Great question! Since the RARI treasury still resides on Ethereum mainnet, this Q2 proposal will be voted on using RARI V1.
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Thank you so much, @jarisjames for the receiving wallet address correction and the clarification regarding which version we will be voting on.
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Hi, thanks for publishing the Delegate Incentive Report for Q2.
I have an objection. @jarisjames is accounting last report’s tally vote as an authored proposal, boosting his own compensation at the expense of others.
The program specifications are very clear that proposals that allocate funds to the authors do not count toward the program, particularly when the proposal author is already getting paid to do so.
For this reason, we think jarisjames should not account for the authored proposal and points rebalanced accordingly.
After the last Q2 report, we have concerns about the decaying performance of the program:
- While initially well intended at increasing governance participation. Numbers show this goal has not materialized, as Q2 had 8 rewarded delegates for 12 in Q1. Therefore, delegate participation is decaying.
- Compensation is disproportionate with the tasks and commitments for delegates. As the budget is denominated in $ with no RARI cap, we have run into the strange situation where after each quarter delegates are earning multiples of the required 2,000 RARI to participate. This creates an massive ROI for delegates with little operational burden: Vote in Tally and write a rationale.
- Decaying governance activity: While by the time the program was proposed governance in Rari was more active. Ever since the proposals and forum activity has been decaying, also motivated by the operational reorganization in Rari Foundation. Even though the program encouraged delegates to submit proposals, this has not significantly materialized.
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Thanks for the clarification @Jose_StableLab. I’ve updated the report and removed the author points from my tally to reflect that.
Appreciate the feedback, and always happy to keep improving the process.
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I agree with you Jose.
Thanks @jarisjames for the Q2 breakdown. Makes sense to me that RARI chain delegations are included as well to account for the dual gov model. Hope the treasury access from RARI chain will launch soon.
I agree with @Jose_StableLab that the Q1 report is already is part of the operations of the program and hence would not generate author points, thanks for adjusting this @jarisjames.
Also agree that the impact of the incentive program is disappointing so far (with even less participants than Q1…), I would have expected more delegates were attracted to the ecosystem by now, and thus dividing the rewards.
Now it looks like tying the rewards to activities instead of a fixed amount per quarter would have been the better option (i.e. a silent quarter would be less costly).
Is there an update regarding the new delegate cohort? I think this could really drive delegate engagement, given the participants are potentially eligible for rewards and existing delegates have enough RARI themselves by now.
Also, I’d suggest some marketing efforts around the delegate incentives, @Anria is that something foundation could have a look on? This could be a good addition to present the new gov model.
If delegate participation remains on that low level in the next quarter, and thus the incentive program does not serve its purpose, I’d suggest lowering the 30k per quarter, or completely halting the program. Evaluation is part of the process.
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We could also lower the 30k for this quarter already, it does feel disproportional.
Great idea, I believe now is the time to start that marketing now that staking is live. Staked RARI numbers will rise if this gets out
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I continue to support the Delegate Incentive Program, but I believe we need to place caps on individual rewards to ensure sustainability and fairness. In Q1 and Q2 2025, only a handful of delegates received payouts, with some earning over 2,000 RARI (~$2,000–$3,000 USD). That’s generous to the point of being excessive and creates the wrong incentive structure.
I propose we cap rewards at 500 RARI per delegate per quarter, with a maximum of 2,000 RARI per year. This still provides meaningful rewards while ensuring proposal submission rights (5K RARI) aren’t too easily accumulated. A hard cap helps shift the program from a high-reward system for a few into a broader incentive model that invites more delegates to participate.
Importantly, a cap also creates aligned incentives: if the value of RARI increases, so do our earnings, without inflating token supply or distorting governance incentives. Healthy governance depends on a diverse, active delegate set. Over-rewarding a small group risks centralization and weakens long-term decentralization goals.
This isn’t about limiting quality — it’s about ensuring opportunity, fairness, and a healthy ecosystem for all future participants.
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I will support this proposal, 500 RARI is fair.
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Hello @bitblondy, thank you so much for your feedback! We completely agree that the program needs to be adjusted and better aligned with the activities. We’ve added this proposal as an agenda topic for our upcoming governance call. The strategy for the next delegate cohort is still a work in progress and will depend on the outcome of Phase 1 of the staking program.
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Hey guys, just wanted to add my 2 cents here.
Q2 has not been a great quarter to use as a reference, as the governance migration from mainnet to RARI Chain brought about a lot of uncertainty and unexpected hiccups. The loss of voting power due to veRARI voting power decay led to a dropoff in participation and proposal creation as it was uncertain if proposals could even pass quorum.
Many prospective delegates who showed interest were also unable to participate due to the governance migration, as the only option to gain voting power was to lock up RARI for veRARI while this governance system was being phased out.
The compensation was originally set with the number of delegates who meet the 2,000 veRARI threshold in mind (38 delegates, as per the v1 RARI DAO delegates page). At $10,000 per month, this would equate to a little over $250 of RARI per delegate if all the delegates were actively voting (which is lower than the average delegate compensation compared to other DAOs. As with all incentive programs, the individual rewards received would decrease over time as more people joined the program.
As mentioned above, Q2 is not a great reference quarter as for most of the quarter, there was uncertainty whether proposals would even reach quorum due to the decay of voting power of most of the delegates, and the governance migration, which was slated to happen early in Q2. Reduced activity is to be expected during a time of transition, and hopefully with RARI Chain governance and RARI Staking now live, we will see a pick up in activity.
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Agreed that if participation falls further in the next quarter, incentives should definitely be reworked. As for now, I do believe, we should wait and see how participation shapes up in Q3 now that we the transition to RARI Chain governance is complete.
