Tagging a few delegates who were either nearly disqualified or ended up top earners, all directly impacted by the flawed process behind RRC-40 that this proposal now corrects:
@coffee-crusher@Firefly808@Jaf@forexus@PGov@lionmsee: The old system required a DAO-wide vote for every quarterly payout, which is exactly why Q1 rewards are now at risk of failing. That design introduced unnecessary bureaucracy and stalled execution, nearly blocking the payments you already earned.
This proposal fixes that by handling payouts offchain moving forward, while keeping all reporting public. Would value your feedback whenever you’re free, this upgrade is built to protect your time and your compensation.
First of all, thank you @jarisjames for the diligence in making sure the program is both sustainable and practical.
I like the suggested changes overall and how the adjustments have been made.
I’m in favor of moving to an off-chain approach for payments. It’s much simpler and easier to handle.
On the management fee change - I get that along the way it turned out to be more time/resource consuming than expected. That said, since the $500 fee was part of the proposal that got approved by the DAO, I’m wondering if for this first iteration we keep it at $500, and then apply the $1000 adjustment starting from iteration #2.
For clarity, this is a replacement proposal, not a continuation of RRC-40. The original version would have only rewarded 8 delegates. I pushed for grace periods that brought it to 11, and this new structure expands eligibility to 15 delegates, making the program more inclusive. I also fought for rewards to be calculated using spot RARI instead of the quarterly average, which would’ve significantly diluted payouts. That change alone ensured delegates had a much better experience than what the original proposal would’ve delivered.
Nearly every aspect of RRC-40 required amendment. I flagged the spot price issue, advocated for grace periods, wrote and structured the payout proposal, and automated the scoring system. And now that the original framework will likely fail quorum, I rebuilt it entirely with a sustainable model that actually works.
The $1K per month fee is 10% of the total reward pool. In contrast, the original authors each took nearly $1,000 just for writing a proposal that couldn’t even execute a single payout. This version delivers where that one stalled.
If the DAO sees alignment here, I’ll make sure the program runs smoothly and scales long term. If not, I’ll need to focus my time and energy elsewhere, where the work is fairly valued.
Hi @jarisjames, thank you for taking the time to write up this replacement proposal. We have some suggestions for the issues raised.
It was very unfortunate that most veRari delegation finalized right before this proposal went up. That has nothing to do with RRC-40 but with the veRARI model and the lack of delegators others than the Foundation. Still we do see a point in removing DAO burden of voting every quarter and pass it on to a reporting multisig (not entirely sure why you refer to that as ‘offchain’ as the rest of the process still remains onchain). We would agree to that scheme if the multisig was sufficiently represented with trusted members of the community with >51% signatures required. Happy to be part of it if necessary, no compensation needed.
In this way, the DAO remains capable of issuing a rejecting proposal to request the funds back from the multisig, and the signers of the multisig commit to respect the DAO will.
One issue we see, if this scheme was to be put into place, is this same proposal should already request for the corresponding yearly budget, which currently does not, and it should be valuated at the current spot Rari price. Therefore, the proposal should account for the situations where at a given quarter, Rari price is higher/lower than currently.
Regarding compensation, we acknowledge the efforts put into making this program happen, but we have also run delegate compensation programs, and struggle to see the difficulty in counting votes and rationales for 15-25 delegates in a DAO with 5-10 proposals per quarter. Happy to provide an excell sheet template that can calculate the points and would take 2-3 hours to fill at most, that you could also later include a link to, avoiding the lengthy posts. An acceptable middle ground we would support would be getting a retroactive compensation for the extra work this quarter, with $3,000 compensation, and continuing the proposed compensation of $1,500 for subsequent quarters.
Really appreciate your response @Jose_StableLab, and I agree; the timing of the veRARI delegation lapse was unfortunate. I don’t blame RRC-40 for that either, but it highlights how fragile recurring quorum-based approvals can be. Even one missed vote can stall the program and break trust with active delegates who contributed in good faith expecting a timely payout. That’s why this model shifts execution to a community-backed multisig after forum consensus, making the program reliable.
