goal for this Q3, as a certain number of new proposals or active delegates?

Actions to be executed are mentioned, but it would be important to know how that progress will be measured and in which spaces or tools can be consulted. Having this clear information can help you all aligned.

I also believe that it would be very valuable for one of the delegates to follow up and concentrate the documentation of what is being achieved. If not, this initiative may remain only as a good idea, but without landing concrete results beyond the general objective of activating the network of delegates.

Finally, I think it would be useful to establish some measurable objectives from the beginning - although approximately - to evaluate the impact more clearly and improve the program on the road.

I love these initiatives and all the work done, congratulated them for this type of initiatives. Especially the programs that foster with the purpose are increasingly rewarding and necessary on Web3.

See you around here.
Let’s Keep Building <3

3 Likes
#7

Thank you so much to @Jaf , @WinVerse , @sohobiit for their feedback on Forum, and for the delegate feedback at last week’s Governance call. As a result, I’ve consolidated all the recommendations and changes and reposted the entire proposal below so it’s easier to read and understand. Please let me know if you have any questions or feedback. Thanks!

Here’s what’s new:

  • New Financial Model Explained: Added a section detailing how this program uses a fixed RARI budget with dynamic payouts to avoid past issues and ensure predictable spending.

  • Why RARI Rewards: Included a section explaining why RARI tokens are the ideal currency for delegate incentives, benefiting both delegates and the DAO.

  • Karma Score Simplified: The Karma Delegate Score calculation is now clearly explained, making it easier for delegates to understand how to qualify.

  • Ambitious New Goals: Set clear, ambitious targets for delegate participation and the number of delegate-authored proposals per quarter.

  • Future Transparency: Added a section on exploring advanced transparency tools like On-chain Attestation (EAS) for future program iterations.

Updated: RRC-XX: Delegate Incentive Program v2.0 for RARI DAO Governance

Original Date of Submission: July 15, 2025

Author: coffee-crusher

Abstract

This proposal introduces the RARI DAO Delegate Incentive Program v2.0, a refined and sustainable compensation framework for active delegates. It replaces RRC-40 and builds upon insights from RRC-47. Aligned with the RARI Chain migration, this program allocates a fixed quarterly budget of 11,500 RARI (totaling 23,000 RARI) for Q3 and Q4 2025. Rewards for active participation, rationale posting, and proposal authorship will be paid in fixed RARI tokens.

To ensure predictable token distribution and maximize delegate incentives, a 10,000 RARI delegate incentive pool will be fully distributed each quarter. If collective earnings fall below this, a proportional bonus ensures the entire pool is utilized; if earnings exceed it, payouts are proportionally scaled down to meet the cap. Eligibility spans both RARI v1 (Ethereum) and RARI v2 (RARI Chain) Tally instances, with future program adjustments utilizing RARI Chain governance. This proposal, upon community discussion, will be submitted for an on-chain vote on Tally v2 RARI Chain, underscoring the DAO’s commitment to advancing governance on the RARI ecosystem. Crucially, successful funding requires a separate, one-time vote on Tally v1 to transfer the entire 23,000 RARI from the DAO treasury (on Ethereum) to a RARI Chain multisig wallet for disbursement.

Motivation

Effective governance is vital to the RARI DAO’s success. The ongoing RARI Chain migration, coupled with recent program reviews and community discussions, highlights the need for a clear, predictable, and sustainable framework for delegate compensation.

This program directly addresses lessons learned from previous incentive periods and aims to:

  • Ensure predictable and sustainable delegate incentives by establishing a fixed quarterly RARI token budget, providing clear tokenomics for the DAO.

  • Encourage and sustain high-quality engagement through a refined reward system that values in-depth contributions across all governance activities, fostering a committed and active delegate community.

  • Strongly incentivize impactful proposal authorship, particularly rewarding proposals that gain enough community support to reach and successfully pass an on-chain vote, driving new initiatives.

  • Support the ongoing transition and participation across both Tally v1 (Ethereum) and Tally v2 RARI Chain, with a clear focus on incentivizing activity on the new RARI Chain.

  • Address concerns about falling participation and quality by rewarding consistent, deep engagement across both Tally instances.

  • Expand the active delegate base by attracting new contributors and retaining existing ones, ensuring a robust and diverse governance ecosystem.

  • Counter unpredictable RARI token outflow and promote scalability by implementing a fixed RARI token budget combined with a dynamic proportional distribution model. This structure ensures the total RARI tokens distributed never exceed the predefined quarterly budget, unlike uncapped individual reward systems. This provides essential tokenomic predictability while allowing for broader participation even if delegate numbers significantly increase (e.g., to 30+ members).

  • Improve overall DAO governance activity, especially in light of multi-chain transition challenges.

Key Improvements and Differentiators from Previous Delegate Incentive Programs

This Delegate Incentive Program v2.0 is a direct evolution, designed to address critical feedback and improve upon the structure of its predecessor, RRC-40, and insights from RRC-47. This updated framework specifically aligns with the RARI Chain migration by emphasizing and incentivizing governance on Tally v2 RARI Chain.

The primary differentiator lies in its refined financial model and approach to delegate compensation:

  • Challenges with Previous Programs (e.g., RRC-40): The previous Delegate Incentive Program (RRC-40), with a larger quarterly budget (e.g., approximately 31,000 USD for Q1 2025), faced a significant challenge during periods of slow governance activity. When there were limited proposals or overall engagement, the high total budget, divided among a small number of active delegates, could lead to individual delegate payouts that felt disproportionately high or “unjustified” for the actual level of DAO activity. This created a perception of the DAO overspending relative to its output.

