[RRC-XX] Formation of a Treasury Committee

Proposals Parent DAO Proposals
#1

[RRC-XX] Formation of a Treasury Committee

Author: cr1st0f

Date: 28/04/2025

Abstract

The proposal seeks to establish a Treasury Committee for Rari DAO to address current financial management deficiencies. The committee would serve for an initial 12-month period at a total cost of $120,000 paid in $RARI tokens.

Motivation

Rari DAO currently lacks a treasury management function, this has resulted in the DAO’s finances lacking oversight and leading to some disorganisation of the treasury, with lack of $RARI liquidity and an undiversified treasury being the major issues.

Rationale

It is proposed that a Treasury Committee is formed for an initial period of 1 year, to carry out the following functions:

  1. Deploy on-chain liquidity for $RARI.
  2. Earn safe yield on non-RARI tokens held by the treasury.
  3. Explore grant opportunities on chains we’re deployed on and apply for grants where appropriate.
  4. Provide a dashboard for treasury monitoring similar to: Gearbox Analytics | TokenLogic and Aave Analytics | TokenLogic
  5. Provide quarterly reporting on the performance and status of the above activities.

Specification

The treasury management committee will be responsible for the following four functions which aim to improve the financial management of the DAO. The initial period of the Committee will be for 12 months following the passing of this proposal - this ensures enough time for strategies to be optimised.

Deploy liquidity

There is little on-chain liquidity for RARI, with only circa $90,000 worth of liquidity on-chain, this results in a $10,000 buy incurring just over 16% slippage (source). It is proposed that $RARI be deployed into a single sided Uniswap V3 pool for the RARI-ETH pair. The benefit of this approach is that there is no need for ETH to pair the RARI with and it allows the DAO to slowly sell RARI for ETH whilst deepening buy side liquidity for the token. It is proposed that fees from this V3 position are added to the DAO treasury. Once the token price goes above the range it is proposed that this ETH is either paired with RARI in a wider range UniV3 position, or is added to the DAO treasury and a further single sided V3 position be created at a new price range.

We may also explore using $ARB tokens owned by the treasury to deploy a Balancer V3 boosted pool on Arbitrum. This approach makes use of the few non-native tokens owned by the DAO treasury to pair with the most RARI possible to provide deep liquidity and maximise fees. It is proposed that fees from this position are also returned to the DAO treasury. If this approach is chosen, we will attempt to secure vlAURA support to generate yield. We will also explore bribing for votes on Paladin during market conditions when earnings from emissions outperform costs.

This plan is provisional and there may be modifications made based on deeper analysis once committee is created and work begins, or based on observed market behaviour. The guiding principles for any changes made will always be to improve the onchain trading experience for $RARI and to maximise fees earned to the DAO treasury.

Earn yield

Once the DAO Treasury has generated token balances from the above activities, the Committee will explore deploying these into low risk on-chain strategies to earn yield.

Explore Grant Opportunities

Several chains regularly run grant programs for protocols deployed on them. We will monitor and explore opportunities when appropriate including applying for grants to be distributed as incentives to Rarible users.

Report on Treasury Committee Activities

Provide quarterly reports on the status of the treasury and the performance of the Treasury Committee activities along with a treasury management dashboard similar to Gearbox Analytics | TokenLogic and Aave Analytics | TokenLogic.

KPIs

  1. Slippage on $RARI buys and sells.
  2. Fees and interest generated on deployed capital.
  3. Value of grants secured for Rari DAO.

Steps to Implement

  1. Creation of multisig to hold compensation of Treasury Committee members.
  2. Formation of committee and transfer of funds for compensation as outlined in this proposal.
  3. The committee formalises a concrete plan for liquidity deployment.
  4. Tokens for liquidity are requested from DAO Treasury in a future proposal where the initial plan is presented.
  5. Liquidity is deployed and managed on an ongoing basis, with funds returned to treasury and future requests from treasury as needed.