On the offchain reference; that was about where the trigger comes from, not the process as a whole. Instead of requiring an onchain vote to unlock each quarter’s payment, the multisig responds to a forum report; the payout flow becomes community-signaled rather than quorum-dependent onchain via Tally.
Regarding the yearly budget ; it’s already defined in the “Overall Cost” and “Admin Fee Justification” sections. The proposal breaks out Q1 separately because the first payout can be executed onchain along with the proposal itself. From there, the same cost structure continues quarterly, using spot price at time of disbursement.
As for scaling the program ; this wasn’t built as a spreadsheet exercise. The system connects Tally wallet addresses to forum posts, matches votes with rationale data, and calculates scores automatically. The goal is to create a live, forward-facing dashboard that incentivizes contribution, showcases transparency, and makes participation feel worth it, making people excited to lock $RARI participate in governance and see their points in real time. Instead of a spreadsheet, I store the data in a cloud hosted database, which is ready to be turned into a live dashboard for Q2 and beyond.
That said, I genuinely appreciate the offer for retroactive compensation and your openness to future alignment. I would love to build something sustainable together, inspiring others that are genuinely interested in NFTs to lock $RARI and participate in RARI DAO governance as well.
This is part of the system, the point is to have to reduce the operational complexity of creating a multisig and then having to select trusted members of the community to be part of that multisig. For those with experience, selecting who to operate, and actually operating a multisig can be extremely frustrating. It also introduces an additional security vulnerability multiplied by each member of the multisig. We have a governance smart contract, I think we should use that, especially as delegates.
Delegates reaching quorum 4 times a year to approve their own compensation should not be seen as an issue but rather as a robust governance process. Quorum might fluctuate yes, but if delegates can’t reach quorum then the DAO’s governance is failing and why exactly should delegates get paid?
I do not support removing quorum, because once again it will just centralize and weaken the governance process by giving multisig members unilateral control of the delegate program and its incentives.
I would rather trust the entire pool of delegates rather than a multisig consisting of a few individuals. It will also creating additional conflict of interest if multisig members are also delegates. So once again I would rather trust smart contracts, and the DAO’s governance process.
RARI Chain governance and cohort 4 were intended to go live in April 2025, so we did not anticipate the vote decaying would be a limiting factor for the continuation of the program. Due to the delay with the governance migration, we will have trouble reaching quorum on ANY vote, so I don’t see how the blame lies with the authors here.
Once again, I do not see how the payout logic is flawed when this is an issue with the entire DAO’s governance. ALL VOTES moving forward will likely be stalled. We are in the midst of a governance migration. The only way to get additional voting power is to stake RARI for veRARI for 2 years, which you can’t exactly do right now, given the governance migration happening.
New or passive token holders can review these threads to find a delegate that aligns with their values. Plus, maintaining an active thread shows that a delegate is committed and informed, not just mindlessly voting.
Also by publicly outlining stances or thoughts on proposals, it helps create dialogue and alignment between delegates, contributors, and community members.
I am going to flag that there is a not insignificant conflict of interest with a delegate also being the administrator of the delegate incentive program. And I believe this role should fall to an impartial party such as StableLab (@Jose_StableLab).
HERE is your original comment of support for the supposed low-ball offer. It is a bit strange to start flagging all these apparent issues after the long discussion and voting period. Especially to try and double the compensation received, while you were in support every step of the way as per public record. There are less than 20 delegates to keep track of, as stated above, this could be done via a simple spreadsheet.
I do not think the program administrator should be trying to overhaul the program, but rather suggesting thoughtful improvements. Especially when doubling compensation is the most relevant change being made.
I will once again highlight that removing quorum as a step to spend the DAO’s funds is a step in the wrong direction, and any non-self-serving delegate should be able to understand this. The delegate incentives are not meant to serve as a salary but as a reward to thoughtful participation within the DAO’s governance process.
In my honest opinion, there is nothing structurally wrong with the original proposal. The quarterly proposal model allowed us to iterate and align on changes (adding a grace period for Q1 and switching to spot price) before the actual proposal compensation went up, so it worked out quite well in retrospect.
The veRARI vote decay is an issue that currently affects all votes by the DAO and not just the current incentives proposal, and that should be our focus right now.
