What portion do you suggest?
Thank you, @Anria, and thanks to everyone who contributed to this discussion.
After reviewing Rariās situation and going through the comments from other delegates, I see clear issues with how treasury management is currently structured: it has been too slow, too concentrated in $RARI, and the room for maneuver is shrinking. This proposal surfaces these challenges well, and as @jarisjames pointed out, other alternatives have been discussed in the past but never executed, another sign that itās time to move forward.
I also understand the concern raised by some delegates about whether this change could undermine decentralization, and itās a valid point. Weāve seen this debate in other DAOs as well. From my perspective, decentralization works best at the strategic level, where the community sets direction and priorities. A certain degree of ācentralizationā in some areas is not inherently negative, execution benefits from having professional and agile operators who can act within clear guardrails to avoid missing market opportunities.
For me, a balanced path forward could include:
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A 12-month mandate for the Foundation, with quarterly reviews and an annual on-chain renewal vote.
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Monthly reports with clear details on treasury inflows/outflows, P&L, positions, and platforms used.
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A conservative risk framework, focused on liquid low-risk instruments (stables, tokenized T-bills, top-tier DeFi without leverage), plus a quarterly cap on $RARI sales.
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Transparency through publishing finalized provider agreements, ensuring accountability while preserving negotiation leverage.
I also agree with @Money that ApeCoin DAO may not be the right benchmark. Its governance structure was ultimately sunset and replaced by ApeCo, meaning the DAO itself was dissolved. What Iād like to see is the Foundation not only improving capital efficiency but also continuing to foster community-driven proposals and ecosystem activity, supporting builders and governance programs, so that the DAOās voice remains central.
In summary: I support this proposal. The greatest risk to Rariās long-term sustainability is inaction. With proper checks and transparency in place, this program can strike a good balance between agility and accountability.
Enough to cover DAO operations and other DAO initiatives for the next year or two, just to avoid the situation where we have to request funds from the foundation anytime we need to get anything done.
Iām not questioning the legitimacy of delegations. But I should not need to point out, that >50% of voting power with one delegate is not favourable for a DAO, then you might as well remove governance.
If I remember correctly, you actually suggested removing StableLabās delegation on mainnet and the others on RARI chain to foster decentralization.
There was not much information, why the last treasury proposal was withdrawn, but cost did not seem to be the main blocker. In this proposal, thereās not even cost included, not to mention other important information.
Thanks for pointing out the treasury on RARI chain. Though, as @Sixty mentioned, if the DAO would like to spend any meaningful amount in this scenario, theyād then have to be requested from the Foundation managed treasury. If there is even a share reserved for that, thereās no info on this in the proposal.
@bitblondy itās a stretch to bring up an old forum draft from 2 months ago, especially twisting it out of context. That suggestion was about removing inherited delegations from the old Foundation. The suggeston from the 3 proposal authors - not just my own, was to explore the option of merit-based governance.
At that time, StableLab still held over 50% of mainnet voting power; proposals literally couldnāt even be posted onchain, let alone pass without them, and you were perfectly fine with that, you even defended that model back then.
Also, itās worth noting that the proposal draft you referenced was never pushed onchain. Since this wasnāt the intent of the new Foundation, we didnāt force it through. Bringing this up now to somehow solidify your point is irrelevant.
It feels like we are stuck now. If this is important for the foundationās future, we have to find a midway or nothing will happen.
Politics friends!
Part of the core functions of any DAO is managing the treasury, which is considered community capital, so naturally there will be some discourse when such a topic is brought forward. I wouldnāt exactly call it politics.
So far no one seems to be against the concept of empowering treasury management. But overall seems we could all use a few more details, and this should be good to go to vote. As @Kaf_StableLab said, āThe greatest risk to Rariās long-term sustainability is inactionā, so hopefully this proposal will finally get the treasury productive.
Thatās right, because mainnet gov was supposed to shut down. Now we have centralized tendencies on two chains.
Itās worth mentioning, that the delegate program and the corresponding delegations also were supposed to be renewed, that was just not executed.
Hello all!
We added some clarifications to the proposal and it now has now been published on RARI DAO v1.
You can review it here: RRC-51: Treasury Management Empowerment Program