Timeline

1-3 months:

  • Liquidity simulations carried out with a plan formulated.
  • Proposal requesting tokens to deploy into liquidity pools from the DAO treasury.
  • Liquidity pools deployed.
  • Exploration of vlAURA emissions on Balancer pools if deployed.

3-6 months:

  • Comparison of observed and expected LP behaviour.
  • Reformulation of LP strategy if needed.
  • If significant non-RARI tokens accumulated, consider seeking yield with a portion.
  • Treasury dashboard created.

9-12 months:

  • LP strategy further optimised.
  • Non-RARI tokens deployed in yield earning strategies.
  • Actively bribing Balancer pools when profitable.

Overall Cost and Committee Composition

We propose that the committee is compensated with a fixed fee structure. All dollar values quoted below will be based on the price of $RARI at the time of payment. The responsibilities and compensation are as follows:

TokenLogic
TokenLogic provides financial analytics and treasury management services for Aave and Gearbox. TokenLogic has extensive experience in curating DEX liquidity, DAO finances and on-chain yield strategies.

Compensation: $5000 of $RARI per month.

cr1st0f
cr1st0f currently works for Aave DAO through ACI as the External Governance Lead. He is an active delegate across DeFi, has applied for multiple external grants for Aave, and recently proposed strategies for Arbitrum DAO treasury to deploy funds resulting in a 4,500 ETH allocation through a competitive proposal process.

Compensation: $5000 of $RARI per month.

Multisig Signers
Stablelab have agreed to carry out oversight and multisig signer work uncompensated in order to maintain reasonable costs. We will request 2 further signers from the community, preferably from the security council to act as multisig signers on a three of five multisig.

Total cost
For the initial 12 month term, the cost to the treasury of this work is $120,000 paid in $RARI. We request 130,000 $RARI paid to the treasury management multisig to provide a buffer against price volatility. Any excess at the end of the committee’s term will be returned to the treasury.

3 Likes
RARI DAO Highlights - May 5-11, 2025
#2

I do not see how this aligns with the current direction the foundation is going towards looking at these points:

  1. Realign with Rarible as the biggest user of DAO’s decentralized infrastructure
  2. Slim down and streamline operations by reducing the headcount
  3. Accelerate ecosystem growth by deploying the Rarible protocol in emerging ecosystems and promoting user onboarding via the Rarible marketplace.
  4. Increase awareness of RARI ecosystem success stories through enhanced marketing efforts, including an ambassador/KOL program.
  5. Promote token awareness and utility to drive engagement and adoption.

Besides that the ask of 130,000 RARI is excessive.

3 Likes
#3

Thanks for the comments Forexus.

My understanding is that the points you lay out relate to the Foundation strategy, the DAO is a separate entity and requires its own basic functionality such as treasury management. This is needed for several reason, some of which are:

  1. The foundation is not able to deploy liquidity themselves, however the DAO is able to do so as a separate entity.
  2. The DAO has a mostly $RARI denominated treasury, this results in exposure to price volatility and sell pressure on the token when paying for running costs (including funding the foundation). Diversification of the treasury has been a longstanding goal of the DAO and this proposal will help with that in a way which has minimal impact on token price.
  3. With increasing RARI denominated costs that the DAO is bearing, sufficient liquidity to facilitate trading of the token is becoming increasingly critical and the DAO should approach this problem with some sense of urgency.

Although the DAO is a separate entity to Foundation time was spent aligning with Foundation on this proposal and was adjusted to ensure it works alongside them to achieve the best outcome. In particular it supports points 3 and 5 in your list: grants will help accelerate ecosystem adoption, and onchain liquidity will facilitate trading of the token which is required if engagement and adoption are a goal. We are also open to taking on other day to day administrative tasks such as multi chain fee collection and will consider any other tasks the DAO wishes to propose which can help align with the strategy.