Ser, I’m not sure you are aware of how RARI governance works, but allow me to ELI5.
All proposals are currently facing the same issue due to the governance migration. All delegates have lost their voting power due to the veRARI voting power decay, and there is no clear solution until the migration is complete. This is not some grand failure or collapse of RRC-40. I urge you to use some common sense.
Once again, flagging a conflict of interest with a delegate running the incentives program. The ‘underpaid terms’ were agreed upon by all delegates, including yourself. This is why the authors refrained from running the program and chose to use an impartial third party to calculate points and put the proposal onchain (unfortunately, impartial is not the case in this situation).
Quorum is not a ‘risk’, but rather an important safeguard in a DAO’s governance process. Passing a proposal under quorum means the community, delegates and tokenholders support what is being proposed. Support for the incentives program could change at any time, and the DAO should reserve the right to regularly signal support or non-support for incentives.
Sorry I’ve been quiet recently, as balancing work as an artist in East Africa while doing governance work, has been quite the challenge. I care deeply about our ecosystem and this proposal offers some solid improvements to RRC 40 that will help to incentivize and reward the work of delegates, so I felt the need to speak up in this discussion.
I fully support Jaris’ work, and the suggestion to move from DAO voting to a trusted multisig method of payment for more convenience, during this transitional period. Being considerate of the unique situation the DAO is in right now, with migration and voting power decay, I think is the best way to move forward.
I appreciate your thoughtfulness @jarisjames on this replacement proposal, which builds upon RRC-40 but provides clarification for missing structurally integrity for this program to function correctly in a fair and transparent manner for a mid-term length program (1 yr) with benefits of active governance, and well as it expands for additional delegates to be eligible for the program.
The reason why I voted on, and therefore supported RRC-40 (and RRC-42) was due to the intent of this program - to provide stability in the DAO to create a more diverse voting power pool, and to ensure that governance can continue beyond the few delegates with Tally proposal submission power.
Therefore, this proposal addresses this initial intent of RRC-40, and also clarifies for me the desire to not have a requirement of the DAO to vote on each quarter, and instead have payment allocated for rewards from a multi-sig. The allocation of rewards for points earned for posting a recurring program payment (that is already approved by the DAO) on Tally, is redundant in both points earned and adds complexity to the program. On-going rewards payment from a multi-sig follows similar practices at larger protocol DAO DIP programs, including Arbitrum and Uniswap.
I support the idea of a creation of a multi-sig for this program, as suggested by @Jose_StableLab , but I would suggest using the combination of some of the members of the Security Council (that StableLab is a part of) and daospace (DIP admin) in a 3/5 multi-sig.
In addition, I would suggest adding a 4 day window for DAO disputes/resolutions to the posted Quarterly rewards report, such as the Arbitrum DIP program has included, that allows for the community to dispute the report, as submitted by the program Admin, or for identifying any missing rewards. This should address prior comments regarding providing the DAO the flexibility to the program, and to address the (viable) concerns regarding of new delegates (or self-delegation) with expanded power from the upcoming Staking proposal or the LaunchPad IV program, that could stall the programs continuance for each of the 4 quarters, that has already been approved by the DAO in RRC-40.
Finally, I support this proposal for the increased program administration of $1K per month and the continued program administration by daospace (as voted on by the DAO in RRC-40). In addition, I would also ask for daospace include in this proposal, a detailed list of all tasks and responsibilities (some are already noted above in early comments) that provides details for the justification of admin costs. This is similar to how the Arbitrum DIP program is structured.
However, I don’t support the concerns that this is a “plug and play” quarterly template that does not require expanded work after the 1st Quarter, as I view the program admin as being responsible for the quality and correctness of the report and the distribution of reward funds. This in addition to being solely responsible for disputes or conflicts of incorrect distributions or even the right to expel delegates from participation in the DIP program who attempt to game or exploit the program or if the delegate does not meet any of the program requirements to be considered eligible.
And to address some the heated commentary posted here. In the best interest of moving any of the proposals forward on Forum (or if necessary, stopping something not aligned to the DAO), all of the delegates need to find a way that addresses responding in a professional and respectful manner to each other and the community that we represent.
