[RRC - XX] DAO Code of Conduct

Latest version of this proposal can be found here

Abstract:

This proposal introduces a Code of Conduct for RARI DAO delegates and community members to ensure a respectful and productive governance environment. It outlines expectations for delegate behavior and engagement policies, enforced by market forces and moderators respectively, and details consequences for violations.

Motivation:

Implementing this Code of Conduct will help establish a respectful and professional environment within the RARI DAO. It ensures that both delegates and community members engage in meaningful and constructive discussions, aligning with the broader mission of decentralization and community-driven governance.

Rationale:

The proposed Code of Conduct aligns with the mission of RARI DAO by promoting transparent, respectful, and informed decision-making. The expectations for delegates encourage professionalism, accountability, and empathy, which reflect the values of a decentralized autonomous organization focused on the collective good. The engagement policies aim to maintain a healthy community discourse, contributing to the long-term sustainability of the DAO.

Key Terms:

  • Delegation market: A system where token holders delegate their voting power to trusted individuals, who act as their representatives within the DAO.
  • Conflicts of interest: Situations where personal interests may compromise the impartiality of a delegate’s decisions.

Specifications:

The Code of Conduct consists of two facets and will be enforced by their own mechanisms:

Delegate Expectations (Enforced by the delegation market)

These are ‘should’ statements which are enforceable by the delegation free market but not directly by any elected or unelected committee. All delegates should abide by these expectations. If a delegate does not abide by these expectations, their delegators should consider re-delegating to a delegate who does abide by them.

  • Be informed about the broader crypto ecosystem.
  • Act and vote based on what they believe best serves the interests of the DAO.
  • Review proposals professionally without bias and abstain if unable to do so.
  • Provide constructive, well-researched feedback, avoid personal attacks, unsubstantiated claims, and use designated channels for discussions.
  • Avoid conflicts of interest wherever possible and reduce the impact of these when it’s not possible to avoid them.
  • Disclose potential conflicts of interest whenever possible.
  • Do not vote for their own candidacy in an election. In cases such as multiple-choice voting, delegates may vote for themselves as long as they also vote for at least one other candidate.
  • Be respectful of diverse options and demonstrate empathy towards other delegates or community members.

Policies for Engagement (Enforced by moderators)

Using the Forum (Discourse), Discord, and Telegram.

  • Treat everyone with respect, avoiding discrimination, harassment, and inappropriate language or behavior, especially in tough conversations.
  • Contribute meaningfully to discussions by adding value, providing constructive critiques, and offering evidence for claims.
  • Use designated channels for discussions, avoiding social media or public spaces for contentious topics.
  • Uphold civility, common sense, and a positive attitude in all interactions.
  • Stay safe from scams and phishing attempts, protect your private keys, and report suspicious activities to safeguard the community.

To report a Policies of Engagement violation by any user one may flag the violation using tools provided by the platform on which it has occurred. These should be handled by moderators of various platforms in cooperation with the Foundation. If a delegate does not abide by the rules above, they will:

  • Receive a warning, in minor cases.
  • Receive a suspension for one month in severe cases.
  • After that, a delegate may receive a six-month suspension for repeated violations.
  • If a delegate continues to violate the above rules they may face permanent suspension from the DAO.

Steps to Implement:

  1. Gather feedback from the community
  2. Modify proposal if needed (based on feedback)
  3. Post onchain for voting

Overall Cost:

There are no direct costs associated with the implementation of this proposal

8 Likes

Question how would a DAO enforce a suspension? Kicking people from a discord server is easy, but would they still be able to vote? Would the DAO be able to block someone from voting? Do we just shun them till they go away?

4 Likes

Thanks for the question @Firefly808

The engagement policies do not cover voting participation since there is currently no sybil resistant way to censor an individual or org from participating in onchain voting. The best we can do is prevent someone from spreading inappropriate content while engaging in public discourse.

5 Likes

I will support this proposal. I can put it on tally once Delegate Launchpad 3 launches and I have a few more votes again, if it hasn’t been put up on tally already by then.

3 Likes

Thanks for the proposal! Definitely an important topic.

For context, is this a deliverable of the governance working group or your initiative? I feel like a shared code of conduct should be a community effort.

Maybe we could have a shared document to comment and add suggestions?

Yes. The GWG maintains public communication and public weekly calls on discord which everyone is welcome to attend and give feedback when these topics are being discussed. Here is the working document https://www.notion.so/rari-foundation/Code-of-Conduct-a08304ffd8b94d33b66a6f998130d090

1 Like

This is a wonderful proposal!
A well-structured delegate program can significantly enhance a DAO’s governance, engagement, and efficiency. By setting standards for behavior, this code of conduct will help to protect the RARI DAO’s reputation and avoid negative publicity.

1 Like

I will be voting in favour of this and I’m happy to see the GWG putting out some of the foundational DAO docs.

