Thanks for putting this together, it’s honestly really helpful for someone like me who’s still getting familiar with how delegate incentives work here. I really like how the fixed-per-activity model rewards genuine participation and transparency rather than just holding voting power.
I do have a small question though, for new delegates who haven’t yet reached the minimum delegated tokens, is there any pathway to start contributing meaningfully while building up to eligibility?
I still fulfilled the requirements for Q3, I believe?
@bitblondy, you didn’t qualify for Q3 because your final two rationales were submitted on October 4th, after the close of the final proposal of the quarter. That proposal closed on October 3rd at 8:15 PM EST, which already served as a brief grace period beyond the official quarter-end of September 30th.
The eligibility rule is the same as the amended framework from Q2:
“Delegates must maintain an active Delegate Thread on the RARI DAO governance forum, posting rationale for each vote during the quarter.”
This rule ensures a timely 1:1 vote-to-rationale ratio for all delegates. Extending the cutoff any further would have meant changing the rules just to accommodate one participant.
Thanks for the clarification @jarisjames.
The last two proposals could equally be Q4, not sure if this is specified, but doesn’t really matter.
More importantly, #RRC-47 (co-authored by you?) further states the following:
"Writing rationales for 100% of onchain votes in a quarter earns 500 RARI. Partial completion will be rewarded proportionally, e.g., rationales for 60% of votes will yield 300 RARI. "
Sounds to me like counting rationals is the way to go.
And @jarisjames I’m sorry to be extra annoying, but since you made me double-check. You seem to miss the last rationale as well.
@bitblondy, The final proposal you’re referring to, the “Treasury Management Empowerment Program” proposal, was published onchain on October 1st, which falls under Q4 voting activity, not Q3.
The Q3 review covers a total of 8 proposals whose voting periods occurred between July 1st and September 30th. Since that one opened in Q4, it will be reflected in the next report instead.
Every Q3 proposal I voted on within that timeframe has a corresponding rationale.
@bitblondy, that’s correct, but the proportional rewards in RRC-47 apply only to delegates who meet the baseline eligibility criteria, which includes maintaining an active Delegate Thread and posting a rationale for each vote during the quarter.
The 1:1 rationale-to-vote rule establishes eligibility first, and proportional rewards are calculated only after that requirement is met. This example is clear with @lionmsee & @Sixty, who voted on 7 out of 8 proposals, and also provided rationales to justify each of their 7 votes withn the voting period that occured within Q3, with the final proposal of the quarter “RRC-52: RARI DAO Security Council Election Proposal”, ending on October 3rd, at 8:15pm EST.
Btw, the last two proposals of the quarter were RRC-51: Establishment of the Rarible Creator Fund Working Group & RRC-52: RARI DAO Security Council Election Proposal, and you posted rationales for each proposal on October 4th, well after the close of Q3, which would be September 30th.
Not sure, if you’re interpreting RRC-47 correctly. Partial rewards make sense, but I hardly believe it was the intention of the program to remove delegates entirely, because they missed posting a rationale.
Is this why you removed other delegates like @DAOplomats @Jaf, or @sohobiit as well?
@bitblondy the program didn’t remove anyone arbitrarily, it followed the same eligibility framework from RRC-47 and the Q2 amendment. Every delegate is required to post a rationale for each of their votes during the quarter to remain eligible.
All qualifying delegates last quarter met that 1:1 vote-to-rationale standard. This quarter, several delegates didn’t, including the ones you mentioned. @Jaf reached out directly and acknowledged the rule once it was clarified.
Posting a rationale for each vote is the bare minimum participation requirement under RRC-47.
I agree with @bitblondy on this.
It feels unfair to remove delegates who have shown consistent interest, participation, and overall good performance from the incentives program.
The rule states:
If this rule is what made me ineligible, I want to clarify that I did maintain an active delegate thread. While I didn’t post my rationale for the last vote on time for different reasons, I don’t think it’s fair to remove me after being active and engaged throughout the entire quarter.
I interpret the program rules somewhat differently, but since the program’s main goal is to motivate delegates to perform well, it feels discouraging in my case.
