[RRC-XX] Replacement Delegate Incentive Program for Q1 2025 and Beyond

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#1

RRC-XX: Replacement Delegate Incentive Program for Q1 2025 and Beyond

Date of Submission:

May 09, 2025

Authors:

jarisjames (Founder of daospace)

Abstract

This proposal replaces RRC-40, the original Delegate Incentive Program framework. While RRC-40 successfully passed onchain, it will more than likely never be executed. The follow-up payout proposal, RRC-42, will likely fail to reach quorum due to veRARI delegation decay; a critical oversight by the authors of RRC-40, which ultimately undermined the program’s ability to function. This updated proposal introduces a more durable system that removes quorum as a recurring requirement for each quarterly report, retroactively issues the Q1 2025 payout onchain, and simplifies future reward disbursement via multisig or automated tools like Superfluid. The program retains its original goals; rewarding onchain participation, rationale posting, and proposal authorship, while removing unnecessary bottlenecks.

Motivation

RRC-40 was well-intentioned but flawed in execution. It required each quarterly payout to pass a new onchain proposal, which was never a sustainable approach. The veRARI delegation that powered the original vote has since decayed, and because the authors of RRC-40 didn’t account for this, the follow-up payout proposal (RRC-42) will likely fail quorum, even though the community already signaled support. This oversight effectively canceled the program’s own ability to pay delegates. We waited long enough for Q1 rewards. This proposal corrects that and ensures no further delays moving forward.

I drafted the Q1 payout proposal (RRC-42), including all onchain actions for individual delegate payouts. @Jose_StableLab reached out to help post it onchain, but after realizing they no longer had the required voting power, they asked me to coordinate with @Firefly808 instead. Firefly had sufficient veRARI to sponsor the proposal, and that’s how it went live. Unfortunately, despite being on Tally, it remains stalled due to low delegate voting power across the board; further proving that RRC-40’s payout logic is unworkable in practice.

Rationale

This proposal preserves the spirit of RRC-40 while stripping out the procedural bloat that made execution impossible. The Q1 payout will be executed through this onchain proposal. After that, the program transitions to a more scalable structure where quarterly payouts are handled offchain via a multisig or streamed automatically using a tool like Superfluid, whichever is more efficient at the time, to be decided by the program admin (daospace). Compared to the rigidity of the previous model, this framework allows RARI DAO to sustain long-term delegate incentives without the risk of bureaucratic deadlock.

Key Terms

  • veRARI: Voting-escrowed RARI used to determine governance power in the DAO.

  • Delegate Launchpad Program: A past initiative that boosted delegate visibility and voting weight.

  • RRC-40: Original Delegate Incentive Program proposal; passed but never executed.

  • RRC-42: Q1 payout proposal under RRC-40; expected to fail quorum.

  • Multisig: A multi-signature wallet used to authorize transactions offchain.

Specifications

Program Structure

  • RRC-40 is obsolete: It passed but will not be able to execute its first payout.

  • Q1 payout will be included in this proposal and executed onchain upon approval.

  • Future quarters will not require new onchain votes: All future disbursements will be handled offchain via multisig or automated via Superfluid after the quarterly report is posted on forum.

  • Program admin remains daospace, as in the original program.

Eligibility

  • Delegates qualify for Q1 and Q2 if they had at least 2,000 veRARI delegated to them (or self-delegated) at the start of each respective Delegate Launchpad program or within each quarter.

  • Future quarters will follow the same criteria.

Point System

  • Votes Cast: 20 points each

  • Rationale Posted for each vote: 20 bonus points each

  • Proposal Authored: 100 points total, split evenly among co-authors

    • Only awarded if the proposal passes onchain
    • Proposal authorship points will not be awarded for proposals related to the Delegate Incentive Program, to prevent point farming or self-serving design loops.

Policy Adjustments

  • Rationale posts are no longer required, which made room for 4 more delegates to qualify for Q1.