It has never been more accessible to participate in the incentive program, as now that the veRARI model is gone, 2000 RARI staked gives you 2000 RARI voting power. As opposed to the previous system, where you would need to lock up 2000 RARI for 2 years to get an equivalent amount of voting power.
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And as a final thought, while the compensation might seem high as it is distributed quarterly. At 8 delegates for Q2, it still averages out to about $1250 a month which is still below the industry standard (1, 2) for delegate compensation.
There are currently 20 delegates on RARI DAO v2 who meet the 2000 RARI threshold after RARI Staking has gone live, and since there is no voting power decay, we should see an uptick in delegate participation.
I do think we should definitely raise the amount of RARI required to submit a proposal from 5K to around 12-15K RARI, as the transition from the veRARI model has significantly lowered the capital requirement to acquire the same amount of voting power.
5K made sense for v1, thanks to the veRARI model, but this should be raised for v2.
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I actually considered raising the cap too, but the trade-off in participation is significant. Increasing the proposal threshold reduces the number of wallets that can meaningfully engage.
For example, there are currently:
- 174 ETH holders with ≥5K RARI
- 5 stRARI holders with ≥5K
- 6 eligible delegates
But if we raise the threshold to 10K:
- Only 108 ETH holders qualify
- Just 3 stRARI holders
- And only 3 delegates remain eligible
That’s a 38% drop in eligible proposal submitters — from 179 to 111. It risks concentrating power and reducing the pool of active contributors, especially new entrants. While the veRARI model did change capital dynamics, I believe it’s still important that governance remains accessible. A 5K threshold still filters for commitment, but keeps participation more open and resilient.
It’s also worth noting that some of those ETH wallets are contracts or exchange addresses, so the actual number of potential real voters is even lower.
That said, I do share your concern about how cheap it currently is to acquire governance rights — especially with RARI at its current low price. I think that’s a separate issue we need to solve through better incentive alignment and deeper community engagement, rather than by making it harder for people to propose ideas.
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I agree we should see how Q3 turns out now that voting is more accessible.
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I agree with most of the points of view here in this thread.
I’d suggest:
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Revisiting the program mechanics before we start Q3. a.k.a. pausing the program before continuing with it. Even @jarisjames had previously suggested a replacement to make it more inclusive.
IMO, we should take the time now to analyze what could have the biggest impact for the DAO’s benefit. -
The team in charge of the program should take into consideration the points of view shared here, and hopefully open a space for discussion (talk, not just written) so we can work on the above.
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We voted against the current Program format to allow for a conclusion of the discussion on incentives alignment that becomes effective this quarter and provides continuity into Q3 and beyond.
We agree with @Firefly808 that a max cap per delegate will help limiting the DAO spending with the goal of attracting more delegates to Rari DAO, aligning the program budget with governance participation. The 500 Rari per quarter seems reasonable for the current governance workload.
Regarding the comparison of delegate incentives between Rari and other DAOs. While we always advocate for a fair compensation for delegates, this compensation has to be fairly adjusted to each DAO’s situation. Rari DAO is significantly more modest in governance activity and available budget than Arbitrum DAO or Maker DAO. Accordingly, we think incentives should be lower to reflect the lower workload and the lower standards (Arbitrum DAO carries on an exhaustive and ongoing analysis of delegate forum contributions in order to qualify for each month’s incentives). In exchange, the barrier of participation in Rari is significantly lower than other programs. 2,000 Rari threshold for incentives are really low compared to the 50,000 Arb in Arbitrum DAO or the mandatory anonymity of Maker DAO. This allows for higher participation and is what we think this program should aim for: attracting more voices to Rari DAO.
Regarding the risk of a low submission threshold. We don’t think 5k RARI submission threshold is a risk for Rari DAO as that still equates to ~$4,000 to submit a proposal. We consider there is still enough active participation that can quickly spot any malicious attempt at misappropriating funds. Additionally, Rari DAO has an active Security Committee that can cancel any proposal suspected of being malicious. In addition, encouraging more active voices and eyes through the Delegate Incentive Program also serves as defense against governance attacks.
To summarize, we will continue supporting delegate incentives that limit the compensation per delegate for Q2 and beyond, aligning the DAO spending with the Program’s ability to attract new delegates.
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With the proposal being defeated, how about we lower the amount that is distributed per quarter, e.g. 10k instead of 30k?
While a cap as @Firefly808 suggested would limit spending, I think it’s not a good strategy incentive-wise. Especially, writing proposals would be discouraged, as everybody would likely receive the same amount.
I also agree with @Sixty’s comments, that the conditions for the program were unfortunately not favourable:
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The governance “migration” was very late, like half a year.
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It’s not really a migration, because we’re stuck with the dual-gov (for an unclear amount of time?). That’s worse than having just the gov on Eth, which is extremely centralized now because it’s unattractive to mint veRARI. I would never have voted for the “migration”, if I knew about the outcome.
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The delegate accelerator being postponed for months, or not happening at all (aka foundation not executing the prop from January that proposed cohort 3). The accelerator was integral in the planning of the incentive program.
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And most importantly, the DAO not really governing anything… With RARI chain being “put in the fridge”, the grants program and gov working group shut down, and foundation to take over the DAO’s tasks like treasury management, there’s naturally not much delegate activity and purpose for the DAO. The DAO being sidelined has been going on for quite a while, already.
Given these factors, I’m not sure if the vision of attracting new delegates is still realistic or even desirable. With none of that improving, it would also be a solid reason to quit the DAO, imho.
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