  • Solution in v2.0: Capped & Dynamically Distributed RARI Pool: This proposal introduces a more predictable and equitable system:

  1. Reduced and Fixed Delegate Incentive Cap (10,000 RARI): The program establishes a strict 10,000 RARI quarterly cap specifically for delegate incentives. This provides the DAO with precise tokenomic predictability and prevents overall RARI distribution from escalating, regardless of delegate activity levels.

  2. Dynamic Per-Reward Value (via Overflow/Reduction): This is the core mechanism that ensures fairness and full utilization of the capped RARI budget:

  • In Periods of Lower Activity (Under-utilization): If the calculated total RARI rewards for all active delegates fall below the 10,000 RARI pool (e.g., 8,000 RARI), the remaining 2,000 RARI will be converted into an additional proportional bonus. This bonus will be distributed among all eligible delegates, ensuring the full 10,000 RARI budget is used to incentivize continued participation. This ensures all payouts, even in periods of lower activity, represent a justified share of a fully utilized, capped 10,000 RARI pool, ensuring tokens are always put to work for incentives.

  • In Periods of Higher Activity (Over-utilization): Conversely, if the collective calculated RARI rewards exceed the 10,000 RARI cap (e.g., 12,000 RARI), all individual delegate RARI payouts will be proportionaly scaled down to ensure the total distributed amount never exceeds the 10,000 RARI budget. Each delegate’s payout decreases proportionally to their initially calculated earnings.

This refined approach transforms the incentive program into a fiscally predictable and transparent system that ensures the DAO’s allocated RARI tokens are always fully utilized for delegate incentives, while also providing fair compensation that adapts to the overall level of governance activity.

Why Using RARI for This Program is the Right Approach

Implementing this incentive program directly in RARI tokens offers a powerful dual benefit, aligning incentives with delegates and providing crucial support for the RARI DAO’s long-term vision and tokenomics.

How it Aligns with Delegates:

  1. Direct Investment & Shared Success: When delegates earn RARI directly for their contributions, they become even more deeply invested in the long-term success and value appreciation of the RARI token and the entire RARI ecosystem. The delegates’ compensation grows with the network they’re actively helping to govern, creating a powerful incentive for sustained, high-quality engagement.

  2. Strategic Accumulation Opportunity: By earning a fixed number of RARI tokens, the delegates have the opportunity to accumulate more RARI during periods when the token’s price is lower in USD terms. This provides a strategic advantage for those who believe in the DAO’s future and want to build their holdings, and the opportunity to self-stake to increase their voting power.

How it Supports the DAO:

  1. Predictable Tokenomics and Treasury Management: The DAO now commits to distributing a fixed quantity of RARI tokens each quarter. This provides predictability for tokenomics and treasury outflow, making it easier to manage token supply, inflation considerations, and long-term financial planning related to the token.

  2. Maximizing RARI Utility: The dynamic pooling ensures that the entire allocated RARI token pool is always distributed. Every token committed to incentives is put directly into the hands of active contributors, maximizing the utility of the token for governance.

  3. Flexible USD Cost (Benefit in Downturns): While the USD cost of the program will fluctuate with RARI’s market price, the DAO’s USD expenditure for the program will be lower when the RARI token price is low. This provides a built-in advantage during market downturns, allowing the DAO to fund its incentive program more efficiently in USD terms when the token price is depressed.

Specifications

1. Program Duration & Payment Schedule

  • Program Period: This program will run for two quarters:

  • Q3 2025: July 1, 2025 – September 30, 2025

  • Q4 2025: October 1, 2025 – December 31, 2025

  • Retroactivity for Q3: Since July 1st has already passed, if this proposal is approved on Tally v2 RARI Chain, Q3 incentives will be applied retroactively to activity starting from July 1, 2025.

  • Payment Schedule: Payments to eligible delegates will occur quarterly, with an on-chain proposal for rewards submitted to Tally v2 RARI Chain shared at the end of each quarter.

  • Early Termination Clause: While the program is scheduled to run until December 31st, 2025, the RARI DAO can choose to terminate this program at any time prior to that date. Any such termination would require a separate, successful on-chain DAO vote, ensuring community consensus on ending the program. If terminated early, all unused funds from the program’s budget will be returned to the DAO treasury.

  • How the Program Can Adapt Over Time: To keep the program responsive to the evolving RARI ecosystem (including RARI price changes, delegate participation levels, and DAO priorities), its key parameters (like total quarterly budget in RARI, point values, and eligibility criteria) can be adjusted for future quarters through a new proposal and on-chain DAO vote. This flexibility is crucial if community activity, especially proposal authorship, significantly increases and impacts funds for the Voting & Engagement (V&E) pool.

2. Eligibility Criteria

To be eligible for quarterly incentives, delegates must meet all of the following criteria:

  • Minimum RARI Delegation: Hold at least 2,000 RARI delegated on Tally v2 (RARI Chain) by the last day of the quarter. The Program Administrator will verify this status. This ensures new delegates joining mid-quarter can still qualify if they meet the threshold by the quarter’s end.

  • Minimum Karma Delegate Score of 60: Achieve a minimum Karma Delegate Score of 60 for their 90-day on-chain voting participation rate on all DAO votes across both RARI v1 (Ethereum) and RARI v2 (RARI Chain) Tally instances for proposals during the quarter. Delegates can check their Karma score here. This threshold aims to encourage consistent, broad governance participation, reflecting a strong commitment while being realistic about current engagement levels.