Steps to Implement

  1. Submit this proposal to forum (May 09, 2025)

  2. Initiate onchain vote after the launch of the next Delegate Launchpad Program

  3. If approved, execute Q1 payout directly via this proposal

  4. All future payouts managed offchain by multisig or via Superfluid (admin discretion)

Timeline

May 2025

  • Community review and vote initiation (timed to follow the launch of the next Delegate Launchpad Program to help ensure quorum)

  • Q1 payout executed onchain

  • Begin Q2 calculations

Overall Cost

  • Q1 Delegate Rewards Pool: $30,000 in RARI
  • Admin Fee (daospace): $3,000 in RARI
  • Total: $33,000 in RARI

Admin Fee Justification

The original $500/month ($1,500 per quarter) rate was a low-ball estimate proposed by the authors of RRC-40 before any implementation had begun. Since then, significantly more time and work were required to identify and resolve structural flaws, draft this replacement proposal, and build the backend logic needed for long-term automation and reporting.

The updated $3,000 admin fee for Q1 reflects the full scope of that work and ensures the program is operational, fair, and future-proofed.

Note: Future quarters will follow the same structure. One proposal per year will initiate the Delegate Incentive Program, with $30,000 in RARI allocated for delegate rewards per quarter, and a $3,000 admin fee applied each quarter for ongoing administration.

The following payout breakdown reflects Q1 activity as calculated under the original program logic, with minor updates and corrections applied, including the addition of 4 more delegates.

Full Report & Payout Breakdown

Note: Final dollar payouts were rounded up or down to the nearest dollar for cleaner disbursement amounts.

  1. Delegate: @bitblondy

Wallet: 0x4d32d90d6535bd4e7eabaa27ee72932cb214bbfa

Votes: 5

Proposals Voted On:

RRC-36: Rumble.exchange - DAO Support Proposal

RRC-37: RARI Foundation 2025 Operational Budget

RRC-38: Updating and Migrating Delegate Launchpad Program to RARI chain

RRC-39: Multichain Primary & Secondary Protocol Fees

RRC-40: RARI DAO Delegate Incentive Program

Rationales (RRC‑36, 37, 38, 39, 40):

→ Voter Points: 100

→ Rationale Points: 100

→ Total Points: 200

Payout: $2,912 in RARI

============================================================

  1. Delegate: Firefly808

Wallet: 0xbe3f82034778fbf474060f7d4a032f592559ab4d

Votes: 5

Proposals Voted On:

RRC-36: Rumble.exchange - DAO Support Proposal

RRC-37: RARI Foundation 2025 Operational Budget

RRC-38: Updating and Migrating Delegate Launchpad Program to RARI chain

RRC-39: Multichain Primary & Secondary Protocol Fees

RRC-40: RARI DAO Delegate Incentive Program

Rationales (RRC‑36, 37, 38, 39, 40):

→ Voter Points: 100

→ Rationale Points: 100

→ Total Points: 200

Payout: $2,912 in RARI

============================================================

  1. Delegate: forexus

Wallet: 0xd8936e602e38dfee5d6466865068b94b1943debf

Votes: 5

Proposals Voted On:

RRC-36: Rumble.exchange - DAO Support Proposal

RRC-37: RARI Foundation 2025 Operational Budget

RRC 38: Updating and Migrating Delegate Launchpad Program to RARI chain

RRC-39: Multichain Primary & Secondary Protocol Fees

RRC-40: RARI DAO Delegate Incentive Program

Rationales (RRC‑36, 37, 38, 39, 40):

→ Voter Points : 100

→ Rationale Points: 100

→ Total Points : 200

Payout: $2,912 in RARI

============================================================

  1. Delegate: coffee-crusher

Wallet: 0x836dd1fb00dcd93b4ce205aac02173f01192b916

Votes: 5

Proposals Voted On: (Technical Issues, See Rationales Below)