2 Likes

As a member of the Governance Working Group StableLab is in favor of this proposal.

3 Likes

Thanks for clarifying, appreciate the effort of the working group. I requested access to the notion.
I agree with @Firefly808 that the part about “suspension from the DAO” might not be accurate, rather from the forum or discord. Maybe you could adapt that.

Also the part “Do not vote for their own candidacy in an election”, does it mean that delegates can vote for themselves if it’s a group of people, or only if there is multiple-choice voting?

2 Likes

I have further feedback having reviewed this more throughly:

I believe this should be simplified to asking people to not vote for themselves under any circumstances, I’m not sure why delegates should be allowed to vote for themselves if multiple choice but not if single choice. How about voting for proposals which benefit them financially in other ways? For example creating a working group where the delegate is a paid member, should delegates be allowed to vote in favour of this?

This needs to be simpler: disclose all conflicts of interest. In what circumstances would this “not be possible”? We need to have clear conflict of interest policies imo otherwise the DAO could become very extractive. Is there any way to impose penalties on this sort of behaviour for example blacklisting individuals who do this from treasury spend or something like that? Would that be better for the DAO?

These seem unnecessary and potentially open to exploitation, I’d recommend removal. We should be free to discuss things on social media, forum is also a public space so I’m not sure what this really means. Civility, common sense and a positive attitude is very subjective, I can see this being abused in the case of contentious topics. The third one could see a delegate being kicked from the forums and discord for having their private keys compromised, this doesn’t seem a particularly good outcome for delegates or the DAO.

Finally, I’d recommend that all working group participants, those who have tokens delegated from the treasury, and anyone receiving funds from the treasury through grants or any other programs are required to abide by all of the code of conduct at risk of having their pay/grants/delegation revoked. This would provide a third level of sanctions aside from “delegation market” and “banning from forums etc”.

1 Like

Thank you for your thorough review and feedback on the proposal @cr1st0f @bitblondy I’d like to address a few of the points raised, as there are some nuances that need further clarification:

1. Voting for One’s Own Candidacy:

While I understand the need for clarity, I believe there’s value in allowing delegates to vote for themselves in multiple-choice elections as long as they also vote for others. The rationale here is that in multiple-choice voting, a delegate may genuinely be a strong candidate but could also fairly support others, thereby ensuring fairness in the process. In single-choice elections, the potential for self-serving bias is much stronger, hence the stricter rule.

Regarding proposals where a delegate stands to benefit financially (such as working group participation), this is an important point, however the way voting power is distributed today disallows proposals from meeting quorum without the top delegates voting in favor. If these delegates are also part of the WG then we face gridlock like we did in the first iteration of the GWG proposal. We can amend this point once the voting power distribution imbalance has been resolved.

2. Conflicts of Interest:

I agree that the statement on disclosing conflicts of interest can be simplified for clarity. The original phrasing was intended to acknowledge the complexities of disclosure in certain cases, but I agree that transparency should be non-negotiable. As for enforcement, I think your idea of introducing penalties for those who fail to disclose conflicts, such as blacklisting individuals from treasury spending, is worth exploring. This would add a layer of accountability and deter exploitative behavior however this would also involve assigning these responsibility to someone, which is something we want to avoid in this exercise. If there is any way we can enforce penalties without additional overhead please let us know.

3. Social Media and Subjective Language:

I appreciate your concerns regarding discussions in public spaces like social media. The intent behind recommending designated channels was to ensure that sensitive or contentious issues are discussed in controlled environments where moderation can take place. However, I see how restricting these discussions may be interpreted as limiting open discourse, which is a critical aspect of decentralized governance. I’m open to revising this language to allow for public discussions, while still maintaining respectful and constructive engagement.

Regarding the points about civility, common sense, and positive attitude, I understand how subjective these can be. However, the aim here is not to suppress valid criticism or heated debate, but to maintain a baseline of respectful discourse. We could refine this language to ensure that it does not become a tool for silencing dissent but still discourages personal attacks or harmful behavior.

As for the point on compromised private keys, the intention was to encourage community vigilance against phishing and scams, not to punish individuals for security failures. We can rephrase this to avoid unintended consequences.

Amendment:

  • “Encourage respectful discourse and avoid personal attacks in all interactions.”
  • “Stay vigilant against scams and phishing attempts. Reporting suspicious activity is encouraged.”

4. Extending Code of Conduct to Working Group Participants:

I think your suggestion to extend the Code of Conduct to working group participants, treasury-delegated token holders, and grant recipients is a strong one. The current framework for setting up WGs is limited to delegates and this CoC document already applies to this group.


The intention behind that part of the proposal is that delegates should not vote for themselves in single-candidate elections to avoid conflicts of interest and self-serving behavior. However, in multiple-choice voting (where delegates vote for more than one candidate or option), the proposal allows a delegate to vote for themselves as long as they also vote for at least one other candidate.