  • Note on Karma Score Updates: Karma scores on Tally are typically updated after a proposal’s vote has been executed on-chain, not immediately after the voting period closes. Delegates should be aware of this delay when checking their eligibility.

  • Understanding Karma Score Calculation: For delegate eligibility on Tally, the “Karma Delegate Score” (specifically the 90-day on-chain votes percentage) is largely a direct reflection of your voting participation rate. For example, if you voted on 60% of eligible proposals in the last 90 days, your Karma score for that component would likely be 60.

  • Proposal Inclusion for Quarter & Earning Rewards: To earn authorship rewards, a proposal must be submitted for voting on Tally (RARI v1 or RARI v2) before the quarter’s end. Similarly, for voting rewards, a vote counts towards the quarter in which the proposal was originally submitted to Tally, even if voting extends into the next quarter. This ensures all relevant proposals contribute to eligibility and reward earning for their respective quarter.

  • Active Delegate Thread: Maintain an active Delegate Thread on the RARI DAO Forum. This provides a public space for accountability, communication, and transparency with delegators and the wider community. This thread should be updated with voting rationales and significant contributions at least once per quarter.

  • Not Already Paid: Any delegate applying for incentives under this program must not be currently receiving payment from the RARI Foundation for professional delegate services during the program quarter.

  • Exclusion from Incentives for Program Authors/Administrators: The Program Administrator and the author of this specific Delegate Incentive Program proposal (v2.0), as well as any delegates who propose minor revisions to its parameters, are not eligible to claim points or rewards for authoring this proposal, for any future minor changes to its core parameters, or for administrative deliverables such as quarterly reports. Their compensation or contributions are recognized separately to prevent conflicts of interest and ensure the program encourages new, important governance initiatives.

3. Reward System (Fixed RARI Amounts)

Rewards will be distributed in fixed RARI token amounts based on the following:

On-chain Voting (Tally v1 Ethereum & Tally v2 RARI Chain): Up to 500 RARI per quarter for casting votes (For/Against/Abstain) on all on-chain proposals. Prorated if votes are missed.

Rationale Posting: Up to 500 RARI per quarter for posting thoughtful rationales in their delegate thread for on-chain votes. Prorated if rationales are missed.

  • Note: Rationales must clearly state the vote, provide concise reasoning, and contribute constructively.

Proposal Authorship:

  • 600 RARI for each proposal authored that successfully reaches an on-chain vote (regardless of outcome).

  • Additionally, an extra 200 RARI will be awarded if the authored proposal successfully passes its on-chain vote.

  • If co-authored, the reward is split evenly.

  • To maintain fairness and avoid conflicts of interest, proposals are not eligible for authorship rewards under this program if they are designed to directly compensate the author(s). This includes proposals where the author(s) are intended to be a grant recipient or a paid member of a committee, Security Council, or working group. This rule encourages delegates to focus on initiatives that broadly benefit the DAO.

4. Program Budget & Reward Calculation: Predictable Spending & Dynamic Payouts

This section details the program’s fixed RARI budget, how rewards are calculated based on delegate activity, and how the total RARI payout dynamically adjusts to fit within the set budget, ensuring predictable token outflow and full utilization of allocated funds.

4.1. Quarterly Budget Breakdown:

For each quarter (Q3 2025 and Q4 2025), a fixed budget of 11,500 RARI is allocated:

  • Program Administration Fee: 1,500 RARI (500 RARI/Month).
  • Delegate Incentive Pool: The remaining 10,000 RARI is dedicated solely to delegate payments.

4.2. Calculating Individual Delegate Payouts:

  1. At the end of each quarter, the total calculated RARI rewards for each eligible delegate will be determined by summing their earned rewards based on the fixed RARI amounts defined in Section 3 (e.g., 500 RARI for voting, 500 RARI for rationales, 600/800 RARI for proposals).

  2. The sum of all individual calculated rewards across all eligible delegates will be determined.

  3. Dynamic Adjustment to the 10,000 RARI Delegate Incentive Pool:

Scenario A: Total calculated rewards are LESS THAN 10,000 RARI.

  • If the sum of all calculated delegate rewards is, for example, 8,000 RARI (less than the 10,000 RARI pool), the remaining 2,000 RARI will be converted into an additional proportional bonus.

  • This bonus will be distributed among all eligible delegates, ensuring the full 10,000 RARI budget is used to incentivize continued participation. This ensures all payouts, even in periods of lower activity, represent a justified share of a fully utilized, capped 10,000 RARI pool, ensuring tokens are always put to work for incentives.

Scenario B: Total calculated rewards are GREATER THAN 10,000 RARI.

  • If the sum of all calculated delegate rewards is, for example, 12,000 RARI (more than the 10,000 RARI cap), then all individual delegate RARI payouts will be proportionaly scaled down to ensure the total distributed amount never exceeds the 10,000 RARI budget. Each delegate’s payout decreases proportionally to their initially calculated earnings.
  1. The final RARI amount for each delegate (after any proportional adjustment) will be disbursed to their wallet, following a successful on-chain vote on Tally v2 RARI Chain for the quarterly rewards proposal.

4.3. Budget Sustainability & Scalability:

This program is designed to be financially sustainable and scalable for the DAO:

  • Fixed Overall Budget & Cap: The DAO commits to a predictable 11,500 RARI per quarter. Crucially, the 10,000 RARI delegate incentive pool acts as a strict cap on total delegate payouts, preventing unexpected RARI token outflow even with a significant rise in active delegates.