RRC-36 Rumble.exchange - DAO Support Proposal

RRC-37: RARI Foundation 2025 Operational Budget

RRC-38: Updating and Migrating Delegate Launchpad Program to RARI chain

RRC-39: Multichain Primary & Secondary Protocol Fees

RRC-40: RARI DAO Delegate Incentive Program

Rationales: (RRC‑36, 37, 38, 39, 40):

→ Voter Points: 100

→ Rationale Points: 100

→ Total Points: 200

Payout: $2,912 in RARI

============================================================

  1. Delegate: @PGov

Wallet: 0x3fb19771947072629c8eee7995a2ef23b72d4c8a

Votes: 5

Proposals Voted On:

RRC-36 Rumble.exchange - DAO Support Proposal

RRC-37: RARI Foundation 2025 Operational Budget

RRC-38: Updating and Migrating Delegate Launchpad Program to RARI chain

RRC-39: Multichain Primary & Secondary Protocol Fees

RRC-40: RARI DAO Delegate Incentive Program

Rationales (RRC‑36, 37, 38, 39, 40):

→ Voter Points : 100

→ Rationale Points: 100

→ Total Points : 200

Payout: $2,912 in RARI

============================================================

  1. Delegate: @lionmsee

Wallet: 0x326301483aaa7366960877fa18b019e9c2d53e5d

Votes: 5

Proposals Voted On:

RRC-36 Rumble.exchange - DAO Support Proposal

RRC-37: RARI Foundation 2025 Operational Budget

RRC 38: Updating and Migrating Delegate Launchpad Program to RARI chain

RRC-39: Multichain Primary & Secondary Protocol Fees

RRC-40: RARI DAO Delegate Incentive Program

Rationales (RRC‑37, 38, 39, 40):

→ Voter Points : 100

→ Rationale Points: 80

→ Total Points : 180

Payout: $2,621 in RARI

============================================================

  1. Delegate: DAOplomats

Wallet: 0xE9Bd00FF8856aF96203d5994F3D73144619A4680 - (Requested a new wallet for payout)

Votes: 4

Proposals Voted On:

RRC-37: RARI Foundation 2025 Operational Budget

RRC-38: Updating and Migrating Delegate Launchpad Program to RARI chain

RRC-39: Multichain Primary & Secondary Protocol Fees

RRC-40: RARI DAO Delegate Incentive Program

Rationales (RRC‑37, 38, 39, 40):

→ Voter Points: 80

→ Rationale Points: 80

→ Total Points: 160

Payout: $2,330 in RARI

============================================================

  1. Delegate: Jaf

Wallet: 0xca85c622d4c61047f96e352cb919695486a193e6

Votes: 4

Proposals Voted On:

RRC-37: RARI Foundation 2025 Operational Budget

RRC-38: Updating and Migrating Delegate Launchpad Program to RARI chain

RRC-39: Multichain Primary & Secondary Protocol Fees

RRC-40: RARI DAO Delegate Incentive Program

Rationales (RRC‑37, 38, 39, 40):

→ Voter Points : 80

→ Rationale Points: 80

→ Total Points : 160

Payout: $2,330 in RARI

============================================================

  1. Delegate: jarisjames

Wallet: 0xb04e6891e584f2884ad2ee90b6545ba44f843c4a

Votes: 3

Proposals Voted On:

RRC-36: Rumble.exchange - DAO Support Proposal

RRC-37: RARI Foundation 2025 Operational Budget

RRC-40: RARI DAO Delegate Incentive Program

Rationales (RRC‑36, 37, 40):

→ Voter Points: 60

→ Rationale Points: 60

→ Total Points: 120

Payout: $1,747 in RARI

============================================================

  1. Delegate: @cr1st0f

Wallet: 0xfa773d02eb76ad8c7585d36c87707b9fe13d766d

Votes: 3

Proposals Voted On:

RRC-37: RARI Foundation 2025 Operational Budget

RRC-38: Updating and Migrating Delegate Launchpad Program to RARI chain

RRC-40: RARI DAO Delegate Incentive Program

Rationales (RRC‑37, 38, 40):

→ Voter Points: 60

→ Rationale Points: 60

→ Total Points: 120

Payout: $1,747 in RARI

============================================================

  1. Delegate: @Sixty

Wallet: 0xc2971fe806ce4438da09e21fc7be7fb121cf7e13

Votes: 3

Proposals Voted On:

RRC-37: RARI Foundation 2025 Operational Budget

RRC-38: Updating and Migrating Delegate Launchpad Program to RARI chain

RRC-40: RARI DAO Delegate Incentive Program

Rationales (RRC‑37, 38, 40):

→ Voter Points: 60

→ Rationale Points: 60

→ Total Points: 120

Payout: $1,747 in RARI

============================================================

  1. Delegate: @andreitr

Wallet: 0x1d671d1B191323A38490972D58354971E5c1cd2A

Votes: 3

Proposals Voted On:

RRC-36: Rumble.exchange - DAO Support Proposal

RRC-37: RARI Foundation 2025 Operational Budget

RRC-40: RARI DAO Delegate Incentive Program

Rationales (0):

→ Voter Points: 60

→ Rationale Points: 0

→ Total Points: 60

Payout: $874 in RARI

============================================================

  1. Delegate: Dzonson

Wallet: 0x53Eaa0d7F5e43d47B0b0E30B283E923601Eaa80B

Votes: 3

Proposals Voted On:

RRC-36: Rumble.exchange - DAO Support Proposal

RRC-37: RARI Foundation 2025 Operational Budget

RRC-39: Multichain Primary & Secondary Protocol Fees

Rationales (0):

→ Voter Points: 60

→ Rationale Points: 0

→ Total Points: 60

Payout: $874 in RARI

============================================================

  1. Delegate: @arikthereal

Wallet: 0x5F37D9A225AA57aE9cA174e475229Bcf88575E8D

Votes: 2

Proposals Voted On:

RRC-36: Rumble.exchange - DAO Support Proposal

RRC-37: RARI Foundation 2025 Operational Budget

Rationales (0):

→ Voter Points: 40

→ Rationale Points: 0

→ Total Points: 40

Payout: $582 in RARI

============================================================

  1. Delegate: @KAF

Wallet: 0xB4cA913E2b6EfB7cF3798b41cD68C72a5d1caC23

Votes: 2

Proposals Voted On:

RRC-39: Multichain Primary & Secondary Protocol Fees

RRC-40: RARI DAO Delegate Incentive Program

Rationales (0):

→ Voter Points: 40

→ Rationale Points: 0

→ Total Points: 40

Payout: $582 in RARI

============================================================

Admin Fee: 3,000 USD in RARI

Daospace wallet: 0xd3EDA7aB6Ed6a1836EAB644D86E7f76ABAd75172

4 Likes
#2

@jarisjames I’m a bit confused about the new proposal. Yes, the RRC-42 (incentives for Q1) proposal does have difficulties to reach quorum, but how should this be different with the new one?
Besides, the veRARI model / decay in voting power will no longer be in place with the gov migration that should happen soon, so that shouldn’t be a problem anymore.

  • The quarterly approvals are an essential part of the incentives program, giving the DAO financial flexibility and reassuring the approval of every payment, so I’m not in favour of changing this.

  • Also, I do not support the higher (doubled) admin fee for DAOspace. I understand there was additional effort around in the first quarter, but we were intentionally keeping it simple with the operations. The size of the program is very small, after all.

  • My understanding was also, that the quarterly process is pretty much automated by now, so the operational effort for the next quarters will be reduced.

4 Likes
#3

Your original proposal requires a DAO-wide vote every quarter just to send a payout.

That design is fragile, not because of veRARI decay, but because any future delegate (including those disqualified or new self-delegates) can vote against a payout they disagree with, stalling it entirely. Governance migration doesn’t fix that risk.