On the topic of costs, the cost is dollar denominated and so should be under 130,000 RARI if token price continues to recover. It aligns with cost range of other basic functions of the DAO such as the delegate incentive program, the security council, the token migration incentives, and the governance working group.

Furthermore this cost is a significant discount to similar treasury management functions of other DAOs and includes the services of Tokenlogic who would normally charge multiples of this price as one of the leading DAO financial service providers in the space with a particular expertise in liquidity management. It should also be noted that I approached several reputable treasury managers and none are taking on work at the moment, this is an objectively great price especially for a sector where demand exceeds supply and budget was set aligning with current DAO expenses for other basic functions.

Lastly this is the only proposal for a committee or working group which is likely to be revenue generating, this is, for the first time not just a sunk cost but provides both the opportunity to generate revenue for the DAO, measurable improvements for token holders through increased liquidity, and the prospect of a diversified treasury reducing sell pressure on RARI.

4 Likes
#4

Thank you @cr1st0f for the proposal and @forexus for your feedback.

We supervised the creation of this proposal and feel this is a great opportunity to bring an expert team into the Rari community. The DAO has long struggled with liquidity problems for $RARI and the Treasury is 99% in RARI, which screams for diversification, giving the DAO better operational solutions. Onboarding a professional Treasury Manager to help improve the current state of Rari Treasury should not interfere with our strategic objectives but if so help us being more effective at reaching them. Specially doing it at a rate that can be afforded by the DAO. For that same reason, StableLab refrained from receiving any compensation, as currently this task is very well fitted for the outlined Committee.

Quarterly Treasury Reports will also allow the DAO to evaluate quarterly the performance of the committee, increasing transparency on the committee’s activities.

3 Likes
#5

Thanks for the proposal @cr1st0f

  • Can you provide some links to the successes you have had with treasury management in other DAOs so far?
  • What % of the current treasury are you planning to target for this initiative and how is this number calculated?
  • Can you help us understand what is the quantitive measure of success of this initiative?
  • From an RoI perspective how likely is the DAO to make profit from these compared to the ask of this proposal?

Transferring funds could legally implicate delegates and/or the service provider. Another perspective is security of funds itself. For these reasons, I’d prefer that the funds remain in custody of the DAO at all times and the service provider has autonomy over allocation decisions. Here is one potential solution for you to consider to facilitate this.

An independent auditor would be more favourable from the perspective of transparency and accountability.

5 Likes
#6

hi @cr1st0f
I haven’t used TokenLogic before. What’s the main purpose of using it for Rari DAO?
The $5K price tag feels a bit high for us right now if its primary function is just to visualize data.

1 Like
#7

I don’t like the direction you are going towards to. We need to support Rarible, not trying to get ourselves paid. I do not see how this proposal is going to help Rarible or boost the NFT marketplace in anyway.

I will be voting against.

#8

I totally agree Jaf.

#9

Tokenlogic are a Treasury Management service provider. They will carry out simulations for the liquidity deployment, manage LP position parameters, and, once we have non-RARI tokens in the treasury will explore opportunities to earn yield on these and manage those yield positions. They will provide a dashboard to allow delegates and anyone else to monitor these positions through the visualisations.

I have been a delegate for around 2 years and have not tried to get myself paid let alone been paid for anything in that time, I’ve dedicated probably hundreds of hours unpaid. I’ve spent over 2 months putting together this proposal and approached every reputable treasury manager and found one to work for a tiny fraction of their usual costs. I also explored cheaper automated solutions which turned out not to be recommended (by the very teams that build them). So I don’t think this is a fair and accurate comment. Services cost money and nobody is going to provide professional level services for free - just as none of the other Councils or Committees at Rari DAO work for free.

In discussion with Stablelab, Rari Foundation and others I have created this proposal to help Rarible, it was agreed that its extremely important to diversify the treasury, deploy liquidity, and provide ongoing management of the DAO finances.