  • Dynamic Per-Reward Value: The value of each reward automatically adjusts to ensure the total RARI budget is always met or not exceeded. This proportional distribution allows the program to effectively scale, rewarding more contributors from the same fixed RARI budget.

Bridging the Governance Gap: Funding Mechanism for RARI Chain v2 Initiatives

This Delegate Incentive Program, designed for voting and implementation on Tally v2 RARI Chain, relies on the DAO’s treasury funds for its execution. It’s crucial to acknowledge that the primary DAO Treasury currently resides on Tally v1 (Ethereum), managed through a multi-signature wallet.

To ensure the successful and timely funding of this program, and to empower the growing governance activity on RARI Chain v2, the following funding mechanism will be employed:

  1. V2 Program Proposal First: This Delegate Incentive Program proposal will first undergo a community discussion period on the RARI DAO forum and then proceed to an on-chain vote on Tally v2 RARI Chain. The successful passage of this proposal will signify the RARI v2 community’s mandate for its implementation, further solidifying the strategic shift towards RARI Chain as the primary hub for RARI DAO governance.

  2. Separate V1 Funding Proposal (One-Time Transfer): Upon the successful passing of this Delegate Incentive Program proposal on Tally v2 RARI Chain, a secondary, highly focused proposal will be submitted on Tally v1 (Ethereum). This V1 proposal will specifically request the one-time transfer of the entire total program budget of 23,000 RARI from the RARI DAO Treasury on Tally v1 (Ethereum) to the Program Administrator’s designated multi-signature wallet on RARI Chain, co-signed by the Program Administrator and members of the RARI DAO Security Council. All program disbursements will be made from this RARI Chain multisig.

  3. Rationale for V1 Approval: The passage of this specific funding proposal on Tally v1 (Ethereum) is essential. It directly enables the implementation of a critical, community-approved initiative from the RARI Chain v2 governance. By funding this program, v1 stakeholders actively support the growth, decentralization, and ongoing health of the entire RARI ecosystem and its future on RARI Chain.

  4. Contingency: The implementation and disbursement of rewards for this Delegate Incentive Program are expressly contingent upon the successful passing and execution of the aforementioned funding proposal on Tally v1 (Ethereum).

This phased approach ensures fiscal responsibility by clearly linking the funding to a v1 vote after v2 delegates has approved the program itself. It streamlines the funding request on v1 while empowering v2 governance and enabling efficient program administration.

Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) & Monitoring: Tracking Progress

To ensure the effectiveness of this refined program, its impact will be systematically monitored. The proposal author will be responsible for tracking key performance indicators (KPIs) and providing regular reports to the DAO on the forum. These metrics are designed to be clear, objective, and easy to track, offering comprehensive information for ongoing adjustments and future iterations of the program.

  • Monthly Activity Snapshots: To keep the community consistently informed, the proposal author will provide concise monthly summaries on the RARI DAO Forum. These updates will highlight recent delegate activity and key governance metrics, offering a frequent pulse check on the program’s progress.

  • Quarterly KPI Reports: At the end of each quarter, the proposal author will publish a comprehensive report detailing the performance against all defined KPIs on the RARI DAO Forum. These reports will serve as the primary documentation of the program’s achievements and impact, drawing data from on-chain sources (Tally v1 and v2) and forum activity.

  • Total Number of Eligible Delegates: The absolute count of delegates who meet all eligibility criteria for the quarter (i.e., those with >= 2,000 RARI delegated and a Karma Score of 60+ by quarter-end). This tracks the overall size of the active delegate pool. Ambitious Goal: The aim is to grow the eligible delegate base to a minimum of 15 delegates by the end of Q4 2025. This target represents a significant increase from current active numbers. While previous program iterations (RRC-40) saw an average of 12 eligible delegates in Q1 and 8 in Q2, this v2.0 program introduces more predictable and sustainable incentives. The goal of 15 delegates reflects a commitment to not only reversing previous trends but also to substantially expanding participation and retention through a more robust and transparent framework. It is important to note that while this is a key quantitative objective, the program’s overall success will also be evaluated based on the qualitative contributions of delegates (e.g., proposal authorship, voting quality, rationales) and the program’s financial sustainability as outlined by its fixed budget. This target, and the program parameters, are designed to be flexible and will inform future iterations based on real-world performance and evolving DAO needs, ensuring a sustainable and adaptable incentive mechanism.

  • Number of Newly Qualified Delegates (per quarter): This specifically tracks the count of delegates who meet all eligibility criteria for the first time within this Delegate Incentive Program v2.0 during the current quarter. This includes both completely new delegates to the RARI DAO governance space, and existing delegates who had not previously met the criteria for this program’s incentives (regardless of their participation in prior programs like RRC-40).

  • Delegate Participation Rate: The percentage of eligible delegates who actively participate in governance, measured against the total number of delegates with 2,000+ RARI delegated. This shows how many active participants are present relative to the potential pool.

  • Average Overall Voting Participation Rate (Karma Score): The average percentage of Tally votes (across RARI v1 and v2) that eligible delegates participated in, as reliably tracked by Karma. This is a direct measure of how engaged delegates are in voting.

  • Number of Rationales: A clear count of rationales posted by eligible delegates on the RARI DAO Forum, reflecting the depth of engagement and discussion.