@Jaf, you didn’t post a rationale for the last 2 votes you made for the quarter, so your statement above is inaccurate.
You didn’t post a rationale for the two following proposals:
RRC-51: Establishment of the Rarible Creator Fund Working Group & RRC-52: RARI DAO Security Council Election Proposal
As mentioned earlier, the eligibility framework from RRC-47 and the Q2 amendment requires a rationale for each vote during the quarter to qualify. You acknowledged this in our earlier telegram exchange as well.
As far as I can see the rules as stated in the proposal are being followed.
I can understand there is disappointment, I would also be disappointed. Best thing to do is to make sure this doesn’t happen in Q4.
Right now it is like it is. Looking forward to see everyone, and new faces, back on the list after Q4!
This infighting and governance theater has got to stop. This is ridiculous. Both of you - @bitblondy and @Jaf participated in passing RRC-47 back in July, and as delegates, it’s your responsibility as a delegate to have the FULL context, knowledge and understanding of all successfully passed votes. And @Jaf you voted in favor of RRC-47 and @bitblondy , your abstain vote still counted for quorum to pass this proposal. If you were both against it then, you would have more than likely voted against it.
So unless any delegates wants to participate in building this DAO and working together, outbursts like these are unproductive and unbecoming traits of delegates who token holders have invested their VP in.
Couldn’t agree more… 
n my opinion, the program shouldn’t exclude good delegates who have shown solid performance.
Perhaps this can serve as a good lesson to improve the program.
no need to start more drama…
Just a suggestion, everything you do is public to all token holders, including those who have chosen to delegate to you. How you respond and act in governance is always transparent.
@Jaf, the program can be improved serveral ways to bring more attnetion to the RARI ecosystem in general. As delegates we can be more active on X as well as forum, to naturally attract potential delegators and new delegates in the first place.
But the current form of the Delegate Incentive Program is very simple. When you vote, post a rationale to justify your vote. The program isn’t asking for much in its current form, this should be the bare minimum for governance participation.
Now, since you and @bitblondy are framing the program as unfair, delegates like @DAOplomats are now posting last minute rationales for Q3 to try and justify being included as well. Without a cutoff date, more and more delegates will try and qualify after the end of the quarter, which diminishes the integrity of the program as if the rules for eligibility doesn’t matter at all.
Besides, a grace period was given in Q1, but now we’re in Q3, with the very same delegates, and in Q2 every delegate posted a rationale for their vote on time, so why is it a problem now?
It’s very imprtant that delegates start reading and comprehending what they vote for onchain as well. If they had done that, rationales would have been posted for each vote on time. And you know that’s not asking for much.
RM!
I think that to prevent this from happening, there should be more transparency and a table of who is actually compliant, because otherwise it becomes ambiguous. How long has it been counted? Does each delegate have time to post their thread as soon as possible? It becomes a rather unhealthy type of competition, and I think what we’re trying to foster is durability on the part of the delegates, but also exponential growth.
Thanks @coffee-crusher for the observation you made. It’s very good, and I agree with what @Jaf says. I find the part about people who have been building for years and with good reason discouraging.
Far from pointing fingers, it’s about growing as a group and decentralizing, not emptying a DAO and then leaving (for example). I love what RARI does and what’s been built around it. Let’s continue creating good things from those of us who are inside.
In my case @jarisjames I’d like to know why I wasn’t included in the Q3 delegate table.
@sohobiit, the Delegate Incentive Program is now in its third consecutive quarter. The amended eligibility rules were clearly outlined in RRC-47, a proposal that you voted for. Those rules specify that delegates must post a rationale for each proposal they vote on within the quarter to qualify for the program.
There were eight proposals in Q3. You voted on five and posted four rationales, breaking the 1:1 vote-to-rationale ratio. You forgot to post a rationale for RRC-52.
Since the program is structured quarterly, delegates have until the close of the quarter to post their rationales, though it’s always best practice to post them shortly after each vote.