Adding some comments on your statements @jarisjames, that — respectfully — I don’t agree with.
The payouts did not fail. Even if they had not reached quorum, that’s unrelated to the initial incentives prop RRC-40. A missed quorum means that you just repost later. A defeated prop means that you reiterate. Please don’t suggest misinformation like that!
To make this clear, I opted for a grace period. The benefit of not having one would have been, that the payouts had happened earlier to the delegates that actually submitted on time. More importantly, there would have been more voting power left, so we wouldn’t have this discussion, making your accusations even more bizarre.
You know how accepting a job works, right? You can do an Excel sheet with twelve rows. The additional automation work is on you.
I don’t remember having a conversation about this, would have been fine either way. The proposal was a lot of work, after all. And as you’re pointed out, you were the one “hardcoding” this.
My understanding is, that you’re at DAOspace together with @Sixty, who was a co-author. Accordingly, DAOspace was closely involved in the design. You guys figured this approach out by yourself to avoid conflict of interest. Please do not take your personal issues out on the DAO.
Generally, if you have improvements for the process, that’s great. Posting replacement-proposal and calling previous work a “complete fail” it not it. Let’s have a respectful conversation about that.
The only valid improvement suggestion in your counter-proposal is the quarterly rhythm.
Pointing out, that the quarterly approvals were favoured and even requested for the first few quarters by the majority of delegates, until the program is established. I agree with @Sixty that it should not be a problem for a DAO to execute that.
As @Jose_StableLab pointed out: If you were to suggest a multi-sig with yearly approvals instead, then give the proposal some more information. You will need to add who should be on the multi-sig, how you handle price changes, and how much you’d allocate towards that. @coffee-crusher has delivered some good input on that.
Multiple delegates have already expressed support for removing quarterly quorum requirements, because it’s unnecessary friction. @coffee-crusher even asked that we keep the discussion respectful, yet both you and @Sixty continue addressing me with sarcasm and talking down to me in a condescending way.
Saying “you know how accepting a job works” is deeply unprofessional. It shows you can’t separate feedback on governance systems from personal ego. That’s not how responsible system designers operate. That’s how central planners operate.
Let’s clarify: I’m the founder of daospace, the product this program was built on. Sixty oversold his background, and only got involved because he pitched himself as a Product Manager after helping me get a grant last year. He was never a developer, and frankly, not essential. I gave him a shot. He burned that trust, and is no longer a member of the daospace team, which currently consists of me, and two designers.
The truth is, the payout structure was created by the authors listed on RRC-40, not by “daospace” or me. And it failed. Not the people. Not the idea. The system. No other initiative in the DAO requires a full vote just to release funds already earned. This was a design flaw that undermined the entire program.
And it’s not just my view that the program had flaws:
Sixty himself admitted this program had flaws during a discussion about the program.
→ “I did not fully consider the downside of setting it up this way.”
→ “I do see support for changing it to the spot price, since tbh no one is going to be happy with this.”
He also admitted it wasn’t about delegate input in a sarcastic kind of way, after I created the Seeking Clarification thread:
→ “There is nothing I want more than all the other delegates to weigh in… because using the forum will take forever.”
That’s not how governance works. You don’t fast-track decisions to avoid transparent community input.
This proposal replaces RRC-40 entirely. So the admin fee set by @Cr1st0f is irrelevant now. Sixty shared screenshots where Cr1st0f stated clearly: if daospace doesn’t accept $500/month, he won’t be associated, or support the program. It was a take-it-or-leave-it offer. I went along with it then, for the DAO’s sake. But I’m not doing that again.
This is why I’m proposing a cleaner, scalable, and fairer version. Because the DAO deserves better than a spreadsheet hidden in backchannels. It deserves transparency, autonomy, and a system designed with actual contributors in mind; not gatekept by a trio who takes every critique personally.
I would like to request that @Jose_StableLab and @Matt_StableLab in their role as providing professional DAO services for the DAO, that they can actively step in and provide guidance and an ombudsman approach to find a balanced resolution for this proposal and for RRC-40 that did not meet quorum.