You asked why this new proposal is different:

  • Because it waits until after the Delegate Launchpad relaunch to guarantee quorum.
  • And only this first payout goes onchain, future ones are handled via multisig, based on a public quarterly report posted on forum.

If the current system worked, Q1 rewards would be on track. Instead, the vote is live but almost guaranteed to fail quorum. That’s why this update is necessary.

Quarterly approvals don’t guarantee flexibility, they create uncertainty. If even one vote fails, the entire program stalls. That’s instability. You don’t need a full DAO vote every quarter to practice fiscal responsibility. A public quarterly report on forum and a multisig to handle the payout achieves the same accountability, without risking failure every 3 months. RRC-40 couldn’t survive its first payout. It demands DAO-wide approval every quarter, even from disqualified or uninvolved delegates. Ironically, the proposal now depends on one such disqualified delegate with 12K veRARI to potentially save it. Under your rules, he can’t earn rewards, yet he holds the power to decide if others get paid. That contradiction alone proves this system is unsound.

Now, Let’s set the record straight on the admin fee.

The original $500/month rate was a non-negotiable low-ball offer handed to me by your team before any work began. Since then, I’ve:

  • Flagged critical flaws in the proposal (you co-authored) through the Seeking Clarification thread.
  • Got a rationale grace period approved, despite your team denying it internally before I brought up the issue on forum, saving delegates like @Firefly808 from disqualification. Ironically, he’s the one who ended up posting the payout proposal onchain.
  • Fought to use spot price for rewards, something everyone agreed on, while you were the only one who pushed back.
  • Drafted the actual payout proposal with 12 onchain actions.
  • Built the backend automation to gather Q2 data and calculate delegate scores, not a theory, real dev work.
  • Created this replacement proposal after your system failed its first test, so the DAO’s first payout could actually happen.

I set a new rate moving forward: $1,000/month to match the actual work this program requires: coordination, reporting, forum management, payout structure, and ongoing Q2+ calculations. Automation helps, but it doesn’t eliminate the manual oversight required to keep things fair and transparent as more delegates enter.

You said, “the quarterly process is pretty much automated by now, so the operational effort will be reduced.”

That automation exists because I built it. I had to design and code a full algorithm to accurately distribute points across multiple scoring categories, not just once, but in a way that scales as more delegates join and activity increases. That’s the whole point of the program: to grow.

Now you’re framing the very work that saved this program from collapsing under its own complexity as a reason to reduce compensation. That’s backwards. Automation isn’t a cost-cutting shortcut, it’s infrastructure.

2 Likes
#4

About the Q1 payouts (RRC-42):

  • I’m disappointed as well, that we’re in this situation again, where the DAO has difficulties to reach quorum, because the gov migration and the new cohort are not in place yet. We have pointed that out to the foundation multiple times. That’s not a flaw of the program design.

  • In any case, the payouts would be resubmitted, if quorum is not reached. So the only issue would be, that the payouts will happen later. Btw, the incentives program is an important step towards delegates receiving their own voting power and not be dependent on the delegate program anymore.

About the quarterly on-chain approvals:
We had opted for this method because the financial commitment was actually one of the main concerns around the delegate incentives.

  • If the majority of voting-power is against the program, we won’t do it. That’s just how a DAO works. It’s also not the case, that one failed vote would end the incentive program. Instead, you reiterate and try to get everybody on board, or retry the next quarter.

  • That said, it’s a valid option to change quarterly approvals, once the program has established itself. In that case, we could change to yearly approval and a multi-sig. Your proposal is lacking substance there.

About the admin fee:
DAOspace has agreed to act as a service provider for the incentive program, with the terms outlined in RRC-40. You have automated the process to reduce workload in the future, that’s great.
But now requesting double the amount retroactively and for all future quarters? That’s not how a professional provider operates.