Let’s imagine there’s no net new liquidity deployed and Rarible distributes $10k of RARI incentives to users who then sell these rewards, as per my proposal this would cause a 16% drop in RARI price which would reduce the value of the DAO treasury by $1.3m.

Likewise I think it does Rari DAO and Rarible no favours to be relying on distributing RARI to pay for services which also has impacts on RARI price, results in uncompetitive pricing from service providers (as they need to eat the price volatility when pricing their services), and subjects the DAO to volatility in token price which restricts its ability to plan properly.

This is a basic financial management function which although perhaps isn’t as glamourous as deploying a chain or funding grants for projects that promise eye catching results, is extremely important for keeping the DAO functioning so that it can continue to support Rarible long into the future.

1 Like
#10

First of all, I’m very happy to see a treasury committee proposal—thanks for putting that together, @cr1st0f. Some clear benefits I see:

  • Establishing a dedicated body within the DAO responsible for treasury strategy, which helps further professionalize operations—especially in terms of transparency, regular reporting, and exploring tools like the recent DeFi agent proposal.

  • Enabling engagement in DeFi actions, which the Foundation as an entity is limited in doing.

  • Earning interest or rewards on treasury funds (though I’d personally favour a conservative approach there), and potentially receiving grants (good idea from my perspective)

A few questions and comments:

  • My main concern would be the cost as well. For 120k a year, I would expect this to be a full-time role for at least one person, which I’m not sure that is for our (rather small) treasury.

  • I’m aware it’s not much for a professional treasury provider, but could you break down the cost further? For example: how many hours are expected, and what milestones or services would Tokenlogic provide in this setup? As @Jaf noted, the dashboards are a nice touch, but I’d consider them optional.

  • With your DeFi background, I think you’re a strong fit for this role. That said, to truly call this a “committee,” I’d expect at least three members involved—not all necessarily in operative roles.

  • As @jengajojo mentioned, I’d appreciate some estimates—how much would you plan to deploy, and what rewards do you anticipate?

  • Finally, have you checked how this aligns with the Foundation’s work? My understanding is that the DAO’s funds are at least partly managed by the Foundation, and there are already plans underway to revise the current strategy. We should make sure we’re on the same page there.

3 Likes
#11

Thanks @jengajojo, I think these are good questions and I want to provide detailed answers as there are some nuances and some of these questions touch on decisions I’ve needed to make when working on this proposal.

@Jaf and @forexus I believe this section also answers your questions about Tokenlogic.

Tokenlogic acts as Treasury Manager for Aave, spearheads the Aave Liquidity Committee, acts as Finance Steward, and acts as GHO Steward. Through these roles they provide services in the following areas: treasury and runway management, analytics and performance metrics, GHO’s growth across DeFi and CeFi, incentive program design, and Aave protocol parameter optimisation.

They are responsible for the management of the $200m Aave treasury, have been a key force in repegging and growing GHO to the current $230m marketcap mainly through intelligent liquidity and incentives management, have been essential in the design of incentive programs distributing $36m resulting in over $2.5bn TVL growth over just the past year, manage all AAVE & GHO Protocol Owned Liquidity positions, and manage the GHO stability module. Outside of Aave, Tokenlogic works closely with many multi-billion dollar funds and other DAOs to perform due diligence and aid in DeFi yield strategy design.

Some links providing more information on Tokenlogic’s work at Aave:

On my part, I work for ACI and Aave DAO through which I work closely with Tokenlogic on a day to day basis. I do not work as a treasury manager although my experience often touches on relevant aspects. Some relevant experience to this committee is:

We intend to look into this in more depth if the committee is approved and we are being compensated. We will be posting a follow up proposal with more detail which will request funds for deployment which the delegates can provide feedback on.

In the first instance we expect to deploy circa $100-150k of liquidity. We intend to tune our approach as we go and with the guidance of the DAO and other stakeholders - we want to start conservative and scale steadily.