  • Number of New Proposals (Forum to Tally): The count of unique proposals that successfully began on the forum and then reached an on-chain Tally vote (either RARI v1 or v2). This measures the program’s success in encouraging new governance initiatives. Ambitious Goal: For both Q3 and Q4 2025, aim for a minimum of 7 new delegate-authored proposals successfully reaching an on-chain vote per quarter. This goal emphasizes fostering new initiatives vital for DAO progression and establishes delegates as key drivers of new proposals. While Q1 and Q2 each saw 5 delegate-authored proposals, this target of 7 represents a significant and challenging increase over the established baseline. It aims to push delegate engagement and leverage the new incentive structure to foster consistent, high-quality, and impactful contributions, ensuring a robust pipeline of delegate-led initiatives without encouraging a focus purely on quantity.

  • Proposal Passage Rate: The percentage of delegate-authored proposals that successfully pass their on-chain Tally votes. This indicates how effective and aligned delegate-led initiatives are with DAO consensus.

  • Total RARI Paid Out: A direct measure of the total RARI tokens disbursed to delegates each quarter, providing transparent financial reporting.

Future Transparency & Accountability Enhancements

  • Exploring On-chain Attestation (EAS): In the interest of maximizing transparency and verifiability of delegate contributions, the DAO will explore the feasibility of integrating a system like the Ethereum Attestation Service (EAS). This could allow for on-chain recording of delegate actions and earned rewards, providing a cryptographically traceable record of participation. This potential enhancement will be considered for future iterations of the program, subject to technical feasibility and community consensus.

Financial Commitments for Implementation

Upon successful approval of this proposal on Tally RARI v2 and the subsequent successful funding proposal on Tally v1, the RARI Foundation will ensure the necessary funds are available and managed as follows:

  • Fund Source: This Delegate Incentive Program will utilize existing funds held in the DAO Treasury at 0x83CBaF64b94D1eDfeDd468b23234DeCf2AecDD8b (Tally v1 Ethereum).

  • Total Program Budget Commitment: The RARI Foundation will ensure that the DAO Treasury’s balance of RARI (RARI Chain) is sufficient to cover the total program budget of 23,000 RARI for Q3 and Q4 2025, ensuring committed funding for the program’s duration.

  • One-Time Transfer & Quarterly Disbursal: Once the entire 23,000 RARI is transferred to the Program Administrator’s designated multi-signature wallet on RARI Chain, daospace, continuing in their role as Program Administrator, will manage the quarterly disbursements. Each quarter, 11,500 RARI will be allocated for eligible delegates and the administration fee. All payments to delegates and the administrator will be made in RARI on RARI Chain.

Timeline

This section outlines the anticipated timeline for implementing the Delegate Incentive Program v2.0.

  • July 15, 2025: Proposal published to RARI DAO forum for community feedback.

  • July 15 - July 22, 2025: 7-day community discussion period on the forum.

  • July 22, 2025 (Approx.): Proposal submitted to Tally v2 RARI Chain for on-chain DAO vote.

  • Following Tally v2 Passage (Approx. July 29, 2025): A separate funding proposal submitted to Tally v1 (Ethereum) for the one-time transfer of the full 23,000 RARI from the treasury to the Program Administrator’s designated multi-signature wallet on RARI Chain.

  • Following Tally v1 Funding Passage: Funds transferred to multisig, and Q3 2025 retroactive rewards calculated and disbursed at quarter-end.

Budget Breakdown (Total for Q3 & Q4 2025):

  • Total Program Budget: 23,000 RARI

  • Delegate Incentives: 20,000 RARI (2 quarters x 10,000 RARI/quarter)

  • Program Administration: 3,000 RARI (2 quarters x 1,500 RARI/quarter)

1 Like
#8

Gm @sohobiit , thank you so much for adding your thoughts and also providing some excellent additions to refine the proposal, thank you!

To address your questions and comments, here’s how your suggestions helped shape the latest proposal version:

  • On Motivation & Fund Transparency: You asked about motivating delegates and transparent fund distribution. The new fixed 10,000 RARI incentive pool (fully distributed each quarter) directly addresses this. The ‘Key Improvements’ section details how this dynamic system ensures all funds are used effectively and transparently.

  • Exploring On-chain Attestation (EAS): Your suggestion to use EAS is excellent, I loved this idea! So I’ve added a new section, ‘Future Transparency & Accountability Enhancements,’ specifically mentioning that the community should explore integrating EAS for future iterations to ensure traceable, robust records.

  • Periodic Program Review: Absolutely yes, the proposal includes a ‘How the Program Can Adapt Over Time’ section, explicitly stating that key parameters can be refined through new proposals and on-chain votes based on KPI performance, keeping the program responsive.

  • Clear Quarterly Goals: Thanks to your great suggestion, this was truly missing from the previous draft to help measure forward movement! I’ve added clear ambitious quantitative goals to the ‘Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) & Monitoring’ section: aiming for a minimum of 15 eligible delegates by end of Q4 2025, and 7 delegate-authored proposals reaching an on-chain vote per quarter for Q3 and Q4 2025.

  • Measuring Progress & Where to Find Updates: I’ve greatly expanded the ‘Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) & Monitoring’ section. I’ll also provide Monthly Activity Snapshots and comprehensive Quarterly KPI Reports on the RARI DAO Forum as the proposal author.

  • Delegate Follow-up & Documentation: Your point about follow-up and documentation is important. As the proposal author, I will be publishing these monthly and quarterly progress reports, to ensure the transparent follow-up on achievements and concrete results.

Thanks so much for your great feedback and comments!

2 Likes
#9

Your proposal is very detailed and I like what I am seeing. 10,000 RARI per quarter seems fair towards the delegates and the treasury.