1 Like
#5

RRC-40 failed to deliver its first payout, making it null and void. The authors of that proposal is not listed as stewards of this program. I am. I built the automation, drafted RRC-42, corrected the flawed logic, and got the community to approve grace periods and spot pricing after your team denied both internally.

Let’s be clear: your “$500/month” offer was non-negotiable and made before any work began. Since then, I’ve done far more than report-writing; I rebuilt a system you designed that collapsed on its first use.

The fact that you hardcoded 200 “Proposal Author” points, split only among you three co-authors for Q1, speaks volumes. That’s 67 extra points each at $14.56/point, nearly $1,000 each, simply for drafting a proposal that couldn’t execute. Meanwhile, I delivered the infrastructure to make the program function and you think that deserves less?

You say, “That’s not how a professional provider operates.” But denying grace periods behind the scenes to shrink the payout pool and inflate rewards for just 8 delegates, only to reverse course after I flagged it publicly isn’t professionalism.

I helped author RRC-40 in a shared doc, contributed edits, and was added to the Telegram group for this initiative, only to be removed the next day and cut as a proposal author entirely. Your team tried to handle key decisions through ad-hoc Discord calls, avoiding forum input altogether, until I opened the Seeking Clarification thread to give delegates a real voice. Now you’re trying to lock me into underpaid terms your team unilaterally imposed, while dismissing the actual work of fixing and delivering the program.

This proposal replaces RRC-40. It increases delegate inclusion, removes the quorum risk you built in, and ensures the program can actually scale. That’s how a real steward operates.

1 Like
#6

Tagging a few delegates who were either nearly disqualified or ended up top earners, all directly impacted by the flawed process behind RRC-40 that this proposal now corrects:

@coffee-crusher @Firefly808 @Jaf @forexus @PGov @lionmsee: The old system required a DAO-wide vote for every quarterly payout, which is exactly why Q1 rewards are now at risk of failing. That design introduced unnecessary bureaucracy and stalled execution, nearly blocking the payments you already earned.

This proposal fixes that by handling payouts offchain moving forward, while keeping all reporting public. Would value your feedback whenever you’re free, this upgrade is built to protect your time and your compensation.

4 Likes
#7

First of all, thank you @jarisjames for the diligence in making sure the program is both sustainable and practical.
I like the suggested changes overall and how the adjustments have been made.

I’m in favor of moving to an off-chain approach for payments. It’s much simpler and easier to handle.

On the management fee change - I get that along the way it turned out to be more time/resource consuming than expected. That said, since the $500 fee was part of the proposal that got approved by the DAO, I’m wondering if for this first iteration we keep it at $500, and then apply the $1000 adjustment starting from iteration #2.

3 Likes
#8

Appreciate the thoughtful reply @Jaf

For clarity, this is a replacement proposal, not a continuation of RRC-40. The original version would have only rewarded 8 delegates. I pushed for grace periods that brought it to 11, and this new structure expands eligibility to 15 delegates, making the program more inclusive. I also fought for rewards to be calculated using spot RARI instead of the quarterly average, which would’ve significantly diluted payouts. That change alone ensured delegates had a much better experience than what the original proposal would’ve delivered.

Nearly every aspect of RRC-40 required amendment. I flagged the spot price issue, advocated for grace periods, wrote and structured the payout proposal, and automated the scoring system. And now that the original framework will likely fail quorum, I rebuilt it entirely with a sustainable model that actually works.

The $1K per month fee is 10% of the total reward pool. In contrast, the original authors each took nearly $1,000 just for writing a proposal that couldn’t even execute a single payout. This version delivers where that one stalled.

If the DAO sees alignment here, I’ll make sure the program runs smoothly and scales long term. If not, I’ll need to focus my time and energy elsewhere, where the work is fairly valued.

#9

Hi @jarisjames, thank you for taking the time to write up this replacement proposal. We have some suggestions for the issues raised.

