I actually considered raising the cap too, but the trade-off in participation is significant. Increasing the proposal threshold reduces the number of wallets that can meaningfully engage.
For example, there are currently:
174 ETH holders with ≥5K RARI
5 stRARI holders with ≥5K
6 eligible delegates
But if we raise the threshold to 10K:
Only 108 ETH holders qualify
Just 3 stRARI holders
And only 3 delegates remain eligible
That’s a 38% drop in eligible proposal submitters — from 179 to 111. It risks concentrating power and reducing the pool of active contributors, especially new entrants. While the veRARI model did change capital dynamics, I believe it’s still important that governance remains accessible. A 5K threshold still filters for commitment, but keeps participation more open and resilient.
It’s also worth noting that some of those ETH wallets are contracts or exchange addresses, so the actual number of potential real voters is even lower.
That said, I do share your concern about how cheap it currently is to acquire governance rights — especially with RARI at its current low price. I think that’s a separate issue we need to solve through better incentive alignment and deeper community engagement, rather than by making it harder for people to propose ideas.
I agree with most of the points of view here in this thread.
I’d suggest:
Revisiting the program mechanics before we start Q3. a.k.a. pausing the program before continuing with it. Even @jarisjames had previously suggested a replacement to make it more inclusive.
IMO, we should take the time now to analyze what could have the biggest impact for the DAO’s benefit.
The team in charge of the program should take into consideration the points of view shared here, and hopefully open a space for discussion (talk, not just written) so we can work on the above.
We voted against the current Program format to allow for a conclusion of the discussion on incentives alignment that becomes effective this quarter and provides continuity into Q3 and beyond.
We agree with @Firefly808 that a max cap per delegate will help limiting the DAO spending with the goal of attracting more delegates to Rari DAO, aligning the program budget with governance participation. The 500 Rari per quarter seems reasonable for the current governance workload.
Regarding the comparison of delegate incentives between Rari and other DAOs. While we always advocate for a fair compensation for delegates, this compensation has to be fairly adjusted to each DAO’s situation. Rari DAO is significantly more modest in governance activity and available budget than Arbitrum DAO or Maker DAO. Accordingly, we think incentives should be lower to reflect the lower workload and the lower standards (Arbitrum DAO carries on an exhaustive and ongoing analysis of delegate forum contributions in order to qualify for each month’s incentives). In exchange, the barrier of participation in Rari is significantly lower than other programs. 2,000 Rari threshold for incentives are really low compared to the 50,000 Arb in Arbitrum DAO or the mandatory anonymity of Maker DAO. This allows for higher participation and is what we think this program should aim for: attracting more voices to Rari DAO.
Regarding the risk of a low submission threshold. We don’t think 5k RARI submission threshold is a risk for Rari DAO as that still equates to ~$4,000 to submit a proposal. We consider there is still enough active participation that can quickly spot any malicious attempt at misappropriating funds. Additionally, Rari DAO has an active Security Committee that can cancel any proposal suspected of being malicious. In addition, encouraging more active voices and eyes through the Delegate Incentive Program also serves as defense against governance attacks.
To summarize, we will continue supporting delegate incentives that limit the compensation per delegate for Q2 and beyond, aligning the DAO spending with the Program’s ability to attract new delegates.
With the proposal being defeated, how about we lower the amount that is distributed per quarter, e.g. 10k instead of 30k?
While a cap as @Firefly808 suggested would limit spending, I think it’s not a good strategy incentive-wise. Especially, writing proposals would be discouraged, as everybody would likely receive the same amount.
I also agree with @Sixty’s comments, that the conditions for the program were unfortunately not favourable:
The governance “migration” was very late, like half a year.
It’s not really a migration, because we’re stuck with the dual-gov (for an unclear amount of time?). That’s worse than having just the gov on Eth, which is extremely centralized now because it’s unattractive to mint veRARI. I would never have voted for the “migration”, if I knew about the outcome.
The delegate accelerator being postponed for months, or not happening at all (aka foundation not executing the prop from January that proposed cohort 3). The accelerator was integral in the planning of the incentive program.
And most importantly, the DAO not really governing anything… With RARI chain being “put in the fridge”, the grants program and gov working group shut down, and foundation to take over the DAO’s tasks like treasury management, there’s naturally not much delegate activity and purpose for the DAO. The DAO being sidelined has been going on for quite a while, already.
Given these factors, I’m not sure if the vision of attracting new delegates is still realistic or even desirable. With none of that improving, it would also be a solid reason to quit the DAO, imho.