What I am worried about is that there are 2 proposals now, and the best proposal might not see the light.

Since there are only 2 quarters left, I tend to try out both proposals, 1 for each quarter. From this experience we can learn and choose the best afterwards.

Thanks again for writing this proposal @coffee-crusher

#10

Hi @forexus , thank you so much for taking the time to review the proposal and for your kind words! I really appreciate your support for the 10,000 RARI per quarter structure.

I want to clarify your concern about there being ‘2 proposals now’ and the idea of ‘trying out both.’ This V2 Delegate Incentive proposal is designed as the direct replacement for the entire RRC-40 framework, which ran for Q1 and Q2 (with Q2 having some amendments via RRC-47).

RRC-40 was originally put forth with the understanding that the DAO would learn and adapt from its performance to make adjustments for future quarters. This V2 Delegate Incentive proposal is that new, adjusted, and improved program. It directly incorporates all the lessons the DAO learned from RRC-40’s operations during Q1 and Q2, especially regarding budget predictability.

So, instead of having two active proposals or trying to run RRC-40/47 for another quarter, this V2 Delegate Incentive proposal is the proposed incentive program moving forward for Q3 and Q4. I’ve built it to address the pain points identified across the DAO’s previous experiences, offering a more predictable and sustainable framework.

Plus, this V2 Delegate Incentive proposal itself is already designed with built-in flexibility to adapt and improve based on KPIs and community feedback. This built-in flexibility ensures the DAO can continually learn from its performance and refine the program throughout Q3 and Q4 2025, while informing future decisions on its continuation and parameters.

#11

Thank you @coffee-crusher for this updated Delegate Incenitve Program.

In our opinion this design is going too complex without achieving the core goals we discussed for the Delegate Incentive Program. Here are some notes:

  • On encouraging participation: While the general vision is that the program should encourage new delegate participation, this version doubles down on some features that in our view go against this goal:

    • Pooled rewards: We discussed how fixed pooled rewards mean the more delegates, the lower the rewards delegates get for the same activities, limiting the number of delegates that can engage with a fair compensation. This update seems to overcomplicate the initial program mechanism with an indistinguishable outcome.
    • Karma score: While the delegate discussion called for more inclusivity, this update included an extra requirement to participate: Karma Score. Initially designed for Rari Staking, including it as a requirement would mean new delegates need to be active for at least 90 days before being eligible for incentives. Why adding more requirements for new delegates to participate when we agreed the program aims for more participation? Isn’t 2,000 RARI delegation enough?

  • Proposal authorship: We addressed in the delegate call how the suggested proposal authorship bonus is easily gameable and doesn’t align with a healthy, permissionless, governance system. Rewarding delegates for simply submitting a proposal onchain regardless of the voting outcome incentivizes irrelevant submissions that do not fully align with the DAO’s best interest.

  • On sending two quarter’s Program funding to a multisig: With the program still in an evolutionary phase, and different budgets being approved every quarter, we don’t see how sending the funds to a multisig makes the process any more efficient, as sending two quarter’s funds to a multisig would not reduce but increase operational burden, as two Tally votes would be needed anyway (one for each quarter allocation) and setting up a multisig and distributing the funds would require multiple signers for each transaction. In addition, if the program budget were to increase, additional funds would have to be sent to the multisig for Q4.

  • On the two vote system: while the transition to Rari Chain creates inefficiencies, the proposed voting sequence is difficult to justify. Is Rari DAO in mainnet (which holds the custody of Treasury funds) expected to comply and vote “For” a positive outcome determined in the Rari Chain DAO? I am not sure if I understood the process correctly but if so, that would mean a hierarchical relationship between mainnet and Rari Chain DAOs that has not been yet discussed. In addition, the latest view as of Foundation communications is that Rari Chain DAO’s purpose will be a dedicated creator fund. Under this view, the ownership of the Delegate Incentive Program would still remain in the mainnet DAO in the short term.

  • On KPIs and tracking metrics: while we fully support tracking KPIs to evaluate a program’s performance, adding numbers on a system that’s too immature usually ends up being an inefficient way to spend valuable delegate efforts. We consider Rari DAO governance activity still not consistent enough to put credible numbers on it. For the time being, using the program as a financial incentive for fair delegate contribution seems like a good enough goal. We can then use it for governance evaluation when the time is right.

Final thoughts: One of the risks of issuing delegate incentives in DAOs is that the discussion shifts from actual DAO-aligned topics into a discussion where delegates are only worried about how and how much are they going to be paid. For this reason, we suggest sticking to the simplest reward mechanism that aligns with the Program’s goals and fairly reward delegate activity. This way, there is no need to continuously iterate the rewards as they are simple to understand and consistent with delegate activity, and delegates are fairly rewarded to focus on topics that can improve the DAO’s ecosystem.

3 Likes
#12

This is a critical issue that shouldn’t be overlooked. It’s right on point and deserves serious attention.

2 Likes
#13

Thank you very much @coffee-crusher for this thoughtful proposal, the evolution from RRC-40, the capped + dynamic model introduces much-needed tokenomic discipline without sacrificing engagement.

From a compliance and treasury stewardship standpoint, the fixed 10,000 RARI budget with proportional adjustments sets a clear precedent for predictable outflows, a critical step toward sustainable DAO budgeting and audit readiness.

I especially appreciate:

  • The eligibility criteria tied to Karma Score + forum activity, reinforcing accountability and proof of work.

  • The exclusion clause for program authors/admins, eliminates self-dealing risks and aligns with best practices in DAO integrity.