It was very unfortunate that most veRari delegation finalized right before this proposal went up. That has nothing to do with RRC-40 but with the veRARI model and the lack of delegators others than the Foundation. Still we do see a point in removing DAO burden of voting every quarter and pass it on to a reporting multisig (not entirely sure why you refer to that as ‘offchain’ as the rest of the process still remains onchain). We would agree to that scheme if the multisig was sufficiently represented with trusted members of the community with >51% signatures required. Happy to be part of it if necessary, no compensation needed.

In this way, the DAO remains capable of issuing a rejecting proposal to request the funds back from the multisig, and the signers of the multisig commit to respect the DAO will.

One issue we see, if this scheme was to be put into place, is this same proposal should already request for the corresponding yearly budget, which currently does not, and it should be valuated at the current spot Rari price. Therefore, the proposal should account for the situations where at a given quarter, Rari price is higher/lower than currently.

Regarding compensation, we acknowledge the efforts put into making this program happen, but we have also run delegate compensation programs, and struggle to see the difficulty in counting votes and rationales for 15-25 delegates in a DAO with 5-10 proposals per quarter. Happy to provide an excell sheet template that can calculate the points and would take 2-3 hours to fill at most, that you could also later include a link to, avoiding the lengthy posts. An acceptable middle ground we would support would be getting a retroactive compensation for the extra work this quarter, with $3,000 compensation, and continuing the proposed compensation of $1,500 for subsequent quarters.

3 Likes
#10

Really appreciate your response @Jose_StableLab, and I agree; the timing of the veRARI delegation lapse was unfortunate. I don’t blame RRC-40 for that either, but it highlights how fragile recurring quorum-based approvals can be. Even one missed vote can stall the program and break trust with active delegates who contributed in good faith expecting a timely payout. That’s why this model shifts execution to a community-backed multisig after forum consensus, making the program reliable.

On the offchain reference; that was about where the trigger comes from, not the process as a whole. Instead of requiring an onchain vote to unlock each quarter’s payment, the multisig responds to a forum report; the payout flow becomes community-signaled rather than quorum-dependent onchain via Tally.

Regarding the yearly budget ; it’s already defined in the “Overall Cost” and “Admin Fee Justification” sections. The proposal breaks out Q1 separately because the first payout can be executed onchain along with the proposal itself. From there, the same cost structure continues quarterly, using spot price at time of disbursement.

As for scaling the program ; this wasn’t built as a spreadsheet exercise. The system connects Tally wallet addresses to forum posts, matches votes with rationale data, and calculates scores automatically. The goal is to create a live, forward-facing dashboard that incentivizes contribution, showcases transparency, and makes participation feel worth it, making people excited to lock $RARI participate in governance and see their points in real time. Instead of a spreadsheet, I store the data in a cloud hosted database, which is ready to be turned into a live dashboard for Q2 and beyond.

That said, I genuinely appreciate the offer for retroactive compensation and your openness to future alignment. I would love to build something sustainable together, inspiring others that are genuinely interested in NFTs to lock $RARI and participate in RARI DAO governance as well.

3 Likes
#11

This is part of the system, the point is to have to reduce the operational complexity of creating a multisig and then having to select trusted members of the community to be part of that multisig. For those with experience, selecting who to operate, and actually operating a multisig can be extremely frustrating. It also introduces an additional security vulnerability multiplied by each member of the multisig. We have a governance smart contract, I think we should use that, especially as delegates.

Delegates reaching quorum 4 times a year to approve their own compensation should not be seen as an issue but rather as a robust governance process. Quorum might fluctuate yes, but if delegates can’t reach quorum then the DAO’s governance is failing and why exactly should delegates get paid?

I do not support removing quorum, because once again it will just centralize and weaken the governance process by giving multisig members unilateral control of the delegate program and its incentives.

I would rather trust the entire pool of delegates rather than a multisig consisting of a few individuals. It will also creating additional conflict of interest if multisig members are also delegates. So once again I would rather trust smart contracts, and the DAO’s governance process.

