Thank you for the feedback @Matt_StableLab . I am happy to incorporate your recommendations 1and 3. In terms of timeline, my suggestion is:
When is the delegation calculated?
For a max lock of 104 weeks, there is no decay according to the formula stated in RRC-1. Additionally as I have suggested before, we can revisit this at the end of each cohort. On recommendation number 4, it would be nice to have some mechanism outside the foundation, perhaps we can use the tokens from the DAO treasury?
I think we all agree that the voting supply / voting activity is low, but as @Matt_StableLab is already pointing out, it would not be healthy if the amount of veRARI / the current quorum is āartificiallyā increased by the foundation. I guess a delegate with 50k voting power (like in your calculation example) could actually discourage regular RARI holders from participating.
I support this concern and recommendations. As I suggested before, a cap o 5-10k is already a 2,5 - 5x increase of the current delegations (2k) for active delegates. That seems like a good ratio / incentive to participate to me.
As for the 5k per passed proposal, I would rather suggest the authors split the amount, since they also shared the work.
@forexus regarding rewards in ārealā RARI tokens, I still think it would be a good additional incentive to grant a (small) share of their delegation to active delegates.
The metrics you suggest are difficult to monitor, however. Looking at the proposal, the evaluation for active delegates could be used for this as well.
Thanks, @jengajojo, for this proposal and everyone for the feedback shared.
I wanted to jump in with Foundation POV. Apologies for the long response, but there is a lot to cover - happy to dive deeper in the next proposal review call.
Delegate launchpad program will run again at the end of Q3 - the current cohort is invited to reapply. We believe this is the best way for new delegates to enter the DAO and for current delegates to re-acquire delegations.
The Delegate launchpad is designed to fast-track delegates, who are encouraged to seek community delegations rather than stay sustained via Foundation delegations
Programs that enable concentration of power are problematic - one single delegate should not be able to meet the quorum. Agree with SL that more active delegates with smaller and/or similarly sized distribution is better for decentralised governance than a few whales.
DAO capture via consolidation of voting power is a real threat
veRARI model will be dropped per DAOs discussion and Eugeneās post - timing to coincide with the next Delegate Launchpad cohort
Only RARI tokens the Foundation has available for delegations are under the Delegate Launchpad. Any other program would need its own budget
That said, agree with SL that a single delegation should not supersede 5k veRARI / proposal threshold. The aim here is to empower, which this achieves. The 5k should be delegated only to those with the top delegate scores (see delegate scores on rari.foundation delegate profiles) AND who have been an active delegate for a period of at least 6 months (active delegate as described in RRC 9).
2k bonus should be given only to those 2k delegations or under, an only to a defined number of top delegates (again based on delegate score).
A budget needs to be set for this initiative. E.g. 3x5k delegation + 5x2k delegation = 25k. Iād advocate to wait until veRARI model is dropped, so we donāt undergo costly locks that are soon released.
Given the upgraded governance will not use veRARI token structure, there needs to be a time limit on Foundation delegations. We suggest 6 months - as the Foundation needs to be able to re-delegate if a delegate becomes inactive.
All that said, delegates should really seek community delegations as the Foundation is here to facilitate becoming a delegate and promote diversity in the delegate ranks. Retention should be up to the delegates and their efforts to convince token holders to delegate.