I believe that all the delegates have the best intentions of ensuring that the DAO’s governance is strengthened and creates longevity for the DAO. And that the intent of RRC-40 and this proposal as submitted by @jarisjames addresses that dilemma, and therefore, finding a resolution to this current stalemate for this proposal is the best way forward.
Following @coffee-crusher’s suggestion to find a balanced resolution, I’d like to propose a simple poll to help gauge delegate sentiment and close out further debate.
While StableLab plays an important role as a professional governance provider, this decision directly impacts each delegate. Since both proposals: RRC-XX and RRC-40 originated from within the community, it’s only fair that the broader delegate group helps guide the direction we take.
This poll gives us a clear signal on which structure delegates feel is most effective and sustainable moving forward, allowing us to resolve the current situation transparently and without further division.
We have two proposals on the table for the Delegate Incentive Program:
RRC-XX – the current replacement proposal
RRC-40 – the original proposal previously passed onchain
Which proposal should the DAO adopt moving forward?
RRC-XX (Replacement Proposal)
RRC-40 (Original Proposal)
0voters
This vote is non-binding but intended to reflect the will of the community and bring clarity on the preferred path. Thank you to everyone who has participated in this process, let’s give the DAO a clear signal on how to proceed.
@jarisjames , I like this temp check poll to gather sentiment from the community. There are several opinions in the comments above, and getting clarity on what everyone wants in a simplistic way is a great way forward, thanks for posting this!
In addition to this signaling poll to clarify the communities thoughts, I still request that @Matt_StableLab and @Jose_StableLab in their role as the DAOs professional delegate services, to actively participate as ombudsman and providing guidance upon the completion of this poll results, and how it affects RRC-40, if that proposal is resubmitted to Tally for a second vote.
@jarisjames , I also do support adding to this proposal additional details of the inclusion of the creation of a multi-sig with yearly approvals, and agree with @bitblondy to include these details on identifying the members of that multi-sig, requested total multi-sig value for yearly allocation (with budgeted amounts per quarter) and a solution to addressing $RARI price fluctuations. I believe that will make this a stronger proposal for the delegates to consider.
In general, the idea of this incentive program was that it could start off simple and be tuned over time by adjusting pay and criteria. This was why quarterly cadence was chosen and the vote on each distribution could include any proposed rule changes. The intention was for this structure to allow consensus to form amongst delegates as there have already been a few failed delegate incentive proposals in the past, perhaps it wasn’t well-defined enough in hindsight.
An alternative solution that the delegates could consider is to have the tracking and distribution done by Karma, and integrated into the existing Rari DAO Karma dashboard: https://rari.karmahq.xyz/
Karma have confirmed this could be done at a cost of $500 per month so would preserve the costs in RRC-40 and would allow automation of distribution to avoid the need of a multisig and coordinating signers for this. This also has the benefit of using a tracking and distribution system well-proven in other DAOs and keeps all of the metrics related to delegate activity together in one simple UI.
Hey @coffee-crusher thanks for all the great suggestions and feedback, I strongly support your suggestion of including an ombudsman such as StableLab to find a reasonable middle ground. While I have voted on the poll, their is still a lot of nuance required to address concerns which are not highlighted in either proposal. And apologies to all parties involved for any distasteful comments.
Key concerns to address would be:
Process for selection of a delegate incentives multisig, prioritizing security and redundancy.
Ensuring we prevent single points of failure, and ensuring signers use hardware wallets.
Detailed breakdown of how much RARI would be held in a multisig while accounting for any price fluctuations in the RARI token. Including what the process for requesting extra funding incase of significant depreciation of the token.
Financial sustainability of the delegate incentive program. Spending $12,000 a year to calculate points for less than 20 delegates each quarter is quite high imo. This is simply not great ROI given the size of our DAO.
The reality is the points system was created to be very simple. The points calculation can be done within an hour with a public spreadsheet anyone can understand.
Hope we can all find a reasonable solution to the points raised above. And thank you all for your feedback and inputs.
Thanks for the suggestion @cr1st0f. Having a professional provider at the initial cost, that is already integrated in the ecosystem, does sound like a good option as well.
Do you know how they’re handling access to the treasury/funds, if not with a multi-sig?
Which proposal should the DAO adopt moving forward?