RARI Chain governance and cohort 4 were intended to go live in April 2025, so we did not anticipate the vote decaying would be a limiting factor for the continuation of the program. Due to the delay with the governance migration, we will have trouble reaching quorum on ANY vote, so I don’t see how the blame lies with the authors here.

Once again, I do not see how the payout logic is flawed when this is an issue with the entire DAO’s governance. ALL VOTES moving forward will likely be stalled. We are in the midst of a governance migration. The only way to get additional voting power is to stake RARI for veRARI for 2 years, which you can’t exactly do right now, given the governance migration happening.

How does a delegator choose a suitable delegate if they do not have a rationale thread? I think this is a crucial requirement. An active delegate thread is important because it serves as a real-time, public-facing record of a delegate’s work and values (Here is your own delegate thread highlighting how RRC-40 program introduces a clean, retroactive reward model that reinforces good governance behavior without inflating complexity).

New or passive token holders can review these threads to find a delegate that aligns with their values. Plus, maintaining an active thread shows that a delegate is committed and informed, not just mindlessly voting.

Also by publicly outlining stances or thoughts on proposals, it helps create dialogue and alignment between delegates, contributors, and community members.

I am going to flag that there is a not insignificant conflict of interest with a delegate also being the administrator of the delegate incentive program. And I believe this role should fall to an impartial party such as StableLab (@Jose_StableLab).

HERE is your original comment of support for the supposed low-ball offer. It is a bit strange to start flagging all these apparent issues after the long discussion and voting period. Especially to try and double the compensation received, while you were in support every step of the way as per public record. There are less than 20 delegates to keep track of, as stated above, this could be done via a simple spreadsheet.

I do not think the program administrator should be trying to overhaul the program, but rather suggesting thoughtful improvements. Especially when doubling compensation is the most relevant change being made.

I will once again highlight that removing quorum as a step to spend the DAO’s funds is a step in the wrong direction, and any non-self-serving delegate should be able to understand this. The delegate incentives are not meant to serve as a salary but as a reward to thoughtful participation within the DAO’s governance process.

In my honest opinion, there is nothing structurally wrong with the original proposal. The quarterly proposal model allowed us to iterate and align on changes (adding a grace period for Q1 and switching to spot price) before the actual proposal compensation went up, so it worked out quite well in retrospect.

The veRARI vote decay is an issue that currently affects all votes by the DAO and not just the current incentives proposal, and that should be our focus right now.

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#12

Ser, I’m not sure you are aware of how RARI governance works, but allow me to ELI5.

All proposals are currently facing the same issue due to the governance migration. All delegates have lost their voting power due to the veRARI voting power decay, and there is no clear solution until the migration is complete. This is not some grand failure or collapse of RRC-40. I urge you to use some common sense.

Once again, flagging a conflict of interest with a delegate running the incentives program. The ‘underpaid terms’ were agreed upon by all delegates, including yourself. This is why the authors refrained from running the program and chose to use an impartial third party to calculate points and put the proposal onchain (unfortunately, impartial is not the case in this situation).

Quorum is not a ‘risk’, but rather an important safeguard in a DAO’s governance process. Passing a proposal under quorum means the community, delegates and tokenholders support what is being proposed. Support for the incentives program could change at any time, and the DAO should reserve the right to regularly signal support or non-support for incentives.

#13

Sorry I’ve been quiet recently, as balancing work as an artist in East Africa while doing governance work, has been quite the challenge. I care deeply about our ecosystem and this proposal offers some solid improvements to RRC 40 that will help to incentivize and reward the work of delegates, so I felt the need to speak up in this discussion.

I fully support Jaris’ work, and the suggestion to move from DAO voting to a trusted multisig method of payment for more convenience, during this transitional period. Being considerate of the unique situation the DAO is in right now, with migration and voting power decay, I think is the best way to move forward.

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