Hey @bitblondy, I haven’t commented on this proposal yet, so I think you may have meant to tag someone else there.
1 Like
From my point of view, ceding control of funds to the Foundation carries clear risks around centralization and accountability… but at the same time, in markets like ours where volatility is constant → speed of action is critical, and DAOs have rarely been known for their speed.
What I’d like to understand better is: are there examples where DAOs have successfully managed treasury strategies without ceding control, and still been able to move quickly enough to capture opportunities? If those cases exist, they could offer a valuable model here.
maybe you know of a case to share here @bitblondy ?
The treasury management topic has come up here many times, and I’m on board with the idea.
My ask to @Anria and the Foundation is to shorten the reporting cycles and share strategies either beforehand or right after execution. That would give the DAO better visibility and stronger transparency.
3 Likes
Hi @coffee-crusher
Thank you for your comments and support of the idea. Please find below the answers:
- Regarding the cap of max 20% for high-risk investments, the definition of “high-risk” is not provided. Is it defined by volatility, lack of audit, newness of a protocol, or another metric?
Answer: “High-risk” = categories with materially higher security, liquidity, or counterparty risk than our core sleeves. We’ll label which categories fall here in our reports; total exposure to this bucket stays within the 20% cap.
- The proposal states that the Foundation will be onboarding custodians, ecosystem partners, and analytics tools, etc, what is the process for selecting these partners? Will the DAO have any input on the selection? For example, will a list of potential partners be shared before the Foundation makes a final decision?
Answer: The Foundation’s obligation under this mandate is to act in the DAO’s best long-term interests—selecting partners that strengthen stability, security, liquidity, and sustainable growth. To protect negotiations and preserve leverage, we won’t publish pre-deal shortlists. Early disclosure can harm terms, breach NDAs, or jeopardize relationships.
- The 5% annual yield on strategic investments as a KPI. Is this a net or gross yield? Is this target yield based on a specific strategy (e.g., staking, lending, or real-world assets)?
Answer: The 5% is a net goal (after all costs), not a promise. Safety and liquidity come first. We plan to use low-risk, liquid approaches (cash-like instruments, conservative lending, plain staking) and won’t take extra risk. If markets are tough, we prioritize capital preservation and explain any shortfall in reports.
- What does the DAO veto power look like in practice for adjusting the strategy mid-cycle, or challenging a specific investment or a series of actions taken by the Foundation? Is there a formal process for the DAO to proactively challenge a specific investment or a series of actions taken by the Foundation, or is it primarily a reactive on-chain vote on strategy + funding release at the end of the year?
Answer: We report regularly; if the community has concerns, a proposal can escalate to on-chain for adjustments or pauses. The annual on-chain renewal vote is the binding checkpoint.
- Is there a contingency plan for a no vote, as you mention a positive DAO vote but the proposal does not but does not address what happens if the DAO votes to reject the plan at the M4 Annual Audit. What is the contingency plan for this scenario? Would the treasury be returned to full DAO control, and would a new proposal be required?
Answer: We’ll continue operating within the existing guardrails while engaging delegates and community to adjust the plan and reach consensus. If consensus isn’t achievable, the mandate—and the funds allocated to this program—will revert to the DAO for reallocation via a follow-up vote.
3 Likes
Hi @Sixty
I really appreciate your feedback and support! Here are a few clarifications:
- Primary goals of treasury management (e.g., capital preservation, liquidity for operations, diversification). Clarify whether the goal is to optimize the treasury for sustainability, protocol growth, return generation, or a mix of all the above.
Answer: Grow and preserve capital to continue sustainably support foundation operations; support protocol health; generate moderate, risk-adjusted returns.
- Asset Allocation & Diversification - How assets will be allocated across stablecoins, ETH, RARI, or other tokens. Including guardrails to prevent overexposure to volatile assets.
Answer: Mix of runway (cash/stables), ETH exposure (unlevered), RARI strategic reserve, and a strategic sleeve—spread to avoid concentration or overexposure to volatility. Reviews and rebalancing happen via our regular reporting.
- Protocols & Platforms for Treasury Management - Which protocols, vaults, or platforms will be used (e.g., Aave, Morpho, Enzyme, MYSO or others). Criteria for selecting them (security track record, audits, decentralization, liquidity). How risk will be managed when deploying into DeFi protocols.
Answer: Favor established, audited venues with strong security and liquidity; we’ll document criteria and choices in reports and adjust if risks change.