The quantitative KPIs that we intend to target are listed in the proposal - they are measurable and will be tracked in the quarterly reports. Due to the significant uncertainty around factors that can influence these such as trading volume and external grant committee decisions, we cannot predict what these numbers will be - we of course will not promise things which are out of our control.

The measure of success will be improvement in these KPIs, although we of course are unable to provide specific numbers we can point to our experience, track record, and professional credibility as evidence that we will work on a best efforts basis to make decisions which we believe will maximise these KPIs.

I don’t expect this proposal to deliver a positive ROI right away, our starting funds are modest and held in $RARI, which currently can’t earn yield in DeFi. The real aim in this first year is simply to lay the groundwork: improve onchain liquidity for trading and move the treasury into assets that can generate returns and position us for profitability down the road.

That said, within a year I’m optimistic this committee can pay for itself although it depends on how much the DAO approves us to deploy in LPs and how much trading volume and buy pressure there is. For example, over the past year Aave’s USDC market has averaged about 5.5% APR, on circa $2m USDC balance, that yield alone would cover our budget of $120k. We’ll also be earning trading fees from any LP positions, and there’s room to layer in more advanced strategies if the DAO wants to explore leveraged yield or other higher-return opportunities - Tokenlogic already has the infrastructure ready to manage these effectively. If trading volume picks up, the token price recovers, and we continue diversifying the treasury, I believe future iterations of this committee could be self-sustaining or even generate positive ROI.

So this year, we’ll focus on getting liquidity deployed, starting our diversification away from pure $RARI, and tapping into external grant programs. Each of those steps brings value whether through deeper liquidity, yield, reduced concentration risk, or outside funding, and together they set us up for stronger performance and better returns in the future.

I see no legal risk in employing a treasury manager, having protocol owned liquidity, or deploying treasury assets to yield strategies. Most DAOs engage in these activities with no legal proceedings resulting from this that I am aware of. There is a thriving treasury management sector which appears to also not perceive any legal risk to these activities. More specifically, Tokenlogic has done similar work for Aave for several years with no legal issues whatsoever.

On the topic of Aera. I did consider this solution, as well as other automated solutions such as Arrakis for LP management. I see three main issues with this:

  1. Management of the Aera instance.

If the DAO manages this, it needs to vote for any change. This means it can only be deployed on chains which have governance and comes with the usual governance burden and delays this causes. Let’s imagine the treasury manager behaves maliciously, the DAO now needs to go through the governance process in order to remove them or pause the Aera instance.

The alternative, to remove governance burden or deploy strategies on chains other than Mainnet or Rarichain is to use a multisig to manage the instance - then we’re back in the same position as with this proposal with the same trust assumptions.

In order to address potential security issues I have proposed that both the liqudity/yield wallet and the compensation wallet are three of five multisigs. The signers will be myself, Tokenlogic, Stablelab, and 2 other signers ideally from the Security Council. As the Security Council and Stablelab are assumed to be trusted parties by the DAO and have full control through the 3-of-5 signing policy to take emergency actions without myself or Tokenlogic if required and at least one person other than me and TL is required to approve any transaction in the normal course of operations.

  1. Additional smart contract risk and added complexity.

Given the assumption above that there would likely need to be a multisig managing the Aera instance, there would be no security benefits yet there would be an additional layer of smart contract risk. There’s also the issue of increasing complexity. The more layers added, and the more systems that need to be interacted with increases the risk of human error when crafting transactions.

  1. No benefit from automation features.

Due to the low liquidity currently available, deploying single sided automated univ3 optimisers for LP positions does not work well. These automated univ3 optimisers need to rebalance into other liquidity pools to adjust the LP range, without sufficient liquidity to do so they cannot function efficiently. This is stated in the first paragraph of the treasury section in Aera docs (Treasury | Aera). Arrakis team provided similar advice.