  • Retroactive but auditable rewards, balances fairness with transparency.

I Strongly support this proposal.

1 Like
#14

Gm @jose_stablelab, I really appreciate your detailed feedback for this proposal, thank you!

While I understand your focus on simplicity, I firmly believe effective evolution is paramount for the DAO, especially after our experiences in Q1, and in particular with the Q2 Delegate Incentive amended report. The DAO deserves a program that actively addresses delegate needs, not merely a good enough solution.

I’ve addressed your comments and concerns below by each section:

Governance & The Two-Vote System

Your point about RARI chain’s purpose is significant. However, the Foundation’s own governance docs clearly state that the v2 DAO on RARI Chain will eventually become the sole governing body for all aspects of the protocol across chains. The two-vote system isn’t about imposing hierarchy; it’s a practical, necessary step to navigate this complex transition towards a unified multichain governance structure.

Encouraging Participation & Budget Allocation

Delegates consistently highlighted the lack of effective budget utilization and fair reward distribution within past models and especially in the original Q2 Delegate Incentive report, including in your own comments.

This V2 proposal directly addresses the budget concerns that neither RRC-40 nor RRC-47 fully resolved. My pooled system aims to maximize the impact of the approved budget, ensuring all allocated RARI is actively and fairly distributed for contributions. It’s about optimizing incentives within a known budget, not creating complexity.

@bitblondy brought up a great point during our governance overflow call yesterday about concerns about pooled rewards reducing the individual incentives if more delegates join, and I acknowledge that dynamic. However, a program with a no cap and no defined budget program, provides even less incentive, as it offers no clear pathway to earning and no guarantee of consistent rewards.

This proposal provides a flexible framework that allows us to start somewhere with a clear budget, which is crucial for incentivizing the right responses like increased governance activity and proposal submissions. It creates a clearer, more predictable earning potential than an undefined model.

Karma Score

You’ve raised a valid concern here, and I agree. From the discussions in yesterday’s Gov overflow call that confirmed that the Karma scores aren’t accurately capturing all votes, and that voting on Tally v1 (where most delegates have 0 voting power) actually reduces a delegate’s overall score over time, it’s clear this is not the ideal edibility measurement. Additionally, the incorrect Karma scoring capture makes it harder for more delegates to participate - both those new to the program and existing. Based on these factors, I will remove the Karma Score requirement from this proposal.

Proposal Authorship:

The goal here is to specifically incentivize the creation of needed on-chain governance proposals, which we currently lack.

This feature aims to foster proactive governance beyond basic voting. While I acknowledge the “game-ability” concern, your point about a flood of proposals isn’t justified; the community and delegates ultimately decide if a proposal goes to Tally by showing their support. As we’ve seen in recent forum history, most proposals don’t even make it to Tally, and all require community support and usually a delegate sponsor to proceed.

Rewarding this higher level of contribution separates the base actions of voting and rationalization from the more impactful work of crafting and seeing proposals through.

Funding & KPIs:

Sending funds to a multisig for two quarters aims to streamline program operations once the budget is approved.

Regarding KPIs, stating that the DAO activity is “too immature” to track metrics fundamentally misses the point. RRC-40 included simple KPIs, but the DAO needs real KPIs that track numbers and results. Otherwise, how will we know if this program is worth continuing?

We must start tracking now to ensure effective governance and informed iteration, not just maintain a good enough goal.

And final thoughts:

I fundamentally disagree that we should stick to the “simplest reward mechanism” to avoid continuous iteration. The DAO deserves better than the status quo.

RRC-47 was an important step, but it, like its predecessor, RRC-40, it does not fully address the underlying delegate concerns about budget utilization and program reach that were frequently raised on both forum and in governance calls.

Our jobs as delegates is to push for continuous improvement and truly effective solutions for all programs to grow and strength the DAO and the ecosystem, not to accept simplicity if it means leaving critical needs unaddressed or if it reduces the incentive for both existing and new delegates to meaningfully participate. That’s just repeating the same mistakes and expecting different results.

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#15

Thank you so much for your support, @GozmanGonzalez4 and for your detailed review of this proposal! I really appreciate your insights, as I know that you have considerable experience with other DAO delegate incentive programs, that are more defined in their eligibility, requirements and KPI’s, so your insights are valuable.

The fixed RARI budget is something that has been lacking in all the previous versions of the incentive program, and with our smaller treasury compared to other DAO’s, something that I believe that we as delegates have to include as a fiduciary responsibility for all the programs that the DAO supports.

I appreciate your support of the Karma score as an edibility criteria, and I have to agree with delegate comments made at our governance overflow call yesterday and my own observations that the Karma scoring is not capturing the scoring correctly. I would suggest we remove it from this proposal until these issues can be resolved, as this proposal includes the flexibility to adjust as needed by the community, based upon the evolution of the DAO.

I do see the proof of work (submitting successful proposals for on-chain voting) as being the most important activity goal for the delegates. Our voting and rationales are just baseline governance requirements, and proposal authorship is what moves the DAO forward.

I’ve seen other programs that don’t address the exclusion clause for program authors and admins and it always leads to lack of trust and integrity. We as delegates need to focus on being incented to submit successful proposals that move the needle only.

And finally, retro for rewards allows for recognition of delegates who are currently engaged, to incentivize them to continue doing the governance work that is needed to keep the DAO operating, while allowing new delegates who meet the 2K RARI minimum on Tally v2 to be eligible to participate during the quarter, as one of the program requirements.