- Who is responsible for execution (foundation team, external managers, service providers)
Answer: The Foundation leads day-to-day execution and holds final sign-off. We will work with an institutional treasury management partner for implementation and monitoring, and engage specialized service providers (custody, compliance, analytics) where needed.
3 Likes
Hi @Jaf
Thank you for your feedback and the support on this idea. Regarding the reporting, we understand the concerns around visibility and accountability. To address this, the Foundation will continue hosting the monthly governance call, where we provide detailed treasury updates and walk through recent actions. This ensures the DAO has full transparency into strategies and execution, while still giving us the ability to act quickly in volatile markets.
4 Likes
As I read all of the comments from the delegates, I do understand the concerns.
However, in my view I believe it is time to end the v1 DAO and treasury and start building up our treasury again in v2. Funds in v1 treasury can be used to create better market conditions and to support the ecosystem. It’s better to send your money to work then to just let it sit somewhere. Things in a DAO go slow and we are definately missing out on opportunities.
I do have concerns about misuse of funds. That cap of 20%, would that be the total amount in the treasury right now? If so, I suggest to lower it to 5%-10% to minimize the risk, especially for high-risk investments.
Besides that I don’t have any objections.
4 Likes
Thank you @Anria for the responses to my questions, and I also support the 20% cap for high-risk investments. A 20% cap is still a conservative risk appetite for our treasury and is a sensible approach.
I totally understand the reasoning regarding not publishing pre-deal shortlists/early disclosure - my question was more aligned with a request for real-time updates on finalized partnerships, if these occur between monthly governance calls. Your focus on security for the treasury and transparency is greatly appreciated.
Gm, @bitblondy I support all your observations regarding the state of our current treasury and the centralization concerns, which are valid, and we need more details of how this will work long term, including will the overseeing of treasury management return at some point to the control of the DAO, which is the core responsibility of the delegates.
However, I’m not sure if we have enough experience in the DAO within the delegates to have deep knowledge of tokenomics to understand and oversee the strategy, other than identifying high level goals (ie. with a Treasury council). I do understand what you’re intent is, an oversight council (an Executive Oversight Council - EOC) for all working groups, which I do support, but I think the DAOs maturity is not there yet to have an oversight council - we’re still early days, but something that we definitely should consider in the future.
2 Likes
@Jaf Thanks for the question. I’m not an expert on this, but most major DAOs have a dedicated treasury provider, mandated by the DAO itself through a transparent and iterative process. There’s no reason this should be routed through another entity, and I’m not aware of any other DAOs handing over full treasury control like this. Unless they are shutting down, as the ApeCoin DAO example shows.
The treasury proposal initiated by @cr1st0f followed this approach, with Togenlogic as the provider. Yet Foundation (apparently) rejected this initiative. Despite asking about it multiple times, there was never a statement from Foundation on why this was an issue. @Anria maybe you can clarify this now?
@coffee This is a good point. We might not have deep treasury expertise, but neither does the Foundation (please correct me if I’m wrong here). As the security council example shows, it’s usually a mix of expertise that’s needed, and external parties could also be involved.
This is a red flag to me. The proposal requests 100% treasury management control with 0 transparency. If providers require this level of confidentiality, I’d question their experience working in a decentralized environment.
I also want to emphasize to other delegates the far-reaching implications this proposal has on the power and autonomy of the DAO. I’m worried this isn’t being addressed strongly enough.
It’s our mandate as delegates to strive for transparency and accountability, as opposed to blind trust. Under this proposal, the DAO’s only right would be a retrospective veto and reporting, which is meaningless in terms of control.
For these reasons, I will not support the proposal unless there is either:
-
a transparent process for selecting treasury providers, or
-
a dedicated organ that oversees the Foundation’s actions.
Also, if this goes for voting, it’s not like any of the delegates commenting here has meaningful voting power on mainnet. In the previous votes, StableLab had >50% of all voting power, so it’s questionable we do have independent decisions given they’re contracted by Foundation. Similar for RARI chain with concentration of voting power on @jarisjames.
3 Likes
Just to clarify @bitblondy, over 65 individual token holders delegated to me on RARI Chain. That concentration comes from many independent choices, not from a single entity. The DAO built delegation so token holders could decide their representatives, and that’s exactly what happened.
2 Likes
The earlier Treasury Committee proposal by @Cr1st0f and “TokenLogic” was withdrawn after cost and structure concerns raised by several delegates, including @forexus who stated he would vote against it, @jengajojo who called the costs highly excessive, and @Jaf who flagged concerns with the pricing as well. It wasn’t blocked by the Foundation.