So in summary, in our specific circumstances Aera is not an appropriate solution, increases rather than reduces risk, and adds additional cost and complexity. Although these solutions may be marketed as one size fits all, they are not always appropriate.

We will be providing reporting alongside a treasury dashboard which will update in realtime. In addition, the treasury management wallet will be public and so anybody is welcome to monitor this wallet and the positions it manages - everything is public and onchain. Anyone can audit it as and when they desire. We cannot be any more transparent than this. I liked your previous financial report and think a section on treasury management would be a great addition.

1 Like
#12

I can provide some additional context on why I saw this figure as being in the DAO’s favour when putting together this proposal. I negotiated this cost and services provided by looking both externally and internally, and with guidance from members of the DAO.

From the external perspective I reviewed costs of treasury management for other DAOs, using professional service providers of the same calibre. See a summary table below:

DAO (Date) Fee structure Dollar equivalent fee
ENS (2022) 0.5% mgmt, 10% perf Mgmt fee ≈ $260k/year + perf fee ≈ $100k/yr. Circa $360k/yr total
Arbitrum (2024) 1% mgmt, 0% perf Mgmt fee ≈ $1.7M/yr, oversight ≈$10k/month. Circa $2m/yr total
SafeDAO (2023) 2% mgmt, 0% perf Mgmt fee ≈$400k/yr
dYdX (2023) 0% mgmt, 5% perf $300k-$1m/yr fixed floor and ceiling
Aave (2024) - Tokenlogic $1m/yr flat fee $1m/yr

Internally, I looked at costs of core services provided to the DAO and Foundation by other professionals:

Service Annual cost
Marketing services $300,000
Legal services $170,000
Audit services $150,000
Security council $120,000

Where this proposal falls in this range:

Internal cost comparison: 35% cheaper than the average cost of professional services, equal cheapest tied with the Security Council.

External cost comparison: 86% cheaper than the average cost of treasury management service providers in this comparison.

I believe even disregarding external comparisons, there is significantly more work involved in this committee than, for example, Legal or Security Council yet this is being provided at the same or lower cost.

Tokenlogic will be providing the following services:

  • Deployment and ongoing management of liquidity positions using protocols which are most appropriate at any given time (likely Balancer and/or Uniswap v3 positions).

  • Once the treasury holds non-RARI tokens (ETH + stablecoins), earning yield on these tokens.

  • Provision of a dashboard to allow monitoring of the treasury - including all of the wallets outlined in the Foundation’s financial report which are currently not all tracked on Tally.

These services are not generally priced on an hourly rate, the more common method of pricing them is as a management fee as % of AUM plus a performance fee which is a % of the yield earned. This would price this proposal at around 1.5-1.7% management fee with 0% performance fee. The usual range of management fees is from circa 0.5% for very large treasuries where minimal work is required, to 5% for smaller treasuries and those requiring more complex management. Performance fee ranges from 5-20% usually. I saw it as beneficial for the DAO for this to be a flat fee instead of a management + performance fee as the token price is at a low point at the moment and will hopefully recover - should this happen the dollar denominated cost of the fee would increase with token price if this were priced using a management fee model.

I perhaps didn’t explain clearly enough in the proposal as this has come up a couple of times but Tokenlogic is not a dashboard provider, they are a treasury manager and will be advising on all steps, building transactions, and managing parameters for the LPs and yield activities. They will also be providing a dashboard but this is not the core service.

Stablelab wanted a professional treasury manager on the proposal (quite sensibly) and Tokenlogic serve this role. To clarify in case there is some confusion, Tokenlogic is not an individual but a professional services company of I think 7 or 8 people.

There are 3 current members of the committee: myself, Tokenlogic, and Stablelab. The majority of the treasury management work will be done by myself and TL, with Stablelab providing oversight and advisory services when necessary. There will be an additional 2 signers who I’d like to draw from the Security Council if they are willing to volunteer.

I want this to be a committee that gets things done and has a positive impact, for this reason keeping it lean is the approach I’ve taken.

