We voted For: The split between v1 on Ethereum and v2 on RARI Chain has been a real source of confusion, and consolidating binding decisions back on Mainnet while keeping RARI Chain for ecosystem coordination and signaling is the cleanest way to resolve it. The proposed Governor and Timelock parameters are sensible defaults, and narrowing the Security Council to pause, operational reversal, and blocking harmful payloads keeps emergency powers scoped to where they belong. We also like the cohort-based delegate relaunch, since onboarding has been harder than it should be and a structured intake gives new delegates a real path in. Glad to see this published as a temperature check with the direction shaped by community feedback before the binding migration steps execute.
We voted Against: This is an unsolicited on-chain proposal with a blank title and description, no forum discussion, and no RFC or governance process behind it, whose single executable action transfers 500,000 RARI from the DAO to the proposer’s own wallet. The proposer submitted it with empty metadata and is voting it through with their own tokens, which is the profile of a treasury-drain attempt rather than a legitimate governance action. We voted Against and encourage other delegates to do the same, since executing an unexplained self-transfer that never passed through any part of Rari’s normal process would directly harm the DAO.
We voted For: This raises the quorum on the legacy RARI DAO V1 Governor from 15% to 20% of total voting power, a targeted parameter change that leaves the current and future canonical governance untouched. Strengthening the minimum participation on the V1 path is a sensible hardening as that legacy surface winds down, since a 15% floor is low enough for a single large position to clear on its own, and the move to 20% is a moderate step that raises the bar without setting an unnecessarily high threshold that could stall legitimate activity. We are comfortable supporting it, and appreciate that it is framed as reassessable rather than a permanent target if the voting-power distribution shifts.