We can modify the language to reflect that:

Amendment:

  • “Suspensions will apply to participation in community platforms such as the forum (Discourse) or Discord, not the DAO as a whole.”
4 Likes

This is the latest version of the proposal

Abstract:

This proposal introduces a Code of Conduct for RARI DAO delegates and community members to ensure a respectful and productive governance environment. It outlines expectations for delegate behavior and engagement policies, enforced by market forces and moderators respectively, and details consequences for violations.

Motivation:

Implementing this Code of Conduct will help establish a respectful and professional environment within the RARI DAO. It ensures that both delegates and community members engage in meaningful and constructive discussions, aligning with the broader mission of decentralization and community-driven governance.

Rationale:

The proposed Code of Conduct aligns with the mission of RARI DAO by promoting transparent, respectful, and informed decision-making. The expectations for delegates encourage professionalism, accountability, and empathy, which reflect the values of a decentralized autonomous organization focused on the collective good. The engagement policies aim to maintain a healthy community discourse, contributing to the long-term sustainability of the DAO.

Key Terms:

  • Delegation market: A system where token holders delegate their voting power to trusted individuals, who act as their representatives within the DAO.
  • Conflicts of interest: Situations where personal interests may compromise the impartiality of a delegate’s decisions.

Specifications:

The Code of Conduct consists of two facets and will be enforced by their own mechanisms:

Delegate Expectations (Enforced by the delegation market)

These are ‘should’ statements which are enforceable by the delegation free market but not directly by any elected or unelected committee. All delegates should abide by these expectations. If a delegate does not abide by these expectations, their delegators should consider re-delegating to a delegate who does abide by them.

  • Be informed about the broader crypto ecosystem.
  • Act and vote based on what they believe best serves the interests of the DAO.
  • Review proposals professionally without bias and abstain if unable to do so.
  • Provide constructive, well-researched feedback, avoid personal attacks, unsubstantiated claims, and use designated channels for discussions.
  • Avoid conflicts of interest wherever possible and reduce the impact of these when it’s not possible to avoid them.
  • Disclose potential conflicts of interest whenever possible.
  • Do not vote for their own candidacy in an election. In cases such as multiple-choice voting, delegates may vote for themselves as long as they also vote for at least one other candidate.
  • Be respectful of diverse options and demonstrate empathy towards other delegates or community members.

Policies for Engagement (Enforced by moderators)

Using the Forum (Discourse), Discord, and Telegram.

  • Treat everyone with respect, avoiding discrimination, harassment, and inappropriate language or behavior, especially in tough conversations.
  • Contribute meaningfully to discussions by adding value, providing constructive critiques, and offering evidence for claims.
  • Encourage respectful discourse and avoid personal attacks in all interactions.
  • Uphold civility, common sense, and a positive attitude in all interactions.
  • Stay vigilant against scams and phishing attempts. Reporting suspicious activity is encouraged.

To report a Policies of Engagement violation by any user one may flag the violation using tools provided by the platform on which it has occurred. These should be handled by moderators of various platforms in cooperation with the Foundation. If a delegate does not abide by the rules above, they will:

  • Receive a warning, in minor cases.
  • Receive a suspension for one month in severe cases.
  • After that, a delegate may receive a six-month suspension for repeated violations.
  • If a delegate continues to violate the above rules they may face permanent suspension from the DAO. Suspensions will apply to participation in community platforms such as the forum (Discourse), Telegram or Discord, not the DAO as a whole.

Steps to Implement:

  1. Gather feedback from the community
  2. Modify proposal if needed (based on feedback)
  3. Post onchain for voting

Overall Cost:

There are no direct costs associated with the implementation of this proposal

2 Likes

Thanks for taking into account the feedback. I still can’t get my head around why there are exceptions to self voting rules and don’t think there’s a difference between single and multiple choice voting here. If there are issues with not enough voting power being active to reach quorum, perhaps this could be something the GWG should look at and provide recommendations for in their report? Allowing self voting to solve this seems suboptimal.

I’d support this as a first version of the code of conduct and if issues emerge with self voting in future I’ll make some noise then - we’re only a small DAO but it’s so easy to slip into bad, high spend, easily manipulated, inefficient practices like we see in arbitrum at the moment for example. Being a small DAO means avoiding this is even more important imo, preventing self voting is a really basic rule that helps build good culture especially where vote power isn’t evenly distributed.

Looking forward to seeing what else the GWG puts out and glad to see progress on building these foundations.

2 Likes

Thanks for the clarification and adaptions to the proposal. The part about suspension sounds good.

When thinking about the term “multiple-choice”, it’s usually referring to multiple options (e.g. giving yes/no for every single candidate, there are different voting schemes in Tally), therefore the wording might not be optimal.

I agree with @cr1st0f that in case of the voting of a whole group (as with the GWG), the candidates should abstain. Same with the thoughts about the quorum.

2 Likes