RRC XX: Finalizing the Transition to Merit-Based Governance

Proposals Parent DAO Proposals
#1

Finalizing the Transition to Merit-Based Governance

Date of Submission: July 14, 2025
Authors: @jarisjames, @Jaf, @coffee-crusher

Abstract

This proposal finalizes the transition of RARI DAO governance from inherited delegations to a fully merit-based system. All Foundation-granted delegate voting power inherited from the previous Foundation on both Ethereum Mainnet and RARI Chain will be revoked.

RARI DAO has transitioned to a new Foundation and now operates with a staking-based governance system on RARI Chain, where voting power is earned through active participation, not granted by legacy authority.

This action brings governance into alignment with the DAO’s current strategy, closes the chapter on Foundation-appointed influence, and ensures that all contributors operate under a unified, transparent standard.

In the event that Ethereum Mainnet governance remains active, this proposal also enables a decentralized path forward by allowing the DAO to elect 3 new proposal sponsors via forum poll to decentralize access and reduce reliance on a single gatekeeper.

Motivation

RARI DAO has outgrown the early scaffolding of legacy delegations. With a new Foundation and a staking-based model live on RARI Chain, governance must now reflect earned participation, not outdated inherited power.

Leaving legacy delegations in place creates:

  • A mismatch between earned and inherited governance power

  • Governance imbalance, where certain delegates retain influence not tied to current merit or DAO involvement

This proposal closes that gap and establishes a single, fair rule for all contributors: governance must be earned.

Rationale

The DAO has already transitioned in practice, most new voting power now comes from staking or organic delegation. This proposal formalizes that transition and ensures the system is future-proof.

Passing this proposal will:

  • Reinforce a merit-based system where all power is earned

  • Eliminate lingering legacy influence from the prior Foundation era

  • Ensure staking incentives on RARI Chain carry real governance weight

  • Decentralize proposal sponsorship if Ethereum Mainnet governance persists

  • Establish accountability and clarity moving forward

Delegates who earned their position through staking or community support remain unaffected. This proposal does not penalize engagement, it simply retires unearned influence.

Key Terms

  • Legacy Delegations: Voting power granted by the previous RARI Foundation, typically in 2,000 RARI increments, with one notable 15,000 RARI delegation made on Ethereum Mainnet shortly before the Foundation’s transition.

  • These delegations exist on both Ethereum Mainnet and RARI Chain and were intended to bootstrap DAO activity during early development.

  • They are no longer aligned with the DAO’s incentive system or community standards.

Specifications

  • Revoke all legacy delegations issued by the previous Foundation on Ethereum mainnet and RARI Chain. These delegations were primarily granted in 2,000 RARI increments, with one exceptional case of a 15,000 RARI delegation made shortly before the Foundation transitioned.

  • Revoke all inherited RARI Chain delegations assigned by the old Foundation granted in 2,000 RARI increments, so all voting power is earned through organic delegation.

  • If Ethereum mainnet governance is to continue:

    • Open a DAO forum poll to elect 3 proposal sponsors, each receiving 5,000 RARI delegated from the DAO Treasury, not the Foundation, to ensure full decentralization and independence from Foundation influence.

  • If the Foundation plans to fully migrate governance to RARI Chain, no redistribution of mainnet power is required

  • All voting power must come from organic delegation via staking, community reputation, or self-delegation.

Steps to Implement

  1. The RARI Foundation revokes all legacy delegations from the previous Foundation on Ethereum mainnet

  2. The Foundation also revokes all RARI Chain delegations inherited from the previous Foundation

  3. If needed, a forum poll is initiated to elect 3 mainnet proposal sponsors

  4. 5,000 RARI is delegated to each elected sponsor (if Ethereum governance continues)

Timeline

  • July 14–17: Forum discussion period (3 days)

  • July 18: Submit proposal on RARI Chain

  • July 23: If passed, Foundation revokes all inherited delegations within 5 days

  • (Optional) by July 30: Forum poll to elect 3 new mainnet proposal sponsors (if needed)

  • (Optional) Aug 5–9: Voting power transferred to new sponsors (if needed)

Overall Cost

None. This proposal requires no new funds and is purely a governance alignment initiative.

3 Likes
#2

This proposal is about ensuring that the future of RARI DAO is based on participation and contribution, not legacy status.

Especially, when one delegate has held significant inherited voting power for years, without a clear process of reevaluation, forum presence, or accountability; it weakens our system and discourages new contributors from getting involved.

We can’t build a credible governance system this way, especially if we want to attract serious builders to our ecosystem. Misaligned incentives and unearned decision-making power will only push them away. The strength of any DAO comes from clarity, fairness, and trust in its governance process.

Here’s one example. In Q2, StableLab reviewed, gave feedback on, and privately approved the revised Delegate Incentives payout proposal. They even sponsored it onchain. But when it came time to vote, they used their inherited 15,000 RARI delegation, granted shortly before the previous Foundation transitioned out, after their previous power expired, to vote against the very proposal they supported behind the scenes.

That single vote blocked every active delegate from receiving rewards they had earned through good faith participation. And it did so at a time when many other delegates had already lost their voting power due to veRARI decay.

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This kind of gatekeeping highlights the risk of legacy influence: it’s unaccountable, misaligned, and no longer reflects the will of today’s DAO contributors.

This proposal changes that. It ensures all governance power on RARI Chain comes from earned participation, not from legacy handouts. It applies to everyone equally.

The DAO already voted to make staking the basis of RARI Chain governance. This proposal simply aligns the voting layer with that reality and closes the chapter on unearned power.

Let’s move forward with a system that rewards contribution, encourages new voices, and reflects the DAO we’re building together.

3 Likes
#3

Long overdue, and absolutely necessary.

This proposal doesn’t just remove legacy power, it restores integrity to governance by making sure votes are earned, not inherited. Merit-based participation is the only sustainable path for a DAO that wants to attract serious contributors and build long-term legitimacy.

The situation described with StableLab shows exactly why legacy delegations are no longer just outdated, they’re a liability. When old voting power can override active consensus, we’re not operating as a DAO, we’re operating under a ghost of the past.

:white_check_mark: Earned power
:white_check_mark: Transparent processes
:white_check_mark: Decentralized sponsorship
:white_check_mark: Clear alignment with staking incentives

This is what credible governance looks like.

Let’s close the chapter on inherited influence and fully embrace the future we’ve already voted for.

1 Like
#4

So you’re essentially suggesting revoking all Foundation delegations, the ones on RARI chain for cohort 3 of the delegates program and the one on mainnet for StableLab?

To assess the proposal, we would need an update from foundation (@Anria), how long the dual gov model will still be in place and what the problems are with migrating. We have asked this question many times, already.

I agree that the current situation on mainnet is indeed a shame for a DAO, and also a security risk, given our treasury is on mainnet.

  • As for the proposal, I don’t see the vision of “merit-based gov” in redistributing a dozen delegations to just three people.
  • I’d prefer a full migration and execution of the delegate program cohort 4. That would diversirfy voting power and is the only way, we’ll attract new delegates, in my opinion.
  • It’s worth pointing out, that as per RRC38, cohort 4 should have been established by April. If foundation is continuing not executing that, I’d suggest the DAO takes on the program. Tally | Rari DAO (v1) | RRC 38: Updating and Migrating Delegate Launchpad Program to RARI chain