Btw, the DAO still maintains assets on RARI Chain (~20 ETH today), though Tally has been slow to integrate RARI Chain via API so those balances don’t yet display. It’s not the case that the DAO has “no treasury.”
It’s also worth remembering that when external providers like Axal offered to manage treasury assets for free, they were still met with significant pushback from the authors of the Treasury Committee Proposal, which was obviously a clear Conflict of Interest. If every potential provider is forced through long governance battles, it creates a hostile environment for builders and deters new service providers altogether. The result is exactly what we have today: treasury assets sitting idle.
The Foundation exploring alternatives is about solving this structural bottleneck and finding a sustainable and accountable model that actually puts the treasury to work for $RARI, instead of leaving it frozen while debates repeat indefinitely.
5 Likes
This did initially go over my head, but I will echo @bitblondy’s sentiment that taking control of 100% of the treasury is not ideal. I was under the impression that the Foundation would be managing a portion of the treasury similar to RRC-22.
Considering that RRC-22 was mostly unsuccessful, it would be more prudent to transfer control of a portion of the treasury, rather than hand over complete 100% control.
4 Likes
What portion do you suggest?
Thank you, @Anria, and thanks to everyone who contributed to this discussion.
After reviewing Rari’s situation and going through the comments from other delegates, I see clear issues with how treasury management is currently structured: it has been too slow, too concentrated in $RARI, and the room for maneuver is shrinking. This proposal surfaces these challenges well, and as @jarisjames pointed out, other alternatives have been discussed in the past but never executed, another sign that it’s time to move forward.
I also understand the concern raised by some delegates about whether this change could undermine decentralization, and it’s a valid point. We’ve seen this debate in other DAOs as well. From my perspective, decentralization works best at the strategic level, where the community sets direction and priorities. A certain degree of “centralization” in some areas is not inherently negative, execution benefits from having professional and agile operators who can act within clear guardrails to avoid missing market opportunities.
For me, a balanced path forward could include:
-
A 12-month mandate for the Foundation, with quarterly reviews and an annual on-chain renewal vote.
-
Monthly reports with clear details on treasury inflows/outflows, P&L, positions, and platforms used.
-
A conservative risk framework, focused on liquid low-risk instruments (stables, tokenized T-bills, top-tier DeFi without leverage), plus a quarterly cap on $RARI sales.
-
Transparency through publishing finalized provider agreements, ensuring accountability while preserving negotiation leverage.
I also agree with @Money that ApeCoin DAO may not be the right benchmark. Its governance structure was ultimately sunset and replaced by ApeCo, meaning the DAO itself was dissolved. What I’d like to see is the Foundation not only improving capital efficiency but also continuing to foster community-driven proposals and ecosystem activity, supporting builders and governance programs, so that the DAO’s voice remains central.
In summary: I support this proposal. The greatest risk to Rari’s long-term sustainability is inaction. With proper checks and transparency in place, this program can strike a good balance between agility and accountability.
3 Likes
Enough to cover DAO operations and other DAO initiatives for the next year or two, just to avoid the situation where we have to request funds from the foundation anytime we need to get anything done.
1 Like
I’m not questioning the legitimacy of delegations. But I should not need to point out, that >50% of voting power with one delegate is not favourable for a DAO, then you might as well remove governance.
If I remember correctly, you actually suggested removing StableLab’s delegation on mainnet and the others on RARI chain to foster decentralization.
1 Like
There was not much information, why the last treasury proposal was withdrawn, but cost did not seem to be the main blocker. In this proposal, there’s not even cost included, not to mention other important information.
Thanks for pointing out the treasury on RARI chain. Though, as @Sixty mentioned, if the DAO would like to spend any meaningful amount in this scenario, they’d then have to be requested from the Foundation managed treasury. If there is even a share reserved for that, there’s no info on this in the proposal.
1 Like
@bitblondy it’s a stretch to bring up an old forum draft from 2 months ago, especially twisting it out of context. That suggestion was about removing inherited delegations from the old Foundation. The suggeston from the 3 proposal authors - not just my own, was to explore the option of merit-based governance.
At that time, StableLab still held over 50% of mainnet voting power; proposals literally couldn’t even be posted onchain, let alone pass without them, and you were perfectly fine with that, you even defended that model back then.
Also, it’s worth noting that the proposal draft you referenced was never pushed onchain. Since this wasn’t the intent of the new Foundation, we didn’t force it through. Bringing this up now to somehow solidify your point is irrelevant.