Please see my response to Jojo above.

I worked alongside the Foundation to review this proposal and adjust the scope so that there is no crossover in our activities.

3 Likes
#13

Hey @cr1st0f, thanks for the well-thought-out proposal and work done securing a reputable treasury manager to serve as part of the committee.

Onchain liquidity is currently one of the biggest problems for the $RARI token as highlighted by your proposal.

And I think it would make more sense for the Treasury Committee to focus on the goal of improving onchain liquidity for the $RARI token over a shorter time period (3 - 4 months), with the suggested KPI of ‘Slippage on $RARI buys and sells.’

Based on the success of the liquidity deployment implementation, a follow up proposal could be made to enable further functions of the Treasury Committee (earning yield, grant opportunities).

2 Likes
#14

Hey @Sixty thanks for the questions.

We will be reporting quarterly so there will be visibility of the performance over the first 3 months. However, Tokenlogic’s involvement has already been heavily negotiated to present good value to the DAO and their minimum acceptable term is 12 months to receive the presented terms. The other aspects of the proposal outside of managing liquidity were added in order to improve the value proposition.

1 Like
#15

Thanks for replying to the community’s questions @cr1st0f I would like to start by thanking you for pursing this

and hope we can find a solution that is optimal for everyone. Since other delegates, @Jaf @forexus @bitblondy have pressed on the cost issue, I’d like to understand this more:

Based on your suggestion of starting out with

  • If you were to start working on the whole treasury, then the cost proposed is in line with the industry standard, however, with 100-150K as a starting point, the proposed cost seems highly excessive
  • Given the current onchain volume and liquidity sits at less than 50k Uniswap Interface it will take you a significant amount of time to convert that 100-150K RARI into stables/ETH which can be then deployed into yield farm.
  • Since governance itself takes a few weeks on average in the DAO, after approving this proposal, we’d be paying the service provider, but the SP cannot start working unless there is any working capital.
  • I see upfront payment not linked to AUM as a misalignment of incentives. The treasury manager is not incentivised to maximize returns for the DAO if their compensation is not tied to performance. This is most relevant in this specific case since the service is specifically for improving the return on DAO assets.

Given these points, I suggest the following amendements:

  • The cost of services can be 2-5% AUM fee + 20% performance fee charged yearly.

  • The proposal for forming the commttiee should also include
    a. the amount of RARI requested for the ‘first phase’
    b. total number of ‘phases’ anticipated
    c. total RARI anticipated over the duration of the next 12 months

This ensures that the service provider can get started immediately and the DAO can ‘budget’ future costs.

I understand that you want to conduct some research as highlighted here:

as well as some BD work:

Since these costs may be higher than the standard Treasury management costs, you can consider adding a separate research and BD cost along with your proposal.

2 Likes
#16

Thanks @cr1st0f for the comments and the additional info.

I understand that the requested compensation is in line with industry standards, though it’s worth noting that the examples cited involve much larger treasuries.

  • The idea of a three-member committee and two additional signers sounds reasonable—I hadn’t fully picked up on that before.

  • Thanks for outlining Tokenlogic’s services—I see the value of having a professional treasury manager involved. However, I’m not entirely convinced by the argument that a fixed fee is better for the DAO. Given our relatively small treasury, including a performance-based component seems like a reasonable alternative.

  • Since the timeline is fixed at one year and Tokenlogic’s compensation is not negotiable, would you consider shifting part of your compensation to a performance-based structure? I’d be in favour, if we can bring down the fixed cost a bit.

  • I also agree with @Jenga that starting with just $100–150k from the treasury feels low relative to the proposal’s scope. Could you explain the rationale behind that number, and what the plan is for scaling to the full treasury? I also support the idea of including a research and BD budget—it could really benefit the DAO.

To end on a positive note: I appreciate the initiative, and I think we’re aligned in believing that a treasury committee would be a valuable step forward for the DAO.