Again, thank you so much for your endorsement and support! I really appreciate that you took the time to carefully review this proposal.

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#16

Thank you for all the time and thought put into this @coffee-crusher, but I have to agree with @Jose_StableLab here, it feels like we are adding too much complexity to what was intended to be a very simple delegate rewards program. We have also spent a disproportionate amount of time discussing delegate rewards rather than initiatives to move the DAO forward.

Just to summarize, I am in favor of:

  • Continuing to use the reward system introduced in RRC-47, with 500 RARI for voting, 500 RARI for rationale, and 500 RARI for publishing a successful onchain proposal. I am of the view however, that rewards should be denominated in $USD as delegates do not have any material impact on the price of the RARI token, and this is standard practice in many other DAOs.

  • Monthly or quarterly reports breaking down governance activity, including community-agreed-upon KPIs.

  • Finding a solution to the dual governance problem, and clearly defining the purpose and future of each of the two DAOs (Mainnet & RARI Chain). We spent 25,000 RARI to incentivize people to migrate to Rari Chain yet the mainnet DAO continues to see the bulk of activity. We won’t be able to reward any new delegates if the onchain voting criteria continues to take into consideration both DAOs.

Let’s keep the incentive program simple and accessible, while addressing the inefficiencies in governance that we currently face.

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#17

Thank you for the detailed response @coffee-crusher, and the direction you’re setting with this proposal I genuinely appreciate the transparency, accountability, and the forward-thinking structure you’ve laid out here.

On the topic of Karma scores, I absolutely agree with your conclusion and the observations you raised are both valid and necessary.

The spot-check you did on RRC-45 (@Firefly808, @jarisjames, and @Jaf), along with discrepancies for Tally v1 votes on RRC-42 through RRC-47 for several delegates (including @bitblondy), clearly show the current scoring system isn’t accurately capturing delegate activity. I fully support your call to temporarily remove Karma scoring from the eligibility criteria until these inconsistencies are resolved. It’s important we avoid excluding valuable contributors based on incomplete or inaccurate data.

Also, your emphasis on proposal authorship as the primary proof of work is critical. While voting and rationales are foundational, pushing successful proposals forward is what drives meaningful outcomes for the DAO. That’s where real governance impact lies.

Your stance on exclusion clauses for program authors/admins also resonates strongly, if we want this to be a truly community-driven system, we have to preserve fairness and avoid the perception of conflicts of interest.

Lastly, I think the retroactive rewards model strikes a smart balance, it recognizes ongoing work while creating room for qualified new delegates to step in as the quarter progresses. That flexibility, paired with transparent KPIs, is exactly what we need to keep governance inclusive and functional.

Thanks again for your leadership on this and for taking the time to break down both the rationale and the technical gaps.

I am fully aligned with the direction this is going.

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#18

Thank you @coffee-crusher for your response :slight_smile:

On the Importance of Documentation and Program Evolution Through Clear KPIs

Documentation is not just a tracking tool — it’s a critical foundation for the program’s maturation and continuous improvement. It allows us to identify patterns, make informed decisions, and adjust course when necessary. In this case, establishing monthly and quarterly reports provides not only visibility into progress, but also sets a precedent for future iterations that are more efficient, equitable, and aligned with RARI DAO’s goals.

Regarding the Key Performance Indicators (KPIs), the goal of reaching at least 15 eligible delegates by the end of Q4 2025 is not just about quantity, but also about quality and diversity of profiles. Ideally, these delegates should represent different parts of the ecosystem — from NFT collectors and artists to technical builders, DAO operators, and community leaders. In the future, we could even create a delegate matrix to visualize whether we are covering key areas of the ecosystem.

As for the goal of having at least 7 delegate-authored proposals reach an on-chain vote per quarter in Q3 and Q4 2025, it becomes essential to establish a curated line of priority topics to avoid thematic concentration — for example, ensuring proposals don’t all focus on DeFi while neglecting areas like cultural adoption, NFT infrastructure, education, or geographic expansion.

Proposed next steps:

  • Add a living list of key topics to the forum as a guide to inspire proposals that align with the broader goals of RARI DAO (e.g., tooling for artists, ambassador programs, interoperability, NFT standards, local DAOs, Web3 education).
  • Invite delegates to select tracks or areas of focus where they can specialize and collaborate.
  • Document not only quantitative results but also the qualitative learnings from each approved or rejected proposal.

This approach not only enhances transparency, but also brings structure and purpose to growth, prioritizing a healthy, diverse, and mission-aligned ecosystem.

Of course! Here’s the enriched version in English:

I’d also like to bring back the idea of a gamification system that I mentioned during the call, as I believe it could make delegate participation much more engaging and turn incentives into something truly purposeful. What do you think?

A well-designed gamification layer wouldn’t just add a “fun” element — it could become a powerful tool to motivate, recognize, and guide meaningful participation within the program. For example, delegates could earn points, badges, or levels for specific actions such as:

  • Drafting or co-authoring proposals
  • Actively participating in key discussions
  • Providing peer feedback
  • Getting proposals to an on-chain vote and/or passed
  • Collaborating on initiatives aligned with DAO-wide goals

This system wouldn’t need to be competitive — it could instead function as a reputation and engagement metric, visible to the community through a leaderboard or contribution map. It would help celebrate progress, make DAO participation more accessible for newcomers, and encourage more consistent and impactful contributions.

Furthermore, if aligned with the defined KPIs and ecosystem priority topics, gamification could help steer effort toward what matters most, generating measurable outcomes that are in sync with RARI DAO’s long-term vision.

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