As for transparency, the report itself is the table of every delegate who qualified, with each participant’s wallet address, votes, and forum rationales fully hyperlinked for public verification. There’s no ambiguity, all the data is verifiable onchain and on the forum.
The program is not a competition. Every delegate can earn up to 1,500 RARI, independent of anyone else’s results. The cap and fixed-per-activity model were introduced in Q2 after DAO feedback and approved unanimously.
The purpose here isn’t to pit delegates against each other, it’s to maintain clear, consistent standards that apply equally to all delegates. The expectation has always been simple: vote, post a rationale to justify your vote, and do so within the quarter. By Q3, all active delegates should be familiar with how this works.
Hey gm @jarisjames
Thanks for putting this together as always.
Quick one though, you might want to adjust the report to accommodate just the 7 proposals that were active in Q3. From this on Tally, we can see the Security council prop voting period ended October 4, that’s Q4, so it shouldn’t be counted with the Q3 props.
In all the communities I am a part of, this analysis is always done using the timeline of vote end and not start;
and as you rightfully said, review should cover props within this period. The period for the SC prop is Sep 29 - Oct 4.
Edit: adding to the general discussion here…
As a growing community, we don’t want to disincentivize governance participation with these sorts of stringent rules. I understand the 1:1 relationship you mention Jaris, but folks who vote on 8 props but give rationales on 7 shouldn’t be completely excluded for incentives.
Also, speaking on the grace period, the same thing applies; we shouldn’t disincentivize gov participation. I would suggest the original proposal is modified to accommodate rationales at least a week after each quarter, as this would leave room for proposals whose voting period concludes very close to each quarter’s end. If the report for a quarter is coming almost two weeks after the end of the quarter, it only makes sense to allow for these sorts of discrepancies.
@WinVerse could you please clarify which specific “other communities” you’re referring to that use vote-end dates instead of start dates to define quarterly scope? Also can you provide the relevent governance documentation here to serve as evidence? It’s important that such statements are backed with verifiable governance frameworks, not vague claims, expecting us to just take your word for it.
Regarding compliance, DAOplomats did not post a rationale for the Grow3dge Accelerator a proposal that they voted on, which closed on August 3rd, nearly two months before the end of Q3. They also didn’t post a rationale for RRC-52 on (RARI Chain) until two days ago, a full week after the proposal closed on October 3rd at 8:15 PM EST, which already functioned as a natural grace period. So even if we did remove RRC-52 from the Q3 report, DAOplomats will still not be eligible for rewards since you would still be missing a rationale for that vote as well.
Removing RRC-52, as you suggest, would also penalize @coffee-crusher, the proposal author who drafted and deployed it on-chain during Q3 and whose author points are tied to that period. Most delegates voted and posted rationales for it before September 30, all within Q3. Your suggestion would benefit a delegate team who missed the deadline while unfairly removing credit from one who met every rule and contributed on time.
This is exactly why the rationale-per-vote rule exists, it prevents delegates from retroactively batching posts after results are known, which already resulted in a delegate providing a rationale for a proposal they did not vote on, since they submitted all of their ratioanles on the last day of the quarter, as you’re suggesting. Check the “Accountability Note” in the report above. This can easily lead to governance malpractice as delegates may not accurately correlate their rationales with proposals they actually voted for within the quarter if they submit them all last minute. This is not the type of action we should be pushing for. By Q3 we should be following a standard and setting an example of responsible governance participation that follows a natural cadence, not a checkbox activity completed after the quarter closes to collect a stpiend.
The eligibility rules you’re referencing were clearly established in RRC-47, a proposal that you voted for and was approved unanimously by the DAO. Besides, Q1 included a grace period of one week to allow delegates to get adjusted to the program, but by Q3, all active delegates should already be aligned with posting a rationale before the end of the quarter.
Lastly, the report went through Foundation review before publication, since Q3 payments are being distributed directly by the Foundation rather than the DAO treasury. That review ensures accuracy, and accountability, which is why it was finalized after verification rather than rushed out prematurely.
The standard remains simple: vote, post a rationale for each vote you make, and do so within the quarter. That’s not punitive, it’s professional governance.
